CVE-2026-89541 (GCVE-0-2026-89541)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-11 19:44 – Updated: 2026-09-13 06:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks
gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with
offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base;
if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
goto unwrap_failed;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset,
offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);
Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with
opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small
value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and
gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a
lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is
accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt
header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token.
A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive
the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the
rotate_left() loop that follows.
Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that
are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum
outer token length:
if (offset > rcv_buf->len)
goto unwrap_failed;
if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset)
goto unwrap_failed;
if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard
unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful
xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already
satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added
in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token
minimum length").
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf , < 89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a
(git)
Affected: 2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf , < ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269 (git) Affected: 2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf , < d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273 (git) Affected: 2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf , < 87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
2.6.15
Unaffected: 0 , < 2.6.15 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.109 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.50 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.4 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.109",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.50",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc1",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.6.15",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks\n\ngss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with\n\n offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head-\u003eiov_base;\n if (offset + opaque_len \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx-\u003egc_gss_ctx, offset,\n offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);\n\nBoth operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with\nopaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small\nvalue that is below rcv_buf-\u003elen, so the bound check passes and\ngss_unwrap() is called with end \u003c begin. The check also lacks a\nlower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is\naccepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt\nheader reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token.\n\nA krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive\nthe client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the\nrotate_left() loop that follows.\n\nFix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that\nare safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum\nouter token length:\n\n if (offset \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n if (opaque_len \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen - offset)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n if (opaque_len \u003c GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n\nThe first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard\nunconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful\nxdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already\nsatisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added\nin commit 5b757c2e57a5 (\"SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token\nminimum length\")."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:N - gss_unwrap_resp_priv() runs in the Linux NFS/SUNRPC client while decoding RPCSEC_GSS privacy (krb5p) replies; a malicious or compromised NFS server supplies the crafted opaque_len and wrap token over the existing TCP/UDP/RDMA RPC connection.\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls the reply, including opaque_len and the cleartext RFC 4121 header, and a single response can make offset+opaque_len wrap in u32 or fall below GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN; no race or layout beyond the attacker\u2019s control is required.\nPR:N - The attacker is the remote RPC/NFS peer that already holds the GSS session keys needed to pass gss_validate(); no local account, user namespace, or capability on the victim client is required.\nUI:N - Once a krb5p NFS mount or other SUNRPC GSS-privacy client is already in use, normal client RPCs elicit replies the attacker can craft; no extra victim action is needed at attack time.\nS:U - Out-of-bounds reads, rotate/decrypt memory corruption, and crashes stay inside the victim kernel\u2019s SUNRPC client and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other security-authority boundary.\nC:H - A short or wrapped opaque_len makes gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() read past the token at ptr+4/ptr+6 and feeds rotate_left()/decrypt with wrapped lengths, disclosing adjacent kernel memory; unwrap cleanup can also memmove nearly UINT_MAX bytes.\nI:H - The same wrapped lengths drive rotate_left() writes, CBC/AEAD decrypt over an unbounded xdr subsegment (xdr_buf_subsegment\u2019s error is ignored), and gss_krb5_unwrap_v2()\u2019s unsigned movelen underflow into a near-4GiB memmove, enabling kernel memory corruption.\nA:H - rotate_left() can divide-by-zero on a zero-length subbuffer, spin in a multi-gigabyte kernel loop on a wrapped subsegment, or oops/panic on the huge memmove or out-of-bounds header access."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-13T06:30:40.442Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2"
}
],
"title": "SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-89541",
"datePublished": "2026-09-11T19:44:18.188Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.721Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-13T06:30:40.442Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-89541",
"date": "2026-09-12",
"epss": "0.00168",
"percentile": "0.06338"
},
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-89541\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-09-11T20:19:37.247\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-09-13T07:17:16.397\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nSUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks\\n\\ngss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with\\n\\n offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head-\u003eiov_base;\\n if (offset + opaque_len \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen)\\n goto unwrap_failed;\\n maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx-\u003egc_gss_ctx, offset,\\n offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);\\n\\nBoth operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with\\nopaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small\\nvalue that is below rcv_buf-\u003elen, so the bound check passes and\\ngss_unwrap() is called with end \u003c begin. The check also lacks a\\nlower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is\\naccepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt\\nheader reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token.\\n\\nA krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive\\nthe client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the\\nrotate_left() loop that follows.\\n\\nFix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that\\nare safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum\\nouter token length:\\n\\n if (offset \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen)\\n goto unwrap_failed;\\n if (opaque_len \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen - offset)\\n goto unwrap_failed;\\n if (opaque_len \u003c GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)\\n goto unwrap_failed;\\n\\nThe first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard\\nunconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful\\nxdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already\\nsatisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added\\nin commit 5b757c2e57a5 (\\\"SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token\\nminimum length\\\").\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf\",\"lessThan\":\"89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf\",\"lessThan\":\"ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf\",\"lessThan\":\"d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf\",\"lessThan\":\"87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"2.6.15\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"2.6.15\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.12.109\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.12.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"6.18.50\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"6.18.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2.4\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.2.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.3-rc1\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":9.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}",
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Important",
"current_release_date": "2026-09-13T06:50:09+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-89541",
"id": "CVE-2026-89541",
"initial_release_date": "2026-09-11T19:44:18.188000+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "2",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: Linux kernel (SUNRPC): Out-of-bounds read via crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-89541.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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