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GHSA-2858-XG23-26FP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:18 – Updated: 2026-03-03 21:18
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Node camera URL payload host-binding bypass allowed gateway fetch pivots
Details

Summary

OpenClaw accepted camera.snap / camera.clip node payload url fields and downloaded them on the gateway/agent host without binding downloads to the resolved node host.

In OpenClaw's documented trust model, paired nodes are in the same operator trust boundary, so this is scoped as medium-severity hardening. A malicious or compromised paired node could still steer gateway-host fetches during camera URL retrieval.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: >= 2026.2.13 <= 2026.3.1
  • Latest vulnerable published version at time of update: 2026.3.1
  • Patched versions: >= 2026.3.2 (released)

Technical Details

Vulnerable flows accepted URL payloads and downloaded directly from the provided URL: - src/cli/nodes-camera.ts (writeUrlToFile) fetched URL payloads without node-host binding. - src/cli/nodes-cli/register.camera.ts passed camera.snap / camera.clip payload URLs into that downloader. - src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts did the same for camera_snap / camera_clip tool actions.

Impact

A malicious/compromised paired node could cause gateway-host URL fetches to off-node destinations reachable from the host network. This could be used for internal network probing/fetch pivots in deployments where paired nodes are not fully trusted.

Remediation

The fix introduces fail-closed node-host binding and guarded fetch for camera URL payload downloads: - Require resolved node host metadata for URL payload downloads. - Enforce hostname match between payload URL and resolved node host. - Use SSRF-guarded fetch with redirect host/protocol checks. - Apply the same enforcement across CLI and agent tool camera paths.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.2.13"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:18:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOpenClaw accepted `camera.snap` / `camera.clip` node payload `url` fields and downloaded them on the gateway/agent host without binding downloads to the resolved node host.\n\nIn OpenClaw\u0027s documented trust model, paired nodes are in the same operator trust boundary, so this is scoped as medium-severity hardening. A malicious or compromised paired node could still steer gateway-host fetches during camera URL retrieval.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.13 \u003c= 2026.3.1`\n- Latest vulnerable published version at time of update: `2026.3.1`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.2` (released)\n\n### Technical Details\nVulnerable flows accepted URL payloads and downloaded directly from the provided URL:\n- `src/cli/nodes-camera.ts` (`writeUrlToFile`) fetched URL payloads without node-host binding.\n- `src/cli/nodes-cli/register.camera.ts` passed `camera.snap` / `camera.clip` payload URLs into that downloader.\n- `src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts` did the same for `camera_snap` / `camera_clip` tool actions.\n\n### Impact\nA malicious/compromised paired node could cause gateway-host URL fetches to off-node destinations reachable from the host network. This could be used for internal network probing/fetch pivots in deployments where paired nodes are not fully trusted.\n\n### Remediation\nThe fix introduces fail-closed node-host binding and guarded fetch for camera URL payload downloads:\n- Require resolved node host metadata for URL payload downloads.\n- Enforce hostname match between payload URL and resolved node host.\n- Use SSRF-guarded fetch with redirect host/protocol checks.\n- Apply the same enforcement across CLI and agent tool camera paths.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533`",
  "id": "GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T21:18:56Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:18:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Node camera URL payload host-binding bypass allowed gateway fetch pivots"
}



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