CVE-2026-12049 (GCVE-0-2026-12049)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-18 23:37 – Updated: 2026-06-18 23:37
VLAI
Title
pgAdmin 4: Open redirect in multi-factor authentication flow via unvalidated 'next' parameter
Summary
Open redirect in pgAdmin 4's multi-factor authentication flow. The MFA validate and register endpoints honoured the user-supplied 'next' query/form parameter without confirming the target pointed back inside pgAdmin, so an authenticated victim who clicked /mfa/validate?next=<external> -- a link typically delivered by phishing -- would be sent to an attacker-controlled host directly out of the trusted auth flow. The defect is a trusted-domain redirect, not a privilege bypass: the attacker gains no read/write access to pgAdmin or the victim's database, but the redirect launders the attacker's destination through pgAdmin's URL, which raises the success rate of credential-phishing follow-on against the victim. Fix introduces a same-origin _is_safe_redirect_url helper and gates every MFA redirect that consumes user-supplied 'next' values through it. The helper allows only relative paths and absolute URLs whose scheme is http(s) and whose host matches the current request host; it rejects external hosts in absolute and protocol-relative form, non-http schemes (javascript:, data:, mailto:), userinfo tricks (http://localhost@attacker/), and backslash variants that some browsers normalize to forward slashes. Unsafe targets fall back to the internal browser index. A dedicated regression test exercises each accept/reject category and the original reporter PoC. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16.
CWE
  • CWE-601 - URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4 Affected: 6.0 , < 9.16 (custom)
Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Mai Phạm Hiền <mai.phamhien171@gmail.com> Dave Page <page@pgadmin.org> Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "Authentication",
            "Multi-Factor Authentication"
          ],
          "product": "pgAdmin 4",
          "programFiles": [
            "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/authenticate/mfa/views.py"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4",
          "vendor": "pgadmin.org",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "9.16",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Mai Ph\u1ea1m Hi\u1ec1n \u003cmai.phamhien171@gmail.com\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Dave Page \u003cpage@pgadmin.org\u003e"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation reviewer",
          "value": "Kundan Sable \u003ckundan.sable@enterprisedb.com\u003e"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Open redirect in pgAdmin 4\u0027s multi-factor authentication flow. The MFA validate and register endpoints honoured the user-supplied \u0027next\u0027 query/form parameter without confirming the target pointed back inside pgAdmin, so an authenticated victim who clicked /mfa/validate?next=\u003cexternal\u003e -- a link typically delivered by phishing -- would be sent to an attacker-controlled host directly out of the trusted auth flow.\n\nThe defect is a trusted-domain redirect, not a privilege bypass: the attacker gains no read/write access to pgAdmin or the victim\u0027s database, but the redirect launders the attacker\u0027s destination through pgAdmin\u0027s URL, which raises the success rate of credential-phishing follow-on against the victim.\n\nFix introduces a same-origin _is_safe_redirect_url helper and gates every MFA redirect that consumes user-supplied \u0027next\u0027 values through it. The helper allows only relative paths and absolute URLs whose scheme is http(s) and whose host matches the current request host; it rejects external hosts in absolute and protocol-relative form, non-http schemes (javascript:, data:, mailto:), userinfo tricks (http://localhost@attacker/), and backslash variants that some browsers normalize to forward slashes. Unsafe targets fall back to the internal browser index. A dedicated regression test exercises each accept/reject category and the original reporter PoC.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 4.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Attacker delivers a crafted /mfa/validate?next=\u003cexternal\u003e URL to a logged-in pgAdmin user (typically via phishing). The endpoint requires login_required so the victim must already be authenticated to pgAdmin -- but the *attacker* needs no pgAdmin privileges at all to construct and deliver the link (PR:N). UI:R captures the click. Scope is unchanged: the defect does not grant the attacker access to pgAdmin\u0027s authority or the victim\u0027s database session; it only launders the attacker\u0027s destination through pgAdmin\u0027s URL, which raises credential-phishing success rates. C:N and A:N follow from the same reasoning; I:L acknowledges the integrity impact of an authenticated-flow redirect that lends pgAdmin\u0027s trust to an attacker domain.\n\nReviewer note (Dave Page, 2026-06-11): defensible at 4.3 for a token-free open redirect. Heads-up that NVD house style for open redirects often lands at S:C/C:L/I:L -\u003e 6.1, so expect a possible upward rescore by the NVD analyst."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: the attacker needs no pgAdmin privileges to craft the link, the victim must click it (UI:P), and the defect grants no new vulnerable-system or subsequent-system capability beyond a trusted-domain redirect that aids downstream phishing (VI:L only)."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-601",
              "description": "CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (\u0027Open Redirect\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:43.328Z",
        "orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
        "shortName": "PostgreSQL"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10028"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/fff6a481854b07822c2b54e8181e6a9076d204cd"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "pgAdmin 4: Open redirect in multi-factor authentication flow via unvalidated \u0027next\u0027 parameter"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
    "assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-12049",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-18T23:37:43.328Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T20:40:09.111Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:43.328Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}


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