FKIE_CVE-2026-18438
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 10:16 - Updated: 2026-08-17 20:16
Severity
Summary
The Templately – Elementor & Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free & Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Templately \u2013 Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud!",
"vendor": "wpdevteam",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "3.7.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Templately \u2013 Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately\u0027s entire REST API \u2014 including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) \u2014 is authorized only by a current_user_can(\u0027delete_posts\u0027) check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site\u0027s global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-18438",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T20:16:41.350",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-18438",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-17T19:26:10.332711Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-15T10:16:29.413",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/API.php#L128"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/Import.php#L78"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/API/MyClouds.php#L103"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1200"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1391"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1423"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.6.5/includes/Core/Platform/Gutenberg.php#L177"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/API.php#L128"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/Import.php#L78"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/API/MyClouds.php#L103"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1200"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1391"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php#L1423"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/templately/tags/3.7.1/includes/Core/Platform/Gutenberg.php#L177"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3636643/templately/trunk/includes/Core/Importer/WPImport.php"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=%2Ftemplately/tags/3.7.1\u0026new_path=%2Ftemplately/tags/3.7.2"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3636643%40templately%2Ftags%2F3.7.2\u0026old=3624408%40templately%2Ftags%2F3.7.1"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4e68b2f2-12e4-4ff2-919d-26d6b21acd03?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-434"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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