GHSA-2QJ4-MMR9-4V2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 17:50 – Updated: 2026-08-17 17:50Summary
SctpMessageCompletionHandler does not limit the total size of buffered fragments, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause an OutOfMemoryError by sending large SCTP fragments.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.sctp.SctpMessageCompletionHandler buffers fragments for incomplete SCTP messages. The fix for CVE-2026-46340 fixed unbounded memory growth by introducing limits on the number of concurrent incomplete messages (maxIncompleteSctpMessages) and the number of fragments per message (maxFragments).
While the count of fragments is now bounded, the handler still does not enforce a maximum size in bytes.
With the default limits of 128 messages and 128 fragments, and a typical max SCTP chunk size of 64KB, an attacker can consume up to ~1GB per connection. By opening a small number of concurrent connections, an attacker can easily exhaust the server's memory, causing an OutOfMemoryError.
Impact
Memory Exhaustion. Any application using Netty's SCTP transport with SctpMessageCompletionHandler is impacted.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.16.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-transport-sctp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.17.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.136.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-transport-sctp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.137.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T17:50:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSctpMessageCompletionHandler does not limit the total size of buffered fragments, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause an OutOfMemoryError by sending large SCTP fragments.\n\n### Details\n`io.netty.handler.codec.sctp.SctpMessageCompletionHandler` buffers fragments for incomplete SCTP messages. The fix for CVE-2026-46340 fixed unbounded memory growth by introducing limits on the number of concurrent incomplete messages (maxIncompleteSctpMessages) and the number of fragments per message (maxFragments).\n\nWhile the count of fragments is now bounded, the handler still does not enforce a maximum size in bytes.\n\nWith the default limits of 128 messages and 128 fragments, and a typical max SCTP chunk size of 64KB, an attacker can consume up to ~1GB per connection. By opening a small number of concurrent connections, an attacker can easily exhaust the server\u0027s memory, causing an OutOfMemoryError.\n\n### Impact\nMemory Exhaustion. Any application using Netty\u0027s SCTP transport with SctpMessageCompletionHandler is impacted.",
"id": "GHSA-2qj4-mmr9-4v2f",
"modified": "2026-08-17T17:50:49Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T17:50:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-2qj4-mmr9-4v2f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/17213"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/pull/17217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/1b5abc6443b63726c72cdd285af2feb7ddbb8ff7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.137.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.17.Final"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty: Memory Exhaustion in SctpMessageCompletionHandler"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.