CVE-2026-54885 (GCVE-0-2026-54885)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-30 14:16 – Updated: 2026-07-31 04:20
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Server-side request forgery in Boruta OAuth request_uri and OpenID jwks_uri fetching
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
Three code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |> Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server's HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.
This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54885.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54885 | related |
| https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/0… | patch |
| https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/9… | patch |
Impacted products
Credits
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-54885",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-30T16:14:18.216537Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-30T16:14:32.431Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g"
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027"
],
"packageName": "boruta",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/boruta",
"product": "boruta",
"programFiles": [
"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex",
"lib/boruta/openid.ex",
"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth",
"vendor": "malach-it",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.3.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027"
],
"packageName": "malach-it/boruta_auth",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/malach-it/boruta_auth",
"product": "boruta",
"programFiles": [
"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex",
"lib/boruta/openid.ex",
"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth",
"vendor": "malach-it",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "15455b86206e0370eabd64c1856a5c996b436455",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.3.7",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.3.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Pascal Knoth"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Pascal Knoth"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eServer-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThree code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. \u003ctt\u003e\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex\u003c/tt\u003e dereferences the OAuth \u003ctt\u003erequest_uri\u003c/tt\u003e parameter from the authorization request via \u003ctt\u003eFinch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u0026gt; Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient)\u003c/tt\u003e. \u003ctt\u003e\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/boruta/openid.ex\u003c/tt\u003e dereferences the \u003ctt\u003ejwks_uri\u003c/tt\u003e supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. \u003ctt\u003e\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex\u003c/tt\u003e later refreshes the stored \u003ctt\u003ejwks_uri\u003c/tt\u003e for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two \u003ctt\u003erequest_uri\u003c/tt\u003e clauses does not even restrict the scheme to \u003ctt\u003ehttp\u003c/tt\u003e or \u003ctt\u003ehttps\u003c/tt\u003e). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server\u0027s HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nThree code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u003e Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server\u0027s HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.\n\nThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-664",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-918",
"description": "CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T04:20:03.434Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54885.html"
},
{
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54885"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d"
},
{
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "Server-side request forgery in Boruta OAuth request_uri and OpenID jwks_uri fetching",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eRestrict the network egress of the Boruta host so that the OAuth/OpenID authorization server cannot reach loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud metadata addresses. Where possible, disable application routes for OAuth \u003ctt\u003erequest_uri\u003c/tt\u003e dereferencing and OpenID Connect dynamic client registration, or restrict OpenID Connect dynamic client registration to trusted callers, until a patched release is deployed.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Restrict the network egress of the Boruta host so that the OAuth/OpenID authorization server cannot reach loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud metadata addresses. Where possible, disable application routes for OAuth request_uri dereferencing and OpenID Connect dynamic client registration, or restrict OpenID Connect dynamic client registration to trusted callers, until a patched release is deployed."
