GHSA-2QVG-QR73-MQXP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 13:35 – Updated: 2026-08-17 13:35Impact
Versions of conflibot before 1.2.1 build git commands by string interpolation and run them through a shell. Several of the interpolated values are pull request branch names (head.ref), which are attacker-controlled: anyone can open a pull request (including from a fork) whose head branch name contains shell metacharacters such as `, $( ), ;, |, or &.
The recommended workflow runs conflibot on the pull_request_target event, where the job has access to the base repository's secrets and a write-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN. As a result, a crafted branch name causes arbitrary command execution on the runner with that write token in the environment, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate secrets and the token, push to the repository, or otherwise abuse the token's permissions. No special privileges and no maintainer interaction are required — the action runs automatically when the pull request is opened.
Affected configurations
Any workflow using wktk/conflibot at a version earlier than 1.2.1. The risk is highest under pull_request_target (the documented configuration), because that is where the write token and secrets are exposed to attacker-influenced refs.
Patches
Fixed in 1.2.1 and 2.0.0. All git invocations now use argument arrays via execFile/spawn instead of a shell, so branch names can no longer be interpreted as shell syntax, and pull requests are referenced by number through refs/pull/<n>/head rather than by branch name.
Workarounds
There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions. Upgrade to wktk/conflibot@v2. On GitHub-hosted runners this is a drop-in upgrade; self-hosted runners additionally need Node.js 24 support and git 2.38 or later.
Resources
- Fix (v2.0.0): https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/0107ac6
- Fix (v1.2.1): https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/59e255c
- Releases: https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v2.0.0 and https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v1.2.1
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "GitHub Actions",
"name": "wktk/conflibot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55158"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T13:35:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nVersions of conflibot before `1.2.1` build `git` commands by string interpolation and run them through a shell. Several of the interpolated values are pull request branch names (`head.ref`), which are attacker-controlled: anyone can open a pull request (including from a fork) whose head branch name contains shell metacharacters such as `` ` ``, `$( )`, `;`, `|`, or `\u0026`.\n\nThe recommended workflow runs conflibot on the `pull_request_target` event, where the job has access to the base repository\u0027s secrets and a write-scoped `GITHUB_TOKEN`. As a result, a crafted branch name causes arbitrary command execution on the runner with that write token in the environment, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate secrets and the token, push to the repository, or otherwise abuse the token\u0027s permissions. No special privileges and no maintainer interaction are required \u2014 the action runs automatically when the pull request is opened.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nAny workflow using `wktk/conflibot` at a version earlier than `1.2.1`. The risk is highest under `pull_request_target` (the documented configuration), because that is where the write token and secrets are exposed to attacker-influenced refs.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `1.2.1` and `2.0.0`. All `git` invocations now use argument arrays via `execFile`/`spawn` instead of a shell, so branch names can no longer be interpreted as shell syntax, and pull requests are referenced by number through `refs/pull/\u003cn\u003e/head` rather than by branch name.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions. Upgrade to `wktk/conflibot@v2`. On GitHub-hosted runners this is a drop-in upgrade; self-hosted runners additionally need Node.js 24 support and git 2.38 or later.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Fix (v2.0.0): https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/0107ac6\n- Fix (v1.2.1): https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/59e255c\n- Releases: https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v2.0.0 and https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v1.2.1",
"id": "GHSA-2qvg-qr73-mqxp",
"modified": "2026-08-17T13:35:07Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T13:35:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/security/advisories/GHSA-2qvg-qr73-mqxp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/0107ac6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/59e255c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wktk/conflibot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v1.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "conflibot vulnerable to command injection via crafted pull request branch names under pull_request_target"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.