CVE-2026-73136 (GCVE-0-2026-73136)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 17:19 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:54
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Static memo configuration in mpp Tempo disables per-challenge attribution binding, enabling third-party replay
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.
MPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static "memo" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type="hash" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:49 UTC
CWE
- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisorie… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73136.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73136 | related |
| https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/2207d7f456a… | patch |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-07-06 00:00
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"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-73136\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-08-19T18:49:35.273666Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-19T18:53:16.731Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Static memo configuration in mpp Tempo disables per-challenge attribution binding, enabling third-party replay\", \"source\": {\"discovery\": \"EXTERNAL\"}, \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"finder\", \"value\": \"E.FU\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"remediation developer\", \"value\": \"E.FU\"}, {\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"analyst\", \"value\": \"Jonatan M\\u00e4nnchen / EEF\"}], \"impacts\": [{\"capecId\": \"CAPEC-60\", \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CAPEC-60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)\"}]}], \"metrics\": [{\"format\": \"CVSS\", \"cvssV4_0\": {\"Safety\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"version\": \"4.0\", \"Recovery\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"baseScore\": 8.2, \"Automatable\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"HIGH\", \"valueDensity\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N\", \"providerUrgency\": \"NOT_DEFINED\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"attackRequirements\": \"PRESENT\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"subIntegrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnIntegrityImpact\": \"HIGH\", \"subAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnAvailabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"subConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnConfidentialityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\": \"NOT_DEFINED\"}, \"scenarios\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"GENERAL\"}]}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\", \"vendor\": \"ZenHive\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"], \"product\": \"mpp\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0.6.1\", \"lessThan\": \"0.6.4\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:hex/mpp\", \"packageName\": \"mpp\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://repo.hex.pm\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:validate_config!/1\"}]}, {\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"repo\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\", \"vendor\": \"ZenHive\", \"modules\": [\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"], \"product\": \"mpp\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"542a525563c2fcedd670b593437deca81c6797a4\", \"lessThan\": \"2207d7f456ae14c1d3fcacc6f635bf4f8cee1a34\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"packageURL\": \"pkg:github/zenhive/mpp\", \"packageName\": \"zenhive/mpp\", \"programFiles\": [\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"], \"collectionURL\": \"https://github.com\", \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\", \"programRoutines\": [{\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}, {\"name\": \"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:validate_config!/1\"}]}], \"datePublic\": \"2026-07-06T00:00:00.000Z\", \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-34g7-vx6g-82mq\", \"tags\": [\"vendor-advisory\", \"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73136.html\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73136\", \"tags\": [\"related\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/2207d7f456ae14c1d3fcacc6f635bf4f8cee1a34\", \"tags\": [\"patch\"]}], \"workarounds\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Remove the static \\\"memo\\\" from the Tempo method_config so verification falls back to the default per-challenge attribution binding, which ties each settled transfer to the challenge being verified. Where a static memo must be kept, configure a dedup store (for example MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore) with a TTL at least as long as the challenge expiry, which reduces unlimited replay to a race on the transaction hash rather than closing it.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eRemove the static \u003ccode\u003e\\\"memo\\\"\u003c/code\u003e from the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e so verification falls back to the default per-challenge attribution binding, which ties each settled transfer to the challenge being verified. Where a static memo must be kept, configure a dedup store (for example \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore\u003c/code\u003e) with a TTL at least as long as the challenge expiry, which reduces unlimited replay to a race on the transaction hash rather than closing it.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Remove the static `\\\"memo\\\"` from the Tempo `method_config` so verification falls back to the default per-challenge attribution binding, which ties each settled transfer to the challenge being verified. Where a static memo must be kept, configure a dedup store (for example `MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore`) with a TTL at least as long as the challenge expiry, which reduces unlimited replay to a race on the transaction hash rather than closing it.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\\n\\nMPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static \\\"memo\\\" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type=\\\"hash\\\" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo\u003c/code\u003e normally binds a settled TIP-20 \u003ccode\u003eTransferWithMemo\u003c/code\u003e to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static \u003ccode\u003e\\\"memo\\\"\u003c/code\u003e is configured in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003echeck_matched_memo_binding/3\u003c/code\u003e returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only \u003ccode\u003etoken\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003erecipient\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eamount\u003c/code\u003e and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a \u003ccode\u003etype=\\\"hash\\\"\u003c/code\u003e credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\u003c/p\u003e\\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\\n\\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo` normally binds a settled TIP-20 `TransferWithMemo` to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static `\\\"memo\\\"` is configured in `method_config`, `check_matched_memo_binding/3` returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only `token`, `recipient`, `amount` and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a `type=\\\"hash\\\"` credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-294\", \"description\": \"CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay\"}]}], \"configurations\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Only deployments that configure a static \\\"memo\\\" in the Tempo method_config are affected. Deployments using the default per-challenge attribution memo are not: that path binds each settled transfer to the challenge under verification and is single-use by construction.\", \"supportingMedia\": [{\"type\": \"text/html\", \"value\": \"\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that configure a static \u003ccode\u003e\\\"memo\\\"\u003c/code\u003e in the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e are affected. Deployments using the default per-challenge attribution memo are not: that path binds each settled transfer to the challenge under verification and is single-use by construction.\u003c/p\u003e\", \"base64\": false}, {\"type\": \"text/markdown\", \"value\": \"Only deployments that configure a static `\\\"memo\\\"` in the Tempo `method_config` are affected. Deployments using the default per-challenge attribution memo are not: that path binds each settled transfer to the challenge under verification and is single-use by construction.\", \"base64\": false}]}], \"cpeApplicability\": [{\"nodes\": [{\"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"vulnerable\": true, \"versionEndExcluding\": \"0.6.4\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"0.6.1\"}], \"operator\": \"OR\"}], \"operator\": \"AND\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"shortName\": \"EEF\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-19T17:19:52.413Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-73136\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-19T18:54:00.153Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-08-18T10:00:02.159Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-19T17:19:52.413Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"EEF\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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