BREW-DSTACK-CVE-2026-44307 (GHSA-2H4P-VJRC-8XPQ)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:43 – Updated: 2026-09-30 19:10 – Source websiteSummary
On Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. \..\..\ secret.txt) bypasses the directory traversal check in Template.__init__ and the posixpath-based normalization in TemplateLookup.get_template(), allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.
Details
The root cause is a mismatch between posixpath (used for URI normalization in get_template()) and os.path (used for file access via os.path.isfile() and validation via os.path.normpath() in Template.__init__). On Windows, os.path is ntpath, which treats \ as a path separator, while posixpath treats it as a literal character.
The vulnerability chain:
get_template()strips only leading/viare.sub(r"^\/+", "", uri)and normalizes withposixpath— backslash\is treated as a literal character, so\..\ secret.txtpasses through with..undetected.Template.__init__()validation usesos.path.normpath()— on Windows this resolves\..\ secret.txtto\secret.txt, which does not start with.., so thestartswith("..")check passes.os.path.isfile()on Windows interprets\as a path separator, resolving the..traversal and finding files outside the template directory.
Affected code
mako/lookup.py:TemplateLookup.get_template()usesposixpath.normpath/posixpath.joinfor path construction butos.path.isfile()for existence checkmako/template.py:Template.__init__()URI validation usesos.path.normpath()which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes thestartswith("..")guard
Impact
If an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to TemplateLookup.get_template(), an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.
Remediation
The fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "mako",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/mako@1.4.3",
"upstream_fixed_in": "1.3.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "dstack",
"purl": "pkg:brew/dstack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/mako@1.4.3",
"name": "mako",
"resource": "mako",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "1.4.3"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOn Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. `\\..\\..\\ secret.txt`) bypasses the directory traversal check in `Template.__init__` and the `posixpath`-based normalization in `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.\n\n\n## Details\n\nThe root cause is a mismatch between `posixpath` (used for URI normalization in `get_template()`) and `os.path` (used for file access via `os.path.isfile()` and validation via `os.path.normpath()` in `Template.__init__`). On Windows, `os.path` is `ntpath`, which treats `\\` as a path separator, while `posixpath` treats it as a literal character.\n\nThe vulnerability chain:\n\n1. `get_template()` strips only leading `/` via `re.sub(r\"^\\/+\", \"\", uri)` and normalizes with `posixpath` \u2014 backslash `\\` is treated as a literal character, so `\\..\\ secret.txt` passes through with `..` undetected.\n2. `Template.__init__()` validation uses `os.path.normpath()` \u2014 on Windows this resolves `\\..\\ secret.txt` to `\\secret.txt`, which does not start with `..`, so the `startswith(\"..\")` check passes.\n3. `os.path.isfile()` on Windows interprets `\\` as a path separator, resolving the `..` traversal and finding files outside the template directory.\n\n### Affected code\n\n- `mako/lookup.py`: `TemplateLookup.get_template()` uses `posixpath.normpath`/`posixpath.join` for path construction but `os.path.isfile()` for existence check\n- `mako/template.py`: `Template.__init__()` URI validation uses `os.path.normpath()` which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes the `startswith(\"..\")` guard\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.",
"id": "BREW-dstack-CVE-2026-44307",
"modified": "2026-09-30T19:10:36Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T16:43:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/security/advisories/GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/issues/435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/72e10c573ca0fbcbddd4455abca8ce92a61780d7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/releases/tag/rel_1_3_12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Mako vulnerable to path traversal via backslash URI on Windows in TemplateLookup",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpq",
"CVE-2026-44307",
"PYSEC-2026-2617"
]
}
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