FKIE_CVE-2026-89541
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-09-13 07:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks
gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with
offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base;
if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len)
goto unwrap_failed;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset,
offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);
Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with
opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small
value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and
gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a
lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is
accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt
header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token.
A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive
the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the
rotate_left() loop that follows.
Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that
are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum
outer token length:
if (offset > rcv_buf->len)
goto unwrap_failed;
if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset)
goto unwrap_failed;
if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard
unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful
xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already
satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added
in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token
minimum length").
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d2da60c63b67174add32f06e8d54c3a0c5cd9cf",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks\n\ngss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with\n\n offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head-\u003eiov_base;\n if (offset + opaque_len \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx-\u003egc_gss_ctx, offset,\n offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf);\n\nBoth operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with\nopaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small\nvalue that is below rcv_buf-\u003elen, so the bound check passes and\ngss_unwrap() is called with end \u003c begin. The check also lacks a\nlower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is\naccepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt\nheader reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token.\n\nA krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive\nthe client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the\nrotate_left() loop that follows.\n\nFix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that\nare safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum\nouter token length:\n\n if (offset \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n if (opaque_len \u003e rcv_buf-\u003elen - offset)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n if (opaque_len \u003c GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)\n goto unwrap_failed;\n\nThe first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard\nunconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful\nxdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already\nsatisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added\nin commit 5b757c2e57a5 (\"SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token\nminimum length\")."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89541",
"lastModified": "2026-09-13T07:17:16.397",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:37.247",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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