}
],
"x_generator": {
"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-54885",
"datePublished": "2026-07-30T14:16:43.631Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-16T10:47:13.914Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T04:20:03.434Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-54885",
"date": "2026-08-03",
"epss": "0.00372",
"percentile": "0.30002"
},
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-54885\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"published\":\"2026-07-30T15:16:34.050\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-07-30T17:16:33.337\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Deferred\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.\\n\\nThree code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u003e Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server\u0027s HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.\\n\\nThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"malach-it\",\"product\":\"boruta\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://repo.hex.pm\",\"packageName\":\"boruta\",\"cpes\":[\"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"],\"modules\":[\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex\",\"lib/boruta/openid.ex\",\"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1\"}],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:hex/boruta\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"2.3.2\",\"lessThan\":\"2.3.7\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"malach-it\",\"product\":\"boruta\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://github.com\",\"packageName\":\"malach-it/boruta_auth\",\"cpes\":[\"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"],\"modules\":[\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex\",\"lib/boruta/openid.ex\",\"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1\"}],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:github/malach-it/boruta_auth\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"15455b86206e0370eabd64c1856a5c996b436455\",\"lessThan\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\",\"changes\":[{\"at\":\"001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"at\":\"95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":6.9,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"NONE\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}],\"ssvcV203\":[{\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\",\"ssvcData\":{\"timestamp\":\"2026-07-30T16:14:18.216537Z\",\"id\":\"CVE-2026-54885\",\"options\":[{\"exploitation\":\"poc\"},{\"automatable\":\"no\"},{\"technicalImpact\":\"partial\"}],\"role\":\"CISA Coordinator\",\"version\":\"2.0.3\"}}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-918\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54885.html\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54885\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g\",\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\"}]}}",
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-54885\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"poc\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-07-30T16:14:18.216537Z\"}}}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g\", \"tags\": [\"exploit\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-30T16:14:29.534Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Server-side request forgery in Boruta OAuth request_uri and OpenID jwks_uri fetching\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"INTERNAL\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"finder\", \"value\": \"Pascal Knoth\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"Pascal Knoth\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"analyst\", \"value\": \"Jonatan M\\u00e4nnchen / EEF\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-664\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-664 Server Side Request Forgery\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"version\": \"4.0\", \"baseScore\": 6.9, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth\", \"vendor\": \"malach-it\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027\"], \"product\": \"boruta\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"2.3.2\", \"lessThan\": \"2.3.7\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:hex/boruta\", \"packageName\": \"boruta\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex\", \"lib/boruta/openid.ex\", \"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://repo.hex.pm\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1\"}]}, {\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth\", \"vendor\": \"malach-it\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027\", \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027\"], \"product\": \"boruta\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"changes\": [{\"at\": \"001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d\", \"status\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"at\": \"95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5\", \"status\": \"unaffected\"}], \"version\": \"15455b86206e0370eabd64c1856a5c996b436455\", \"lessThan\": \"*\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:github/malach-it/boruta_auth\", \"packageName\": \"malach-it/boruta_auth\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex\", \"lib/boruta/openid.ex\", \"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\", \"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54885.html\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54885\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"workarounds\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Restrict the network egress of the Boruta host so that the OAuth/OpenID authorization server cannot reach loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud metadata addresses. Where possible, disable application routes for OAuth request_uri dereferencing and OpenID Connect dynamic client registration, or restrict OpenID Connect dynamic client registration to trusted callers, until a patched release is deployed.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eRestrict the network egress of the Boruta host so that the OAuth/OpenID authorization server cannot reach loopback, private, link-local, multicast, or cloud metadata addresses. Where possible, disable application routes for OAuth \u003ctt\u003erequest_uri\u003c/tt\u003e dereferencing and OpenID Connect dynamic client registration, or restrict OpenID Connect dynamic client registration to trusted callers, until a patched release is deployed.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"cvelib 1.8.0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.\\n\\nThree code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u003e Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server\u0027s HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.\\n\\nThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eServer-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThree code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. \u003ctt\u003e\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex\u003c/tt\u003e dereferences the OAuth \u003ctt\u003erequest_uri\u003c/tt\u003e parameter from the authorization request via \u003ctt\u003eFinch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u0026gt; Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient)\u003c/tt\u003e. \u003ctt\u003e\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/boruta/openid.ex\u003c/tt\u003e dereferences the \u003ctt\u003ejwks_uri\u003c/tt\u003e supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. \u003ctt\u003e\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex\u003c/tt\u003e later refreshes the stored \u003ctt\u003ejwks_uri\u003c/tt\u003e for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two \u003ctt\u003erequest_uri\u003c/tt\u003e clauses does not even restrict the scheme to \u003ctt\u003ehttp\u003c/tt\u003e or \u003ctt\u003ehttps\u003c/tt\u003e). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server\u0027s HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-918\", \"description\": \"CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\"}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"2.3.7\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"2.3.2\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-31T04:20:03.434Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-54885\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-07-31T04:20:03.434Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-06-16T10:47:13.914Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-07-30T14:16:43.631Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
Loading…
Loading…