GHSA-2MG2-P7R7-G27F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 21:06 – Updated: 2026-07-06 21:06
VLAI
Summary
Coder: Zip upload decompression lacks aggregate size limit, enabling denial of service
Details

Summary

POST /api/v2/files converts zip uploads to tar in memory via CreateTarFromZip, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer.

Note: Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service).

Impact

An authenticated user could upload a zip within the 100 MiB upload limit but containing many highly compressible entries whose decompressed size exhausted memory, crashing coderd before any RBAC check. Repeated requests could keep the service unavailable. This is a denial of service; it does not allow data disclosure or code execution.

Patches

The fix adds a metadata preflight check that sums projected entry sizes and a streaming writer that enforces the aggregate limit during decompression.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line Patched version
2.34 v2.34.2
2.33 v2.33.8
2.32 v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR) v2.29.17

Workarounds

Restrict file-upload permissions to trusted users or place a reverse proxy with request-body size limits in front of coderd.

Resources

  • Fix: #25877

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22438) for independently disclosing this issue!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.29.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55078"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T21:06:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`POST /api/v2/files` converts zip uploads to tar in memory via `CreateTarFromZip`, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service).\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user could upload a zip within the 100 MiB upload limit but containing many highly compressible entries whose decompressed size exhausted memory, crashing `coderd` before any RBAC check. Repeated requests could keep the service unavailable. This is a denial of service; it does not allow data disclosure or code execution.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix adds a metadata preflight check that sums projected entry sizes and a streaming writer that enforces the aggregate limit during decompression.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |\n| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict file-upload permissions to trusted users or place a reverse proxy with request-body size limits in front of `coderd`.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Fix: #25877\n\n### Credits\n\nCoder would like to thank Anthropic\u0027s Security Team (ANT-2026-22438) for independently disclosing this issue!",
  "id": "GHSA-2mg2-p7r7-g27f",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T21:06:45Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T21:06:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-2mg2-p7r7-g27f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25877"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Coder: Zip upload decompression lacks aggregate size limit, enabling denial of service"
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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