CVE-2026-95625 (GCVE-0-2026-95625)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 08:51 – Updated: 2026-09-23 14:10
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade
Summary
The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 14:07 UTC
CWE
- CWE-354 - Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/s… | issue-tracking |
| https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace | product |
| https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/c… | patch |
| https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/r… | release-notes |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tauri | tauri-plugin-updater |
Affected:
2.0.0 , < 2.12.0
(semver)
Affected: 2.12.0 , ≤ * (semver) |
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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