FKIE_CVE-2026-12235

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-12 05:17 - Updated: 2026-08-12 13:17
Summary
The Linkable Loadable Extensions (llext) subsystem mis-handles PLT/RELA relocation entries when linking a relocatable (partially-linked) ELF extension. In llext_link_plt() (subsys/llext/llext_link.c), the relocatable branch (tgt != NULL, the path used for Xtensa relocatable objects) computed the patch address as ext->mem[LLEXT_MEM_TEXT] - text.sh_offset + rela.r_offset + tgt->sh_offset and then performed the relocation write there without validating rela.r_offset. Its sibling shared/dynamic branch already rejected out-of-range offsets via llext_file_offset(). rela.r_offset is read directly from the ELF's RELA table, so a crafted entry with an offset larger than the target section makes the write land arbitrarily far outside the extension's text buffer. The result is an attacker-influenced out-of-bounds write (the location via r_offset, the written value being the resolved symbol address) performed in supervisor context at link time, before any extension code runs. The path is reached from llext_load() whenever an application loads an attacker-influenced ELF extension on Xtensa with writable storage; llext is documented to accept extensions of untrusted origin. Impact is supervisor-context memory corruption (integrity and availability loss, and a sandbox-boundary escape for user-mode extensions). Exploitation is gated by the Xtensa relocatable PLT path and writable storage, and turning the out-of-range write into a useful primitive is non-trivial. The fix adds a bound check rejecting any RELA entry whose r_offset >= tgt->sh_size, mirroring the existing validation in the shared branch.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/llext/llext_link.c"
          ],
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.7.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Linkable Loadable Extensions (llext) subsystem mis-handles PLT/RELA relocation entries when linking a relocatable (partially-linked) ELF extension. In llext_link_plt() (subsys/llext/llext_link.c), the relocatable branch (tgt != NULL, the path used for Xtensa relocatable objects) computed the patch address as ext-\u003emem[LLEXT_MEM_TEXT] - text.sh_offset + rela.r_offset + tgt-\u003esh_offset and then performed the relocation write there without validating rela.r_offset. Its sibling shared/dynamic branch already rejected out-of-range offsets via llext_file_offset().\n\nrela.r_offset is read directly from the ELF\u0027s RELA table, so a crafted entry with an offset larger than the target section makes the write land arbitrarily far outside the extension\u0027s text buffer. The result is an attacker-influenced out-of-bounds write (the location via r_offset, the written value being the resolved symbol address) performed in supervisor context at link time, before any extension code runs.\n\nThe path is reached from llext_load() whenever an application loads an attacker-influenced ELF extension on Xtensa with writable storage; llext is documented to accept extensions of untrusted origin. Impact is supervisor-context memory corruption (integrity and availability loss, and a sandbox-boundary escape for user-mode extensions). Exploitation is gated by the Xtensa relocatable PLT path and writable storage, and turning the out-of-range write into a useful primitive is non-trivial.\n\nThe fix adds a bound check rejecting any RELA entry whose r_offset \u003e= tgt-\u003esh_size, mirroring the existing validation in the shared branch."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-12235",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-12T13:17:19.377",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-12235",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-12T12:34:31.991332Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-12T05:17:42.277",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/106540afbd22087ad40b90f53fb22657754a719e"
    },
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xv9q-6mrf-8j49"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xv9q-6mrf-8j49"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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