FKIE_CVE-2026-47712

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-10 23:16 - Updated: 2026-06-11 15:21
Severity
3.3 (Low) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Summary
Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, \, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit\u0027s subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \\), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f\"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch\"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git\u0027s format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to   porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against  os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject\u0027s first line contains /, \\, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-47712",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-11T15:21:07.370",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 3.3,
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-10T23:16:48.650",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}


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