CVE-2026-86554 (GCVE-0-2026-86554)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-20 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-20 09:17
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Email enumeration and account ID leakage vulnerabilities in ZTE SmartLife APP
Summary
SmartLife app dynamically generates brand‑new SmartLife application authentication parameters within its runtime process. With the obtained SmartLife application authentication parameters, attackers can directly invoke the backend interface /account/verify.serv to determine whether a target email address is registered for a SmartLife account. If the account exists, the real backend account ID can also be retrieved.
Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CWE
- CWE-269 - # CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
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"id": "CVE-2026-86554",
"lastModified": "2026-09-20T10:16:52.700",
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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