{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "koel",
          "vendor": "koel",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 9.7.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Koel is a free, open-source music streaming solution. Prior to 9.7.1, outbound podcast and radio fetch paths perform a point-in-time App\\Helpers\\Network::isPublicHost() or isSafeUrl() check without pinning the validated address, and most paths lack redirect-hop validation and do not revalidate every redirect target. PhanAn\\Poddle\\Poddle::fromUrl(), PodcastService::getStreamableUrl(), PodcastService::isPodcastObsolete(), App\\Rules\\HasAudioContentType, and App\\Rules\\SafeUrl can therefore follow an attacker-controlled redirect to an internal address or connect after DNS rebinding changes a public resolution to a private one. These paths are reachable through podcast and radio APIs, including createPodcastChannel, createInternetRadioStation, refreshPodcasts, apiResource podcasts, and radio/stations, allowing an authenticated user to request internal services or cloud metadata and potentially receive parsed or streamed response content. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-54491",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-19T21:16:57.453",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-19T21:16:57.453",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/commit/5f6ce2cefd08f437a269236b677ad971517ccbb6"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/commit/c264a3d52513a83b21e1cc3a20e895caea97fc4a"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/pull/2546"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/pull/2549"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/releases/tag/v9.7.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/security/advisories/GHSA-6qvr-wjmv-v8mm"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.7.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phanan/koel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54491"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T17:59:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe fix for **CVE-2026-47260** (v9.3.5) added an **initial** `isSafeUrl()` check to several fetchers (`synchronizeEpisodes`, `getStreamableUrl`, `AddRadioStation`, `EpisodePlayable`), but the **redirect-target validation** \u2014 the per-hop Guzzle `on_redirect` callback added in follow-up commit `be1e867` \u2014 was applied to **only one** path, `EpisodePlayable`. Every other server-side fetcher therefore has **only the initial check, which an HTTP 302 redirect to an internal address bypasses**, or no check at all. **DNS rebinding** (validation and connection resolve DNS separately, with no IP pinning) bypasses the initial check on every path.\n\nAn **authenticated, non-admin** user can thus cause the Koel server to issue requests to arbitrary internal / cloud-metadata endpoints (SSRF) by supplying a URL on an attacker-controlled host that 302-redirects to an internal address.\n\n\u003e Note: commit `be1e867` shows the redirect-based SSRF vector was recognised, but the redirect defense was applied to a single call site rather than generalised \u2014 so the class survives in the sibling paths below.\n\n### Details \u2014 Root cause\n\n`App\\Helpers\\Network::isPublicHost()` / `isSafeUrl()` perform a **point-in-time host check** with no pinning of the resolved IP, and **per-redirect-hop** re-validation exists **only** in `App\\Values\\Podcast\\EpisodePlayable` (the `on_redirect` callback from commit `be1e867`). Consequently every other fetcher is exposed to (1) **redirect SSRF** \u2014 initial URL passes `isSafeUrl`, then the HTTP client follows a cross-host 302 to an internal target without re-validating the hop; and (2) **DNS rebinding (TOCTOU)** \u2014 `isPublicHost` resolves DNS at validation, the HTTP client resolves again at connect time.