GHSA-P525-H9PQ-233R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-18 18:30
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/mmcid: Don't assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch

Shinichiro reported a KASAN UAF, which is actually an out of bounds access in the MMCID management code.

CPU0 CPU1 T1 runs in userspace T0: fork(T4) -> Switch to per CPU CID mode fixup() set MM_CID_TRANSIT on T1/CPU1 T4 exit() T3 exit() T2 exit() T1 exit() switch to per task mode ---> Out of bounds access.

As T1 has not scheduled after T0 set the TRANSIT bit, it exits with the TRANSIT bit set. sched_mm_cid_remove_user() clears the TRANSIT bit in the task and drops the CID, but it does not touch the per CPU storage. That's functionally correct because a CID is only owned by the CPU when the ONCPU bit is set, which is mutually exclusive with the TRANSIT flag.

Now sched_mm_cid_exit() assumes that the CID is CPU owned because the prior mode was per CPU. It invokes mm_drop_cid_on_cpu() which clears the not set ONCPU bit and then invokes clear_bit() with an insanely large bit number because TRANSIT is set (bit 29).

Prevent that by actually validating that the CID is CPU owned in mm_drop_cid_on_cpu().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-18T16:22:32Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/mmcid: Don\u0027t assume CID is CPU owned on mode switch\n\nShinichiro reported a KASAN UAF, which is actually an out of bounds access\nin the MMCID management code.\n\n   CPU0\t\t\t\t\t\tCPU1\n   \t\t\t\t\t\tT1 runs in userspace\n   T0: fork(T4) -\u003e Switch to per CPU CID mode\n         fixup() set MM_CID_TRANSIT on T1/CPU1\n   T4 exit()\n   T3 exit()\n   T2 exit()\n\t\t\t\t\t\tT1 exit() switch to per task mode\n\t\t\t\t\t\t ---\u003e Out of bounds access.\n\nAs T1 has not scheduled after T0 set the TRANSIT bit, it exits with the\nTRANSIT bit set. sched_mm_cid_remove_user() clears the TRANSIT bit in\nthe task and drops the CID, but it does not touch the per CPU storage.\nThat\u0027s functionally correct because a CID is only owned by the CPU when\nthe ONCPU bit is set, which is mutually exclusive with the TRANSIT flag.\n\nNow sched_mm_cid_exit() assumes that the CID is CPU owned because the\nprior mode was per CPU. It invokes mm_drop_cid_on_cpu() which clears the\nnot set ONCPU bit and then invokes clear_bit() with an insanely large\nbit number because TRANSIT is set (bit 29).\n\nPrevent that by actually validating that the CID is CPU owned in\nmm_drop_cid_on_cpu().",
  "id": "GHSA-p525-h9pq-233r",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T18:30:40Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T18:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81f29975631db8a78651b3140ecd0f88ffafc476"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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