FKIE_CVE-2026-44663

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-18 21:16 - Updated: 2026-06-18 21:16
Severity
6.1 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Summary
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, an integer overflow in ht_undo_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_ht.cpp leads to a heap-buffer overflow when decoding a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file. decode->channels[i].width (int32_t) is multiplied by bytes_per_element in 32-bit signed arithmetic. With large widths (e.g., >= 536870912 for FLOAT data), this overflows, producing a corrupted offset that is later used for pointer arithmetic and can cause a heap out-of-bounds write. The same unchecked multiplication pattern appears in two other HTJ2K paths (bytes-per-line accumulation and pixel-line pointer advancement). As with related CVE-2026-34378 through CVE-2026-34589 fixes in other codecs, validating only after the multiplication is too late because the value may already be overflowed. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/releases/tag/v3.4.12
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/security/advisories/GHSA-777r-f9x8-7r84
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "openexr",
          "vendor": "AcademySoftwareFoundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.4.0, \u003c 3.4.11"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, an integer overflow in ht_undo_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_ht.cpp leads to a heap-buffer overflow when decoding a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file. decode-\u003echannels[i].width (int32_t) is multiplied by bytes_per_element in 32-bit signed arithmetic. With large widths (e.g., \u003e= 536870912 for FLOAT data), this overflows, producing a corrupted offset that is later used for pointer arithmetic and can cause a heap out-of-bounds write. The same unchecked multiplication pattern appears in two other HTJ2K paths (bytes-per-line accumulation and pixel-line pointer advancement). As with related CVE-2026-34378 through CVE-2026-34589 fixes in other codecs, validating only after the multiplication is too late because the value may already be overflowed. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-44663",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-18T21:16:28.767",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.1,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-18T21:16:28.767",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/releases/tag/v3.4.12"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/security/advisories/GHSA-777r-f9x8-7r84"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-190"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}


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