CVE-2019-15027 (GCVE-0-2019-15027)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2019-08-14 12:03
Modified
2024-08-05 00:34
Severity ?
Summary
The MediaTek Embedded Multimedia Card (eMMC) subsystem for Android on MT65xx, MT66xx, and MT8163 SoC devices allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root via shell metacharacters in a filename under /data, because clear_emmc_nomedia_entry in platform/mt6577/external/meta/emmc/meta_clr_emmc.c invokes 'system("/system/bin/rm -r /data/' followed by this filename upon an eMMC clearance from a Meta Mode boot. NOTE: compromise of Fire OS on the Amazon Echo Dot would require a second hypothetical vulnerability that allows creation of the required file under /data.
References
cve@mitre.orghttps://dojo.bullguard.com/dojo-by-bullguard/blog/gaining-rooting-primitives-for-android-mediatek-chips/Exploit, Third Party Advisory
cve@mitre.orghttps://github.com/andr3jx/MTK6577/blob/238012ebf18e3751397884d1742ff7ab6417e80d/mediatek/platform/mt6577/external/meta/emmc/meta_clr_emmc.c#L302-L305Third Party Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://dojo.bullguard.com/dojo-by-bullguard/blog/gaining-rooting-primitives-for-android-mediatek-chips/Exploit, Third Party Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://github.com/andr3jx/MTK6577/blob/238012ebf18e3751397884d1742ff7ab6417e80d/mediatek/platform/mt6577/external/meta/emmc/meta_clr_emmc.c#L302-L305Third Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
n/a n/a Version: n/a
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