BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-GHSA-2… (GHSA-2858-XG23-26FP)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:24 – Source websiteSummary
OpenClaw accepted camera.snap / camera.clip node payload url fields and downloaded them on the gateway/agent host without binding downloads to the resolved node host.
In OpenClaw's documented trust model, paired nodes are in the same operator trust boundary, so this is scoped as medium-severity hardening. A malicious or compromised paired node could still steer gateway-host fetches during camera URL retrieval.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.2.13 <= 2026.3.1 - Latest vulnerable published version at time of update:
2026.3.1 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.3.2(released)
Technical Details
Vulnerable flows accepted URL payloads and downloaded directly from the provided URL:
- src/cli/nodes-camera.ts (writeUrlToFile) fetched URL payloads without node-host binding.
- src/cli/nodes-cli/register.camera.ts passed camera.snap / camera.clip payload URLs into that downloader.
- src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts did the same for camera_snap / camera_clip tool actions.
Impact
A malicious/compromised paired node could cause gateway-host URL fetches to off-node destinations reachable from the host network. This could be used for internal network probing/fetch pivots in deployments where paired nodes are not fully trusted.
Remediation
The fix introduces fail-closed node-host binding and guarded fetch for camera URL payload downloads: - Require resolved node host metadata for URL payload downloads. - Enforce hostname match between payload URL and resolved node host. - Use SSRF-guarded fetch with redirect host/protocol checks. - Apply the same enforcement across CLI and agent tool camera paths.
Fix Commit(s)
3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.2.13"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.4"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nOpenClaw accepted `camera.snap` / `camera.clip` node payload `url` fields and downloaded them on the gateway/agent host without binding downloads to the resolved node host.\n\nIn OpenClaw\u0027s documented trust model, paired nodes are in the same operator trust boundary, so this is scoped as medium-severity hardening. A malicious or compromised paired node could still steer gateway-host fetches during camera URL retrieval.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.13 \u003c= 2026.3.1`\n- Latest vulnerable published version at time of update: `2026.3.1`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.2` (released)\n\n### Technical Details\nVulnerable flows accepted URL payloads and downloaded directly from the provided URL:\n- `src/cli/nodes-camera.ts` (`writeUrlToFile`) fetched URL payloads without node-host binding.\n- `src/cli/nodes-cli/register.camera.ts` passed `camera.snap` / `camera.clip` payload URLs into that downloader.\n- `src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts` did the same for `camera_snap` / `camera_clip` tool actions.\n\n### Impact\nA malicious/compromised paired node could cause gateway-host URL fetches to off-node destinations reachable from the host network. This could be used for internal network probing/fetch pivots in deployments where paired nodes are not fully trusted.\n\n### Remediation\nThe fix introduces fail-closed node-host binding and guarded fetch for camera URL payload downloads:\n- Require resolved node host metadata for URL payload downloads.\n- Enforce hostname match between payload URL and resolved node host.\n- Use SSRF-guarded fetch with redirect host/protocol checks.\n- Apply the same enforcement across CLI and agent tool camera paths.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533`",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:24:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Node camera URL payload host-binding bypass allowed gateway fetch pivots",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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