CVE-2026-46585 (GCVE-0-2026-46585)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-06 08:03 – Updated: 2026-07-06 19:24
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache Camel Lucene: The query control headers used non-Camel-prefixed names (QUERY, RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS) that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to inject the full-text search query
Summary
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Lucene Component.
The camel-lucene producer reads the search phrase from an Exchange header (LuceneConstants.HEADER_QUERY) whose value was the plain string QUERY (and RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS for HEADER_RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS). Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that exposes a Lucene query operation behind an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http), any HTTP client could therefore set the QUERY header and have its value executed against the full-text index, overriding the query the route intended to run. Depending on what is indexed, this allows reading documents the request should not have access to (for example a match-all query returns the entire index, or the route's intended per-user filter can be replaced), and expensive regular-expression queries can consume significant CPU. No credentials are required when the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set the query via the raw header name must use CamelLuceneQuery (and CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs) instead of QUERY / RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the attacker-controllable headers before the Lucene producer and set the query from a trusted source (for example removeHeader('QUERY') and removeHeader('RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS'), then setHeader('QUERY', constant(...)) at the start of the route).
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-06 19:24 UTC
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46585.html | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0… |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Camel Lucene |
Affected:
4.0.0 , < 4.14.8
(semver)
Affected: 4.15.0 , < 4.18.3 (semver) Affected: 4.19.0 , < 4.21.0 (semver) |
guessed |
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"assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
"assignerShortName": "apache",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-46585",
"datePublished": "2026-07-06T08:03:16.498Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-15T07:54:48.302Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T19:24:45.975Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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