Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-91085 (GCVE-0-2026-91085)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-29 08:39 – Updated: 2026-09-29 09:15

Title

Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin

Summary

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

CWE-862

Assigner

apache mitre root Scorecard

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Karaf	Affected: 0 , < 4.4.12 (semver)	guessed

Credits

Rin Ray <rindilray@gmail.com>

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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      "title": "Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin",
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        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "product": "Apache Karaf",
                "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "4.4.12",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  }
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              }
            ],
            "source": "security@apache.org"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-91085",
        "lastModified": "2026-09-29T14:56:12.013",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2026-09-29T09:17:10.347",
        "references": [
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            "source": "security@apache.org",
            "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
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        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
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                "value": "CWE-862"
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}

FKIE_CVE-2026-91085

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-29 09:17 - Updated: 2026-09-29 14:56

Severity

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Apache Karaf",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
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      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
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  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-91085",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-29T14:56:12.013",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-29T09:17:10.347",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8G53-M82P-XQF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-29 12:31

Details

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.

The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-/update on the jmx.acl., org.apache.karaf.command.acl. and org.apache.karaf.service.acl. PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.

config:install fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf..acl. files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.

Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.

By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-91085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T09:17:10Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.",
  "id": "GHSA-8g53-m82p-xqf5",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T12:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T09:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

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CVE-2026-91085 (GCVE-0-2026-91085)

FKIE_CVE-2026-91085

GHSA-8G53-M82P-XQF5

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