{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "og-image",
          "vendor": "nuxt-modules",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 6.2.5, \u003c 6.4.9"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Nuxt OG Image generates OG Images with Vue templates in Nuxt. The isBlockedUrl() denylist introduced in nuxt-og-image@6.2.5 to remediate GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp (Dmitry Prokhorov / Positive Technologies, March 2026) is incomplete. It has an incomplete IPv6 prefix list and is missing redirect re-validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.4.9."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-44589",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:50:53.060",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 3.7,
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-44589",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-05-14T19:42:41.587185Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-14T19:16:38.007",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-modules/og-image/security/advisories/GHSA-c2rm-g55x-8hr5"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nuxt-og-image"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.2.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44589"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T20:52:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `isBlockedUrl()` denylist introduced in `nuxt-og-image@6.2.5` to remediate **GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp** (Dmitry Prokhorov / Positive Technologies, March 2026) is incomplete. The patch advisory states \"Decimal/hexadecimal IP encoding bypasses are also handled\" \u2014 that part is true (Node\u0027s WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes those forms before validation), but the v6.2.5 implementation misses two independent surfaces in the latest release `6.4.8`:\n\n1. **IPv6 prefix list is incomplete.** The IPv6 branch checks only `bare === \"::1\" || startsWith(\"fc\") || startsWith(\"fd\") || startsWith(\"fe80\")`. It misses:\n   - `[::ffff:7f00:1]` \u2014 IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback in pure-hex form (RE_MAPPED_V4 regex requires dotted-quad). **Reaches 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 host with no other primitive needed.**\n   - `[fec0::/10]` (RFC 3879 site-local \u2014 deprecated but still routable on legacy networks)\n   - `[5f00::/16]` (RFC 9602 SRv6 SIDs)\n   - `[3fff::/20]` (RFC 9637 IPv6 documentation v2)\n   - `[64:ff9b:1::/48]` (RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use, including embedded IPv4 loopback `[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]`)\n\n2. **No redirect re-validation.** `isBlockedUrl` runs once on the initial `\u003cimg src\u003e`. The subsequent `$fetch(decodedSrc, ...)` (ofetch, default redirect-follow) follows 30x responses with no second-pass validation. Any allowed origin that returns a 302 to an internal IP \u2014 S3 redirect rules, GCS, Azure, CloudFront, any user-content CDN where the attacker can place a single redirect \u2014 completes the SSRF.\n\nThe net result is that the v6.2.5 SSRF advisory is bypassable in two distinct ways. The same root family as #29 / #38 (ipx) but in a **different code path with different gaps** \u2014 `nuxt-og-image` does not delegate to `ipx`, it ships its own validator, and that validator has fresh issues that survived the prior fix.\n\n## Affected\n\n| Package          | Version           | Role                                                |\n|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n| `nuxt-og-image`  | `6.4.8` (latest)  | default OG-image generator for Nuxt apps            |\n| `@nuxtjs/og-image` (alias) | same          | re-export, same code path                            |\n\nThe vulnerable code lives in `dist/runtime/server/og-image/core/plugins/imageSrc.js` and is enforced for every `\u003cimg src\u003e` (and `style=\"background-image: url(...)\"`) inside an OG image component, on production builds (`!import.meta.dev`).