FKIE_CVE-2026-97644

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-03 04:18 - Updated: 2026-10-03 16:16
Severity
8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v3/contacts-api.php#L373
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v4/emails-api.php#L571
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/db/contacts.php#L205
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/main-roles.php#L532
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/replacements.php#L2280
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/rewrites.php#L460
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3724910/groundhogg/trunk/api/v3/contacts-api.php
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&new=3724910%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9.1&old=3724058%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/557306b7-7b66-465e-8d4d-ebae5b1577c9?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Groundhogg \u2014 CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation",
          "vendor": "trainingbusinesspros",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "4.9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Groundhogg \u2014 CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload \u2014 including the security-bearing `user_id` column \u2014 into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator\u0027s user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) \u2014 also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability \u2014 to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-97644",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-03T16:16:49.700",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-97644",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-03T15:33:36.949763Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-03T04:18:04.917",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v3/contacts-api.php#L373"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v4/emails-api.php#L571"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/db/contacts.php#L205"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/main-roles.php#L532"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/replacements.php#L2280"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/rewrites.php#L460"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3724910/groundhogg/trunk/api/v3/contacts-api.php"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3724910%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9.1\u0026old=3724058%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/557306b7-7b66-465e-8d4d-ebae5b1577c9?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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