CVE-2026-23199 (GCVE-0-2026-23199)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-14 16:27 – Updated: 2026-02-14 16:27
VLAI?
Title
procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock
Fix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock
or per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid
deadlock reported by syzbot:
-> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
__might_fault+0xed/0x170
_copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720
copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0
filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0
blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0
vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
__lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0
lock_acquire+0x185/0x340
down_read+0x98/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0
__kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90
freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80
__build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0
do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050
procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
*** DEADLOCK ***
This seems to be exacerbated (as we haven't seen these syzbot reports
before that) by the recent:
777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")
To make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but
other than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()
API assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so
just add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed
directly.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc]
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
ed5d583a88a9207b866c14ba834984c6f3c51d23 , < b9b97e6aeb534315f9646b2090d1a5024c6a4e82
(git)
Affected: ed5d583a88a9207b866c14ba834984c6f3c51d23 , < cbc03ce3e6ce7e21214c3f02218213574c1a2d08 (git) Affected: ed5d583a88a9207b866c14ba834984c6f3c51d23 , < b5cbacd7f86f4f62b8813688c8e73be94e8e1951 (git) |
||
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/proc/task_mmu.c",
"include/linux/buildid.h",
"lib/buildid.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b9b97e6aeb534315f9646b2090d1a5024c6a4e82",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ed5d583a88a9207b866c14ba834984c6f3c51d23",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cbc03ce3e6ce7e21214c3f02218213574c1a2d08",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ed5d583a88a9207b866c14ba834984c6f3c51d23",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b5cbacd7f86f4f62b8813688c8e73be94e8e1951",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ed5d583a88a9207b866c14ba834984c6f3c51d23",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/proc/task_mmu.c",
"include/linux/buildid.h",
"lib/buildid.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.70",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.70",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.10",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.11",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nprocfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock\n\nFix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock\nor per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid\ndeadlock reported by syzbot:\n\n -\u003e #1 (\u0026mm-\u003emmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:\n __might_fault+0xed/0x170\n _copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720\n copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0\n filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0\n blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0\n vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0\n ksys_read+0x12a/0x250\n do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\n -\u003e #0 (\u0026sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:\n __lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0\n lock_acquire+0x185/0x340\n down_read+0x98/0x490\n blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0\n __kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90\n freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80\n __build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0\n do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050\n procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210\n do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\n other info that might help us debug this:\n\n Possible unsafe locking scenario:\n\n CPU0 CPU1\n ---- ----\n rlock(\u0026mm-\u003emmap_lock);\n lock(\u0026sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_key#8);\n lock(\u0026mm-\u003emmap_lock);\n rlock(\u0026sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_key#8);\n\n *** DEADLOCK ***\n\nThis seems to be exacerbated (as we haven\u0027t seen these syzbot reports\nbefore that) by the recent:\n\n\t777a8560fd29 (\"lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context\")\n\nTo make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but\nother than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()\nAPI assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so\njust add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed\ndirectly.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc]"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-02-14T16:27:24.326Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9b97e6aeb534315f9646b2090d1a5024c6a4e82"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbc03ce3e6ce7e21214c3f02218213574c1a2d08"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5cbacd7f86f4f62b8813688c8e73be94e8e1951"
}
],
"title": "procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-23199",
"datePublished": "2026-02-14T16:27:24.326Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:45.985Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-02-14T16:27:24.326Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-23199\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-02-14T17:15:57.743\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-02-14T17:15:57.743\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nprocfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock\\n\\nFix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock\\nor per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid\\ndeadlock reported by syzbot:\\n\\n -\u003e #1 (\u0026mm-\u003emmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:\\n __might_fault+0xed/0x170\\n _copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720\\n copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0\\n filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0\\n blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0\\n vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0\\n ksys_read+0x12a/0x250\\n do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80\\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\\n\\n -\u003e #0 (\u0026sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:\\n __lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0\\n lock_acquire+0x185/0x340\\n down_read+0x98/0x490\\n blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0\\n __kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90\\n freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80\\n __build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0\\n do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050\\n procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0\\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210\\n do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80\\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\\n\\n other info that might help us debug this:\\n\\n Possible unsafe locking scenario:\\n\\n CPU0 CPU1\\n ---- ----\\n rlock(\u0026mm-\u003emmap_lock);\\n lock(\u0026sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_key#8);\\n lock(\u0026mm-\u003emmap_lock);\\n rlock(\u0026sb-\u003es_type-\u003ei_mutex_key#8);\\n\\n *** DEADLOCK ***\\n\\nThis seems to be exacerbated (as we haven\u0027t seen these syzbot reports\\nbefore that) by the recent:\\n\\n\\t777a8560fd29 (\\\"lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context\\\")\\n\\nTo make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but\\nother than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()\\nAPI assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so\\njust add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed\\ndirectly.\\n\\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc]\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5cbacd7f86f4f62b8813688c8e73be94e8e1951\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9b97e6aeb534315f9646b2090d1a5024c6a4e82\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbc03ce3e6ce7e21214c3f02218213574c1a2d08\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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