FKIE_CVE-2026-10023
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-18 04:16 - Updated: 2026-06-18 15:23
Severity
Summary
The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution – Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.3 via the change_order_status, add_order_note, delete_order_note, add_shipping_tracking_info, grant_access_to_download, and revoke_access_to_download AJAX handlers due to missing ownership validation on a user-controlled order ID key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom vendor-level access and above, to modify the status of arbitrary orders, add attacker-controlled notes to any order (including customer-facing notes that trigger WooCommerce notification emails to buyers), delete any order note or WordPress comment by ID regardless of ownership, inject fake shipping tracking information on any order, and grant or revoke downloadable-product permissions on any order in the marketplace. Critically, nonce validity is not a barrier to exploitation: each of these AJAX handlers generates and embeds its nonce on the authenticated vendor's own dashboard order pages (e.g., /dashboard/orders/?order_id=OWN_ORDER_ID), which the attacker legitimately controls. The attacker harvests a valid nonce from their own order detail page and replays it against a victim order ID — the nonce only proves the request originates from a logged-in session, not that the order belongs to that vendor. This directly rebuts the prior rejection reasoning that 'users cannot generate valid nonces on command': vendor users can and do generate valid nonces on demand simply by loading their own dashboard pages. Source-code analysis confirmed the vulnerable code path is present and unpatched through version 5.0.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution \u2013 Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy",
"vendor": "dokaninc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.0.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution \u2013 Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.3 via the change_order_status, add_order_note, delete_order_note, add_shipping_tracking_info, grant_access_to_download, and revoke_access_to_download AJAX handlers due to missing ownership validation on a user-controlled order ID key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom vendor-level access and above, to modify the status of arbitrary orders, add attacker-controlled notes to any order (including customer-facing notes that trigger WooCommerce notification emails to buyers), delete any order note or WordPress comment by ID regardless of ownership, inject fake shipping tracking information on any order, and grant or revoke downloadable-product permissions on any order in the marketplace. Critically, nonce validity is not a barrier to exploitation: each of these AJAX handlers generates and embeds its nonce on the authenticated vendor\u0027s own dashboard order pages (e.g., /dashboard/orders/?order_id=OWN_ORDER_ID), which the attacker legitimately controls. The attacker harvests a valid nonce from their own order detail page and replays it against a victim order ID \u2014 the nonce only proves the request originates from a logged-in session, not that the order belongs to that vendor. This directly rebuts the prior rejection reasoning that \u0027users cannot generate valid nonces on command\u0027: vendor users can and do generate valid nonces on demand simply by loading their own dashboard pages. Source-code analysis confirmed the vulnerable code path is present and unpatched through version 5.0.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-10023",
"lastModified": "2026-06-18T15:23:56.087",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-10023",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-18T13:22:19.284505Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-18T04:16:33.803",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://github.com/getdokan/dokan/pull/3246"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Ajax.php#L225"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Ajax.php#L293"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Ajax.php#L378"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Ajax.php#L400"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Ajax.php#L439"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Ajax.php#L511"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.0.1/includes/Install/Installer.php#L209"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3564542%40dokan-lite\u0026new=3564542%40dokan-lite\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/998e545c-2ad5-48ec-bad1-d346170af408?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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