\n\n### Affected paths (all reachable by any authenticated user)\n\n| # | Location | Issue |\n|---|----------|-------|\n| 1 | `PhanAn\\Poddle\\Poddle::fromUrl()` \u2192 `Http::timeout()-\u003eget($url)` (used by `PodcastService::addPodcast`/`refreshPodcast`) | Plain `Http::get`, follows redirects, no per-hop validation; `refreshPodcast` does not re-run `isSafeUrl` at all |\n| 2 | `PodcastService::getStreamableUrl()` (`PodcastService.php:244`/`251`) | Has the initial `isSafeUrl()` (line 244) but the request uses `ALLOW_REDIRECTS =\u003e [\u0027track_redirects\u0027 =\u003e true]` with **no `on_redirect`** \u2192 302 to internal is followed. Called at episode stream time via `PodcastStreamerAdapter`. Also DNS-rebinding-exposed |\n| 3 | `PodcastService::isPodcastObsolete()` (`:221`) `Http::head($podcast-\u003eurl)` | No `isSafeUrl`, no redirect validation |\n| 4 | `App\\Rules\\HasAudioContentType` (`:45`/`:54`) `Http::head`/`Http::get` | Self-documented \"use after SafeUrl\"; ordering-dependent, no own validation, no per-hop check. Extends the surface to the **internet-radio** feature (`RadioStationStore/UpdateRequest`) |\n| 5 | `App\\Rules\\SafeUrl` validator (`:52`/`:56`) | Follows redirects, validates only the **final** effective host \u2014 intermediate-hop requests still fire |\n\nReachable via the native API (`apiResource podcasts`, `radio/stations`; `PodcastController::store` has **no authorization check**, only `#[DisabledInDemo]`) and the Subsonic API (`createPodcastChannel`, `createInternetRadioStation`, `refreshPodcasts`).\n\n### PoC\n\nA mechanism PoC that runs the exact Guzzle/Laravel-Http call shapes Koel uses (attacker-redirect server + internal-target listener on loopback), verified on PHP 8.2 + Guzzle 7:\n\n```\nisPublicHost(\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027) = false        # a per-hop check WOULD block this\nCase1 Poddle::fromUrl        -\u003e [VULNERABLE]  leaked INTERNAL-SECRET-TOKEN\nCase2 getStreamableUrl       -\u003e [VULNERABLE]  leaked INTERNAL-SECRET-TOKEN\nCase3 EpisodePlayable        -\u003e [BLOCKED]     UnsafeUrl on redirect\ninternal_hits.log: 2 hits    # internal service actually reached by Case1 + Case2\n```\n\nCase1/Case2 reaching the internal target while Case3 (the fixed path) blocks under identical conditions demonstrates the incomplete remediation. The full PoC kit (poc.php, attacker_router.php, internal_router.php) is available on request.\n\nEnd-to-end on a real instance: an authenticated user `POST /api/podcasts` (or Subsonic `createPodcastChannel`) with a feed URL on an attacker host that returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...` (or `http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/`); the server follows it. The response is reflected back via parsed podcast fields / `getStreamableUrl` when the internal endpoint returns `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`; otherwise blind SSRF via status/timing.\n\n### Impact\n\nAuthenticated (any user) SSRF: access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials on IMDSv1), internal-only admin panels, and internal network service probing \u2014 from the Koel server\u0027s network position. Same threat model as CVE-2026-47260.\n\n**Attack scenario (fully remote, no user interaction):** the only precondition is a single low-privilege account. On AWS/GCP/Azure-hosted instances, redirecting to the metadata IP and reflecting the body discloses temporary IAM credentials \u2192 cloud-account pivot. (AWS IMDSv2\u0027s token-via-PUT is not reachable through a simple GET-redirect SSRF; IMDSv1 instances are fully exposed.) \"Koel only runs on an internal/trusted network\" does not reduce the risk \u2014 the bug makes the Koel server itself the attacker\u0027s pivot **into** that trusted network and cloud control plane.\n\nSuggested severity: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N (7.1); lower where exploitation is blind.\n\n### Remediation\n\nDo not fix per-call-site. Centralize: route **all** outbound HTTP through a shared Guzzle handler/middleware that, on **every** connection and **every redirect hop**, resolves the target and rejects private/reserved IPs, and **pins** the validated IP for the actual connection (defeats DNS rebinding). Apply to `EpisodePlayable`, `getStreamableUrl`, `Poddle::fromUrl` usage, `isPodcastObsolete`, `HasAudioContentType`, and the `SafeUrl` rule.",
  "id": "GHSA-6qvr-wjmv-v8mm",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T17:59:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T17:59:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/security/advisories/GHSA-6qvr-wjmv-v8mm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/pull/2546"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/pull/2549"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/commit/5f6ce2cefd08f437a269236b677ad971517ccbb6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/commit/c264a3d52513a83b21e1cc3a20e895caea97fc4a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koel/koel/releases/tag/v9.7.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Koel: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-47260 \u2014 systemic SSRF in podcast \u0026 radio fetch paths"
}