CVE-2026-10647 (GCVE-0-2026-10647)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-29 21:39 – Updated: 2026-06-29 21:39
VLAI
Title
Deadlock denial of service in USB CDC-NCM device class on TX enqueue failure
Summary
The USB CDC-NCM device class (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_cdc_ncm.c) ignores the return value of usbd_ep_enqueue() in its ethernet transmit callback cdc_ncm_send(). When the enqueue fails, the function still calls k_sem_take(&data-sync_sem, K_FOREVER), blocking on a completion semaphore that is only ever signaled from the bulk-IN transfer-completion callback. Because nothing was enqueued, that callback never fires and the calling thread — a shared network traffic-class TX thread — deadlocks permanently while holding the interface TX lock, halting transmission until reboot (and leaking the transmit buffer). The enqueue fails under conditions controlled by the attached USB host: usbd_ep_enqueue() returns -EPERM whenever the bus is suspended (a standard, persistent host operation), and the underlying udc_ep_enqueue() returns -EPERM/-ENODEV on disconnect, bus reset, or endpoint disable. The cdc_ncm_send() guard only checks the DATA_IFACE_ENABLED and IFACE_UP flags, not the suspended state, so a packet transmitted while the host holds the bus suspended reaches the failing enqueue and deadlocks the TX path. The realistic trigger is a bus suspend that occurs while the exported network interface is active and has traffic to send — host sleep, USB selective/auto-suspend, or hub power management — after which any device-originated packet deadlocks the path, recoverable only by reboot. The impact is a persistent loss of the virtual network connection between the host's NCM interface and the Zephyr device; because the deadlocked thread is a shared traffic-class TX thread, egress on other network interfaces can stall as well. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure. The defect was introduced with the CDC-NCM driver and shipped in releases through v4.4.0; it is fixed by checking the usbd_ep_enqueue() return value and freeing the buffer before the blocking wait.
CWE
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
zephyrproject zephyr Affected: 4.1.0 , < 4.5.0 (semver)
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          "value": "The USB CDC-NCM device class (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_cdc_ncm.c) ignores the return value of usbd_ep_enqueue() in its ethernet transmit callback cdc_ncm_send(). When the enqueue fails, the function still calls k_sem_take(\u0026data-sync_sem, K_FOREVER), blocking on a completion semaphore that is only ever signaled from the bulk-IN transfer-completion callback. Because nothing was enqueued, that callback never fires and the calling thread \u2014 a shared network traffic-class TX thread \u2014 deadlocks permanently while holding the interface TX lock, halting transmission until reboot (and leaking the transmit buffer).\n\nThe enqueue fails under conditions controlled by the attached USB host: usbd_ep_enqueue() returns -EPERM whenever the bus is suspended (a standard, persistent host operation), and the underlying udc_ep_enqueue() returns -EPERM/-ENODEV on disconnect, bus reset, or endpoint disable. The cdc_ncm_send() guard only checks the DATA_IFACE_ENABLED and IFACE_UP flags, not the suspended state, so a packet transmitted while the host holds the bus suspended reaches the failing enqueue and deadlocks the TX path.\n\nThe realistic trigger is a bus suspend that occurs while the exported network interface is active and has traffic to send \u2014 host sleep, USB selective/auto-suspend, or hub power management \u2014 after which any device-originated packet deadlocks the path, recoverable only by reboot. The impact is a persistent loss of the virtual network connection between the host\u0027s NCM interface and the Zephyr device; because the deadlocked thread is a shared traffic-class TX thread, egress on other network interfaces can stall as well. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure.\n\nThe defect was introduced with the CDC-NCM driver and shipped in releases through v4.4.0; it is fixed by checking the usbd_ep_enqueue() return value and freeing the buffer before the blocking wait."
        }
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        "orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
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          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xcf7-r86m-5q9f"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Deadlock denial of service in USB CDC-NCM device class on TX enqueue failure",
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-10647",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-29T21:39:08.442Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-02T15:11:50.331Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-29T21:39:08.442Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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  }
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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