FKIE_CVE-2026-98366
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD
rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then
validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument:
if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
rxe_put(old_pd);
rxe_get(pd);
mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd;
}
if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
if (access & ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR)
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
mr->access = access;
}
Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is
IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access
check with mr->ibmr.pd already reassigned.
mr->ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd->usecnt only on the
success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error
without undoing the reassignment, so mr->pd == new_pd while the usecnts
still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements
new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references
it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup()
writes to freed memory:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591
__rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200
__rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370
rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80
Allocated by task 591:
ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540
Freed by task 591:
ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210
uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0
ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0
Validate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either
applies every requested change or none.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "08f12745cb72981aa2cabe214af0c7a42a856f0a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "544c7f62cf32db2bd358f1e8a40a98bf98fa2a5c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7230cc456d4bb2221c20c5f1d22b38b8576aa16f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "544c7f62cf32db2bd358f1e8a40a98bf98fa2a5c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fe602c91a52e161ace4afd5bdb8f33270c554c6f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "544c7f62cf32db2bd358f1e8a40a98bf98fa2a5c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4dd7a53f1c5b44693c26dac4b9b5bd5bb9d604c8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "544c7f62cf32db2bd358f1e8a40a98bf98fa2a5c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ae36a5b609ae79f4de966328b78d2584be9719a4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "544c7f62cf32db2bd358f1e8a40a98bf98fa2a5c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR\u0027s PD\n\nrxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr-\u003eibmr.pd first and only then\nvalidates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument:\n\n\tif (flags \u0026 IB_MR_REREG_PD) {\n\t\trxe_put(old_pd);\n\t\trxe_get(pd);\n\t\tmr-\u003eibmr.pd = ibpd;\n\t}\n\n\tif (flags \u0026 IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {\n\t\tif (access \u0026 ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR)\n\t\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);\n\t\tmr-\u003eaccess = access;\n\t}\n\nBoth flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is\nIB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access\ncheck with mr-\u003eibmr.pd already reassigned.\n\nmr-\u003eibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd-\u003eusecnt only on the\nsuccess path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error\nwithout undoing the reassignment, so mr-\u003epd == new_pd while the usecnts\nstill charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements\nnew_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references\nit; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup()\nwrites to freed memory:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591\n __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0\n rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200\n __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370\n rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80\n Allocated by task 591:\n ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540\n Freed by task 591:\n ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210\n uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0\n ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0\n\nValidate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either\napplies every requested change or none."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98366",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:30.823",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:30.823",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08f12745cb72981aa2cabe214af0c7a42a856f0a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dd7a53f1c5b44693c26dac4b9b5bd5bb9d604c8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7230cc456d4bb2221c20c5f1d22b38b8576aa16f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae36a5b609ae79f4de966328b78d2584be9719a4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe602c91a52e161ace4afd5bdb8f33270c554c6f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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