\n\n## Vulnerable code (`imageSrc.js`, verbatim)\n\n```js\nfunction isPrivateIPv4(a, b) {\n  if (a === 127) return true;\n  if (a === 10) return true;\n  if (a === 172 \u0026\u0026 b \u003e= 16 \u0026\u0026 b \u003c= 31) return true;\n  if (a === 192 \u0026\u0026 b === 168) return true;\n  if (a === 169 \u0026\u0026 b === 254) return true;\n  if (a === 0) return true;\n  return false;\n}\nfunction isBlockedUrl(url) {\n  let parsed;\n  try { parsed = new URL(url); } catch { return true; }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== \"http:\" \u0026\u0026 parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") return true;\n  const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();\n  const bare = hostname.replace(RE_IPV6_BRACKETS, \"\");\n  if (bare === \"localhost\" || bare.endsWith(\".localhost\")) return true;\n  const mappedV4 = bare.match(RE_MAPPED_V4);   // /^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$/\n  const ip = mappedV4 ? mappedV4[1] : bare;\n  const parts = ip.split(\".\");\n  if (parts.length === 4 \u0026\u0026 parts.every((p) =\u003e RE_DIGIT_ONLY.test(p))) {\n    /* dotted-decimal IPv4 path */\n  }\n  if (RE_INT_IP.test(ip)) {\n    /* single-integer IPv4 path */\n  }\n  if (bare === \"::1\" || bare.startsWith(\"fc\") || bare.startsWith(\"fd\") || bare.startsWith(\"fe80\"))\n    return true;                                  // \u2190 gap: only 4 IPv6 prefixes\n  return false;                                   // \u2190 everything else is \"public\"\n}\n\n// Then:\nasync function doResolveSrcToBuffer(src, kind, ctx) {\n  ...\n  if (!import.meta.dev \u0026\u0026 isBlockedUrl(decodedSrc)) {\n    return { blocked: true };\n  }\n  const buffer = await $fetch(decodedSrc, {     // \u2190 follows 30x by default\n    responseType: \"arrayBuffer\",\n    timeout: fetchTimeout,\n  });\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nTwo distinct issues:\n\n- **The IPv6 prefix list is hand-rolled** (`fc`, `fd`, `fe80`, `::1`) and inherits no taxonomy from `ipaddr.js` or any RFC table.\n- **`$fetch` is `ofetch`**, which wraps Node `fetch()` with default `redirect: \"follow\"`. The validator does not run on the redirect target.\n\n## Reproducer (verbatim, no host privilege)\n\nEnd-to-end test of `isBlockedUrl` on a corpus of internal-IP forms, paired with empirical `fetch()` confirming which forms actually reach loopback. Verbatim output:\n\n```\n  isBlockedUrl?  fetch reaches loopback?  url\n  -------------  -----------------------  ---\n  \u2713 blocked      YES                      http://127.0.0.1:8765/             (control: dotted-decimal loopback)\n  \u2713 blocked      YES                      http://localhost:8765/             (control)\n  \u2713 blocked      no(ECONNREFUSED)         http://[::1]:8765/                 (control: IPv6 loopback)\n  \u2713 blocked      no(EHOSTUNREACH)         http://169.254.169.254:8765/       (control: AWS IMDS)\n  \u2713 blocked      YES                      http://2130706433:8765/            (control: decimal-int IPv4)\n  \u2713 blocked      YES                      http://0x7f000001:8765/            (control: hex-int IPv4)\n  \u2713 blocked      YES                      http://0177.0.0.1:8765/            (control: octal \u2014 URL parser canonicalizes)\n  \u2713 blocked      YES                      http://127.1:8765/                 (control: shorthand \u2014 URL parser canonicalizes)\n\n  \u2717 NOT blocked  YES                      http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:8765/       (BYPASS: IPv6-mapped, hex form)\n  \u2717 NOT blocked  no(unreachable)          http://[fec0::1]:8765/             (BYPASS: RFC 3879 site-local)\n  \u2717 NOT blocked  no(unreachable)          http://[5f00::1]:8765/             (BYPASS: RFC 9602 SRv6)\n  \u2717 NOT blocked  no(unreachable)          http://[3fff::1]:8765/             (BYPASS: RFC 9637 docs)\n  \u2717 NOT blocked  no(unreachable)          http://[64:ff9b:1::1]:8765/        (BYPASS: RFC 8215 NAT64)\n  \u2717 NOT blocked  no(unreachable)          http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]:8765/   (BYPASS: NAT64 + embedded loopback)\n```\n\nThe first six bypass rows say \"\u2717 NOT blocked\" \u2014 that is `isBlockedUrl` returning `false` (i.e., \"this URL is fine to fetch\") for each of those addresses. The \"fetch reaches loopback\" column shows that `[::ffff:7f00:1]` actually round-trips to 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 dev box; the four cluster ranges are unreachable on the dev box but succeed on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 / SRv6 networks where any of these prefixes is internally bound.