Vulnerability-Lookup

FKIE_CVE-2026-94404

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-21 14:17 - Updated: 2026-09-21 15:17

Severity

7.1 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

MISP has a security issue that could let an attacker change threat-intelligence data through a logged-in user’s browser without that user knowingly approving the change. The affected function did not properly enforce MISP’s usual protection against forged requests. Because of this, an attacker could create a malicious webpage that silently sends a request to MISP when visited by an authenticated user. If successful, the attacker could change details of an attribute, such as its value, type, category, comment, distribution settings, or related timestamps. The attack requires the victim to already be logged in to MISP and to visit an attacker-controlled page. The main impact is unauthorized modification of threat-intelligence data, which could lead to incorrect indicators, wrong classifications, or altered sharing settings and reduce confidence in the accuracy of the information stored in MISP. Version affected: <2.5.47

References

	URL	Tags
	5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8	https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/dfbae33f9

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "modules": [
            "AttributesController"
          ],
          "product": "MISP",
          "programFiles": [
            "app/Controller/AttributesController.php"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
          "vendor": "MISP",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.5.47",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "MISP has a security issue that could let an attacker change threat-intelligence data through a logged-in user\u2019s browser without that user knowingly approving the change.\n\nThe affected function did not properly enforce MISP\u2019s usual protection against forged requests. Because of this, an attacker could create a malicious webpage that silently sends a request to MISP when visited by an authenticated user.\n\nIf successful, the attacker could change details of an attribute, such as its value, type, category, comment, distribution settings, or related timestamps.\n\nThe attack requires the victim to already be logged in to MISP and to visit an attacker-controlled page.\n\nThe main impact is unauthorized modification of threat-intelligence data, which could lead to incorrect indicators, wrong classifications, or altered sharing settings and reduce confidence in the accuracy of the information stored in MISP.\n\nVersion affected: \u003c2.5.47"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-94404",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-21T15:17:40.073",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
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        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-94404",
          "options": [
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          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-21T14:34:58.261364Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
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  "published": "2026-09-21T14:17:31.203",
  "references": [
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      "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/dfbae33f9"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
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        {
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          "value": "CWE-352"
        }
      ],
      "source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-94404 (GCVE-0-2026-94404)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-21 13:50 – Updated: 2026-09-21 14:48

Title

MISP CSRF vulnerability allows unauthorized attribute modification

Summary

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-21 14:34 UTC

CWE

CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Assigner

CIRCL ENISA root

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/dfbae33f9	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
MISP	MISP	Affected: 0 , < 2.5.47 (semver)

Credits

Jeroen Pinoy iglocska Claude Opus 5 (1M context)

GCVE extensions

AI-generated Confidence: high Model qwen3.8:27b advisory bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02

AI involvement GCVE-BCP-05-X-01

Whole record AI-generated Review: review GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification

Model	Source	Identifier
qwen3.8:27b	ollama	`qwen3.8:27b`

Patch provenance GCVE-BCP-05-X-02

Generator: patch2vuln.py on 2026-09-21 13:38
Model: qwen3.8:27b
Input: https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/dfbae33f9.patch beb65b8daaa1…
Confidence: high

Commit	Subject	Patch SHA-256
`dfbae33f9a93`	fix: [security] Keep the CSRF check on the inline attribute	`beb65b8daaa1…`

Fix summary

The editField action is removed from the Security component's unlockedActions list and added to the _csrfTokenHeaderOnly array. This enforces CSRF token validation (accepted either in the X-CSRF-Token header or in the request body) while dropping only the field-hash check, which the existing AJAX callers (Overmind index and legacy inline forms) cannot satisfy. Legitimate callers are unaffected because they already transmit a valid CSRF token.

Patch summary

In app/Controller/AttributesController.php, the string 'editField' is added to the _csrfTokenHeaderOnly() call in beforeFilter(), enabling header-or-body CSRF token validation for that action. Simultaneously, the line adding 'editField' to $this->Security->unlockedActions[] is removed, so the action is no longer exempt from CSRF checks. A comment block is added explaining that both the Overmind index (token in X-CSRF-Token header) and legacy inline forms (token in body) already carry a valid token, so only the unsatisfiable field-hash check is dropped.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The attack is delivered over the network via a malicious web page. AC:L: Crafting a CSRF form is straightforward and requires no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: The target MISP instance is not under the attacker's control. PR:N: The attacker needs no account on MISP; the victim's existing session is sufficient. UI:P: The victim must passively load the attacker's page (e.g., visit a link), which triggers the auto-submitting form; no explicit click or form submission by the victim is required. VC:N: The attack modifies data but does not disclose confidential information. VI:H: The attacker can alter attribute values, types, categories, distribution, and timestamps, corrupting threat-intelligence data for all users. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact is indicated. SC/SI/SA:N: No secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.

Weakness rationale

CWE-352 The editField action was placed in unlockedActions, which explicitly bypassed the CSRF token check. This allowed a cross-site form post to modify attribute data using only the victim's session cookie, a textbook CSRF weakness.

Attack pattern rationale

CAPEC-124 The patch description explicitly states that a cross-site form post carrying the victim's session cookie could rewrite attribute fields. This is the canonical CSRF attack pattern: an attacker induces a victim's browser to send an authenticated request to a target application without the victim's knowledge or consent. CAPEC-124 is the most direct and specific match.

Assumptions to verify

The affected version range is inferred from the tag_version_boundary (v2.5.47 with 7 commits after the fix); no explicit 'affected' or 'fixed' version strings are provided in the metadata, so the exact version boundary is approximate.
UI:P (Passive) is assumed because the commit message describes a 'cross-site form post' that auto-submits when the victim's browser loads the attacker's page; if the attack requires the victim to explicitly click a link or submit a form, UI:A would be more appropriate.
PR:N is assumed because the attacker does not need their own MISP account; the victim's authenticated session cookie is sufficient. If MISP deployments require additional authentication factors (e.g., MFA) that would block a cross-site form post, the effective exploitability may be lower.
The CAPEC-124 mapping is the closest standard pattern for CSRF; no more specific CAPEC exists for the CakePHP unlockedActions bypass mechanism.
The Co-Authored-By AI tool is included as a 'tool' credit based on explicit commit metadata; it is not a human contributor.

Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model	Score	Agreement	Confidence	Assumptions
`qwen3.8:27b`	6	9	high	5

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T14:48:16.245Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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