FKIE_CVE-2026-57079

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-30 12:16 - Updated: 2026-06-30 14:16
Severity
5.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Summary
Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.
References
9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441ehttps://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "Net-BitTorrent",
          "product": "Net::BitTorrent",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/Net/BitTorrent/Torrent.pm",
            "lib/Net/BitTorrent/Storage.pm",
            "lib/Net/BitTorrent/Storage/File.pm"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "Net::BitTorrent::Torrent::_on_metadata_received"
            },
            {
              "name": "Net::BitTorrent::Storage::add_file"
            },
            {
              "name": "Net::BitTorrent::Storage::_parse_file_tree"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm",
          "vendor": "SANKO",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "2.0.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.\n\nNet::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny\u0027s child() does not collapse \"..\". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing \"..\" segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.\n\nBecause the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-57079",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-30T14:16:28.377",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 5.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-57079",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-30T13:52:00.535187Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-30T12:16:25.427",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "url": "https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


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