FKIE_CVE-2026-86465
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 09:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 20:18
Severity
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
Summary
Apache Airflow Akeyless provider: the Akeyless secrets backend's team-scope guard can be bypassed with a user-controlled key. In a multi-team deployment, a Dag author scoped to one team can supply a Variable key containing a path separator that causes the backend to resolve a secret belonging to a different team, because the lookup path is concatenated from an unvalidated key after the team-scoped lookup misses. The Execution API Variables route accepts a path-shaped key, so this is reachable from ordinary Dag code.
Affects multi-team deployments using the Akeyless secrets backend. Single-team deployments are not affected, as there is no cross-team boundary to cross. This is the same class as CVE-2026-68870, CVE-2026-68871 and CVE-2026-68872 in the Azure Key Vault, Yandex Lockbox and Amazon secrets backends.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-akeyless are recommended to upgrade to version 0.3.1 or later, which fixes the issue.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@apache.org | https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72646 | Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory | |
| security@apache.org | https://lists.apache.org/thread/vczt5xgqjv8ot8fpp1vdq3rmnfm50w0g | Mailing List, Vendor Advisory | |
| security@apache.org | https://lists.apache.org/thread/vczt5xgqjv8ot8fpp1vdq3rmnfm50w0g?users@airflow.apache.org | Mailing List, Vendor Advisory | |
| security@apache.org | https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68870 | Not Applicable | |
| security@apache.org | https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68871 | Not Applicable | |
| security@apache.org | https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68872 | Not Applicable |
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| apache | apache-airflow-providers-akeyless | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.python.org",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "apache-airflow-providers-akeyless",
"packageURL": "pkg:pypi/apache-airflow-providers-akeyless",
"product": "Apache Airflow Akeyless provider",
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.3.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:apache-airflow-providers-akeyless:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "2402A893-04B1-4CD3-B51E-04E7EB635E84",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.3.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Apache Airflow Akeyless provider: the Akeyless secrets backend\u0027s team-scope guard can be bypassed with a user-controlled key. In a multi-team deployment, a Dag author scoped to one team can supply a Variable key containing a path separator that causes the backend to resolve a secret belonging to a different team, because the lookup path is concatenated from an unvalidated key after the team-scoped lookup misses. The Execution API Variables route accepts a path-shaped key, so this is reachable from ordinary Dag code.\n\nAffects multi-team deployments using the Akeyless secrets backend. Single-team deployments are not affected, as there is no cross-team boundary to cross. This is the same class as CVE-2026-68870, CVE-2026-68871 and CVE-2026-68872 in the Azure Key Vault, Yandex Lockbox and Amazon secrets backends.\n\nUsers of apache-airflow-providers-akeyless are recommended to upgrade to version 0.3.1 or later, which fixes the issue."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-86465",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T20:18:50.343",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-86465",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-17T19:28:17.409208Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-16T09:17:07.197",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72646"
},
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Mailing List",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/vczt5xgqjv8ot8fpp1vdq3rmnfm50w0g"
},
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Mailing List",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/vczt5xgqjv8ot8fpp1vdq3rmnfm50w0g?users@airflow.apache.org"
},
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68870"
},
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68871"
},
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-68872"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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