CVE-2026-23225 (GCVE-0-2026-23225)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-18 14:53 – Updated: 2026-02-18 14:53
VLAI?
Title
sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch
Shinichiro reported a KASAN UAF, which is actually an out of bounds access
in the MMCID management code.
CPU0 CPU1
T1 runs in userspace
T0: fork(T4) -> Switch to per CPU CID mode
fixup() set MM_CID_TRANSIT on T1/CPU1
T4 exit()
T3 exit()
T2 exit()
T1 exit() switch to per task mode
---> Out of bounds access.
As T1 has not scheduled after T0 set the TRANSIT bit, it exits with the
TRANSIT bit set. sched_mm_cid_remove_user() clears the TRANSIT bit in
the task and drops the CID, but it does not touch the per CPU storage.
That's functionally correct because a CID is only owned by the CPU when
the ONCPU bit is set, which is mutually exclusive with the TRANSIT flag.
Now sched_mm_cid_exit() assumes that the CID is CPU owned because the
prior mode was per CPU. It invokes mm_drop_cid_on_cpu() which clears the
not set ONCPU bit and then invokes clear_bit() with an insanely large
bit number because TRANSIT is set (bit 29).
Prevent that by actually validating that the CID is CPU owned in
mm_drop_cid_on_cpu().
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/mmcid: Don\u0027t assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch\n\nShinichiro reported a KASAN UAF, which is actually an out of bounds access\nin the MMCID management code.\n\n CPU0\t\t\t\t\t\tCPU1\n \t\t\t\t\t\tT1 runs in userspace\n T0: fork(T4) -\u003e Switch to per CPU CID mode\n fixup() set MM_CID_TRANSIT on T1/CPU1\n T4 exit()\n T3 exit()\n T2 exit()\n\t\t\t\t\t\tT1 exit() switch to per task mode\n\t\t\t\t\t\t ---\u003e Out of bounds access.\n\nAs T1 has not scheduled after T0 set the TRANSIT bit, it exits with the\nTRANSIT bit set. sched_mm_cid_remove_user() clears the TRANSIT bit in\nthe task and drops the CID, but it does not touch the per CPU storage.\nThat\u0027s functionally correct because a CID is only owned by the CPU when\nthe ONCPU bit is set, which is mutually exclusive with the TRANSIT flag.\n\nNow sched_mm_cid_exit() assumes that the CID is CPU owned because the\nprior mode was per CPU. It invokes mm_drop_cid_on_cpu() which clears the\nnot set ONCPU bit and then invokes clear_bit() with an insanely large\nbit number because TRANSIT is set (bit 29).\n\nPrevent that by actually validating that the CID is CPU owned in\nmm_drop_cid_on_cpu()."
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"dateUpdated": "2026-02-18T14:53:28.387Z",
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81f29975631db8a78651b3140ecd0f88ffafc476"
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"title": "sched/mmcid: Don\u0027t assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch",
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-23225",
"datePublished": "2026-02-18T14:53:28.387Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:45.987Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-02-18T14:53:28.387Z",
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}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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