CVE-2026-15460 (GCVE-0-2026-15460)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-09 22:40 – Updated: 2026-09-10 17:50
VLAI
Title
Missing channel-state validation in Zephyr Bluetooth Classic L2CAP receive path
Summary
The Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP receive handler bt_l2cap_br_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c dispatched inbound data PDUs based only on the destination channel ID, without checking that the target channel had reached the BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED state. A dynamic channel is assigned its RX CID and added to the connection's channel list while still in BT_L2CAP_CONNECTING (and later BT_L2CAP_CONFIG) — before configuration completes and, for PSMs that require security, before the peer is authenticated (l2cap_br_conn_req()). Because the channel is already findable by bt_l2cap_br_lookup_rx_cid() during this window, a remote peer within radio range can send a data PDU addressed to that CID and have it processed on a not-yet-established channel. The dispatch keys off channel fields (BR_CHAN(chan)->rx.mode, rx.mps) that are only initialized during configuration by l2cap_br_conf(); since channel objects are pooled and bt_l2cap_br_chan_del() does not reset rx.mode or the reassembly buffer _sdu, a reused channel can carry stale state into the CONNECTING window and route the frame into the retransmission/flow-control path (bt_l2cap_br_ret_fc_recv()) with stale parameters and a possibly stale _sdu pointer. The impact is delivery of attacker data to upper-layer protocol handlers on a half-open (and possibly unauthenticated) channel, plus operation on stale or partially initialized channel state on reused channel objects — leading to channel/link teardown (denial of service) and, in the stale-_sdu case, a dangling-pointer condition. The fix adds an explicit BR_CHAN(chan)->state < BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED guard that drops any data received before the channel is fully connected.
Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-10 17:50 UTC
CWE
Assigner
zephyr CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard B 77/100 over 200 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
zephyrproject zephyr Affected: 1.6.0 , < 4.4.2 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
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