CVE-2026-49820 (GCVE-0-2026-49820)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 14:36 – Updated: 2026-08-14 15:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization
Summary
Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). Prior to version 0.19.3.1, the validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like `/../\evil.com` passed validation because the second character is `.`. Go's `http.Redirect` normalizes this path to `/\evil.com` before setting the `Location` header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (`https://evil.com`), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a `continue` parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere. This is fixed in `go.probo.inc/probo` 0.193.1 by normalizing relative paths with `path.Clean` before validation, rejecting backslashes (including percent-encoded `%5c`) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes. Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to probod v0.194.1 or later. SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched. No practical workaround is available for self-hosted installations.
Severity
4.7 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-14 15:40 UTC
CWE
- CWE-601 - URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/adviso… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/getprobo/probo/blob/main/SECUR… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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