\n\nThe \"control\" rows confirm the bypass set is minimal \u2014 the validator catches the obvious cases. The bypasses are the cases the prefix list forgot.\n\n### Class 2: redirect amplifier\n\n`$fetch(url, { responseType: \"arrayBuffer\", timeout })` follows 30x by default. Confirmed empirically \u2014 `ofetch(\u0027http://lab.menna.website/test/redirect-to-loopback\u0027)` (where `lab.menna.website` returns `302 Location: http://127.0.0.1/`) ends with `\u003cno response\u003e fetch failed` after the connect attempt to `127.0.0.1:80`, proving the redirect was followed. On a target where the redirect destination has a service bound, the bytes round-trip back through the OG renderer.\n\nSame primitive as #29 / #38 (ipx redirect bypass), in a different validator. The fix recommendations for #29 also apply here, with the same trade-offs.\n\n## Impact\n\nA Nuxt application that uses `nuxt-og-image` (the official-recommended OG generator) and includes any user-influenced URL in an OG component is vulnerable to SSRF that returns the bytes of the internal response as part of the rendered OG image:\n\n- **Class 1 directly:** `\u003cimg src=\"http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:PORT/path\"\u003e` reaches 127.0.0.1 on the OG worker. If the dev\u0027s deployment has anything bound to loopback (admin dashboards, internal HTTP-RPC, Redis HTTP UI, anything running alongside the function on the same machine in self-hosted setups), it leaks.\n- **Class 1 cluster:** the IPv6 cluster ranges trigger only on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 networks \u2014 but those are exactly the production targets where SSRF matters most.\n- **Class 2 redirect:** any allowed CDN with a redirect rule extends the reach to all RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local space.\n\n`nuxt-og-image` is the OG-image module recommended in Nuxt\u0027s official documentation; it is shipped with Nuxt UI templates and is one of the top-2 Nuxt modules by GitHub stars. The user-facing primitive in real apps is \"title/avatar comes from a request param\" \u2014 exactly the same `\u003cNuxtLink to=\"/og?avatar=...\"\u003e` pattern Nuxt docs encourage.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nThree non-exclusive options:\n\n1. **Replace the hand-rolled IPv6 prefix list with `ipaddr.js`\u0027s `range()` predicate** (or equivalent), then either:\n   - explicitly deny the four cluster ranges that `ipaddr.js` currently misses (`fec0::/10`, `5f00::/16`, `3fff::/20`, `64:ff9b:1::/48`), or\n   - wait for the `ipaddr.js` upstream patch (see Vercel #27 \u2014 same gap, separately disclosed) and bump.\n   - In any case, also catch `[::ffff:7f00:1]` either by widening `RE_MAPPED_V4` or by classifying any `::ffff:` address as the embedded IPv4.\n\n2. **Pass `redirect: \"manual\"` in `$fetch` defaults** and reject 3xx. (Compare `astro:assets`, which already does this \u2014 `await fetch(url, { redirect: \"manual\" })` and explicit 3xx-rejection.)\n\n3. **Pin the validated IP to the connection.** Resolve the hostname once during validation, then pass a custom `undici.Agent` with `connect.lookup` returning the resolved IP only. This closes both the IPv6 bypass class (the resolved IP is checked again) and the redirect class (post-30x lookup is forced to the original IP). Reference: `request-filtering-agent` on npm.\n\n(2) alone closes Class 2. (1) alone closes Class 1. (3) closes both with one change.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2rm-g55x-8hr5",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:44:55Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T20:52:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-modules/og-image/security/advisories/GHSA-c2rm-g55x-8hr5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44589"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt-modules/og-image"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nuxt-og-image SSRF \u2014 bypass of GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp / v6.2.5 fix (IPv6 + redirect)"
}