FKIE_CVE-2026-92975

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-10 06:16 - Updated: 2026-10-10 06:16
Severity
8.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'support@groundhogg.io'` / `'help@groundhogg.io'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://github.com/groundhoggwp/groundhogg/commit/4b413aa6e
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L224
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L238
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L250
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L298
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L599
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c355658a-515a-48ed-a114-6a202e23e34b?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Groundhogg \u2014 CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation",
          "vendor": "trainingbusinesspros",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "4.8.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Groundhogg \u2014 CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants \u2014 `user_login` `\u0027groundhogg\u0027` and email addresses `\u0027support@groundhogg.io\u0027` / `\u0027help@groundhogg.io\u0027` \u2014 where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `\u0027groundhogg\u0027` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator \u2014 and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` \u2014 resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-92975",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-10T06:16:44.253",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-10T06:16:44.253",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/groundhoggwp/groundhogg/commit/4b413aa6e"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L224"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L238"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L250"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L298"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L599"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c355658a-515a-48ed-a114-6a202e23e34b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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