FKIE_CVE-2026-54083
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-28 00:18 - Updated: 2026-08-28 20:18
Severity
Summary
Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. The ip-customblock active response script contains a path traversal vulnerability that lets an attacker create or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem as root. The script builds a file path by concatenating the srcip field taken from alert JSON directly onto the fixed /ipblock/ base directory, without validating that the value is a well-formed IP address. Because the extraction routine returns the raw string unchecked, an attacker who can trigger alert-matching log events with a crafted srcip containing ../ sequences can escape the base directory. The block action opens the resulting path in append mode, creating an empty file at an arbitrary location, while the unblock action passes it to remove(), deleting an arbitrary file; since the active response daemon runs as root, this includes sensitive files such as system credentials and Wazuh configuration. Unlike the sibling scripts host-deny.c, default-firewall-drop.c, and firewalld-drop.c, which reject non-IP input via get_ip_version(), ip-customblock.c omits this validation. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "wazuh",
"vendor": "wazuh",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.2.0, \u003c 4.14.7"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 5.0.0-alpha0, \u003c 5.0.0-beta3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. The \u00a0ip-customblock\u00a0 active response script contains a path traversal vulnerability that lets an attacker create or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem as root. The script builds a file path by concatenating the \u00a0srcip\u00a0 field taken from alert JSON directly onto the fixed \u00a0/ipblock/\u00a0 base directory, without validating that the value is a well-formed IP address. Because the extraction routine returns the raw string unchecked, an attacker who can trigger alert-matching log events with a crafted \u00a0srcip\u00a0 containing \u00a0../\u00a0 sequences can escape the base directory. The block action opens the resulting path in append mode, creating an empty file at an arbitrary location, while the unblock action passes it to remove(), deleting an arbitrary file; since the active response daemon runs as root, this includes sensitive files such as system credentials and Wazuh configuration. Unlike the sibling scripts host-deny.c, default-firewall-drop.c, and firewalld-drop.c, which reject non-IP input via get_ip_version(), ip-customblock.c omits this validation. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54083",
"lastModified": "2026-08-28T20:18:14.457",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-54083",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-28T17:38:53.135012Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-28T00:18:07.233",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/commit/e6ef99025b2ca4ba8003efb591c51545006bc2d4"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-m4mf-qmhf-8vj6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-22"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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