Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-66901 (GCVE-0-2026-66901)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-04 20:49 – Updated: 2026-08-04 22:24

Title

Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON

Summary

Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON. The URLs the library requests are read from the credentials JSON, and their hosts were not checked against the universe domain before the request. For an external_account configuration, retrieve_subject_token fetched credential_source.url with headers from the same JSON, and fetch_access_token posted the subject token to token_url, then sent the STS access token it received to service_account_impersonation_url in an Authorization: Bearer header. The authorized_user, impersonated_service_account and service_account configurations posted the client secret and refresh token, the source access token, and a signed JWT assertion to their own JSON-supplied token_uri or impersonation URL. Any caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control issues those requests from the application's network position, reaching hosts the configuration names, including internal services and link-local metadata endpoints, and hands them the credentials each request carries. The service_account assertion is bound to aud, so it is not replayable against Google. Version 0.06 added a _validate_url host check to the external_account class, keyed on a universe_domain read from the same credentials JSON. Version 0.07 gated a JSON-supplied universe domain behind GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_CUSTOM_UNIVERSES=1, deriving the pin flag from arguments that an earlier BUILDARGS pass had already merged on the make_creds path. Version 0.08 passed the pin decision through as an explicit constructor argument and moved _validate_url to Google::Auth::Credentials, adding the call to UserRefreshCredentials and ImpersonatedServiceAccountCredentials, and 0.09 added it to ServiceAccountCredentials.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
CWE-201 - Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

Assigner

CPANSec

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-aut…	patch
https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-aut…	patch
https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-aut…	patch
https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-aut…	patch
https://metacpan.org/release/CJCOLLIER/Google-Aut…	release-notes
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
CJCOLLIER	Google::Auth	Affected: 0 , < 0.09 (custom)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T22:24:40.149Z",
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          "value": "Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON.\n\nThe URLs the library requests are read from the credentials JSON, and their hosts were not checked against the universe domain before the request. For an external_account configuration, retrieve_subject_token fetched credential_source.url with headers from the same JSON, and fetch_access_token posted the subject token to token_url, then sent the STS access token it received to service_account_impersonation_url in an Authorization: Bearer header. The authorized_user, impersonated_service_account and service_account configurations posted the client secret and refresh token, the source access token, and a signed JWT assertion to their own JSON-supplied token_uri or impersonation URL.\n\nAny caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control issues those requests from the application\u0027s network position, reaching hosts the configuration names, including internal services and link-local metadata endpoints, and hands them the credentials each request carries. The service_account assertion is bound to aud, so it is not replayable against Google.\n\nVersion 0.06 added a _validate_url host check to the external_account class, keyed on a universe_domain read from the same credentials JSON. Version 0.07 gated a JSON-supplied universe domain behind GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_CUSTOM_UNIVERSES=1, deriving the pin flag from arguments that an earlier BUILDARGS pass had already merged on the make_creds path. Version 0.08 passed the pin decision through as an explicit constructor argument and moved _validate_url to Google::Auth::Credentials, adding the call to UserRefreshCredentials and ImpersonatedServiceAccountCredentials, and 0.09 added it to ServiceAccountCredentials."
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      "date": "2026-08-05",
      "epss": "0.00183",
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  }
}

GHSA-XXPM-5C34-X4C3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 21:30 – Updated: 2026-08-05 00:30

Details

Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON.

The URLs the library requests are read from the credentials JSON, and their hosts were not checked against the universe domain before the request. For an external_account configuration, retrieve_subject_token fetched credential_source.url with headers from the same JSON, and fetch_access_token posted the subject token to token_url, then sent the STS access token it received to service_account_impersonation_url in an Authorization: Bearer header. The authorized_user, impersonated_service_account and service_account configurations posted the client secret and refresh token, the source access token, and a signed JWT assertion to their own JSON-supplied token_uri or impersonation URL.

Any caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control issues those requests from the application's network position, reaching hosts the configuration names, including internal services and link-local metadata endpoints, and hands them the credentials each request carries. The service_account assertion is bound to aud, so it is not replayable against Google.

Version 0.06 added a _validate_url host check to the external_account class, keyed on a universe_domain read from the same credentials JSON. Version 0.07 gated a JSON-supplied universe domain behind GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_CUSTOM_UNIVERSES=1, deriving the pin flag from arguments that an earlier BUILDARGS pass had already merged on the make_creds path. Version 0.08 passed the pin decision through as an explicit constructor argument and moved _validate_url to Google::Auth::Credentials, adding the call to UserRefreshCredentials and ImpersonatedServiceAccountCredentials, and 0.09 added it to ServiceAccountCredentials.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66901"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-201"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T21:16:37Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON.\n\nThe URLs the library requests are read from the credentials JSON, and their hosts were not checked against the universe domain before the request. For an external_account configuration, retrieve_subject_token fetched credential_source.url with headers from the same JSON, and fetch_access_token posted the subject token to token_url, then sent the STS access token it received to service_account_impersonation_url in an Authorization: Bearer header. The authorized_user, impersonated_service_account and service_account configurations posted the client secret and refresh token, the source access token, and a signed JWT assertion to their own JSON-supplied token_uri or impersonation URL.\n\nAny caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control issues those requests from the application\u0027s network position, reaching hosts the configuration names, including internal services and link-local metadata endpoints, and hands them the credentials each request carries. The service_account assertion is bound to aud, so it is not replayable against Google.\n\nVersion 0.06 added a _validate_url host check to the external_account class, keyed on a universe_domain read from the same credentials JSON. Version 0.07 gated a JSON-supplied universe domain behind GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_CUSTOM_UNIVERSES=1, deriving the pin flag from arguments that an earlier BUILDARGS pass had already merged on the make_creds path. Version 0.08 passed the pin decision through as an explicit constructor argument and moved _validate_url to Google::Auth::Credentials, adding the call to UserRefreshCredentials and ImpersonatedServiceAccountCredentials, and 0.09 added it to ServiceAccountCredentials.",
  "id": "GHSA-xxpm-5c34-x4c3",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T00:30:37Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T21:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66901"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-auth-library-perl/commit/9b5157062acc605ca9e6c507b910587f4829ce9e.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-auth-library-perl/commit/c95c77e70bec94f17e239d88050f843ea1cade95.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-auth-library-perl/commit/cbbb07804e3f8cc7cf9638ecc9c2097d80a9ef50.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/google-auth-library-perl/commit/cd42bdef53afcc4531161e85e91d0d5997e01324.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/CJCOLLIER/Google-Auth-0.09/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/04/34"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-66901 (GCVE-0-2026-66901)

GHSA-XXPM-5C34-X4C3

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature