GHSA-2WXC-X7RJ-HG8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 15:34 – Updated: 2026-08-26 15:34| Product | asyncssh (all versions through 2.23.0) |
| Related | CVE-2019-6111 (same class in OpenSSH) |
| Fix | AsyncSSH 2.23.1 |
A malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client's filesystem by sending filenames containing ../ traversal sequences. The SCP receive path does not currently sanitize server-provided filenames. By chaining directory traversals via the D (directory) action, an attacker can escape any target directory and overwrite ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/rc, or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, achieving code execution. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2019-6111. The mitigation applied in OpenSSH does not appear to have been adopted in asyncssh.
Steps to exploit:
Step 1 - Normal usage: Application calls await asyncssh.scp((conn, 'file'), '/home/user/downloads/'). This is the standard, documented API.
Step 2 - SCP protocol: asyncssh opens an SSH exec channel, runs scp -f file. The server controls the filename field:
C0644 100 ../pwned.txt\n (simple traversal)
D0755 0 ..\n (traverse up, repeat as needed)
C0644 47 .bashrc\n (write payload)
E\n
Step 3 - _parse_cd_args (scp.py:134-142) returns the filename verbatim:
def _parse_cd_args(args: bytes) -> Tuple[int, int, bytes]:
permissions, size, name = args.split(None, 2)
return int(permissions, 8), int(size), name # no sanitization
The returned name is not passed through basename() and is not checked for .. or / components.
Step 4 - _recv_files (scp.py:706-713) joins the unsanitized name:
new_dstpath = posixpath.join(dstpath, name)
With dstpath=b'/home/user/downloads/subdir' and name=b'../pwned.txt', this resolves to /home/user/downloads/pwned.txt, outside the target.
Step 5 - File write: _recv_file opens the traversed path via self._fs.open(dstpath, 'wb') and writes attacker-controlled content. The resolved path is not checked against the target directory boundary.
Step 6 - RCE chains:
| Target | Execution trigger | Reliability |
|---|---|---|
~/.bashrc |
Next terminal open | High |
~/.profile |
Next login | High |
~/.ssh/rc |
Next SSH connection (requires sshd) | High |
~/.ssh/authorized_keys |
Attacker logs in with command= |
Medium |
Reproduction:
Link to reproduction script: path_traversal_poc.zip
docker build -t asyncssh-scp-traversal -f Dockerfile .
docker run --rm asyncssh-scp-traversal
The attached poc_scp_traversal.py starts a malicious SSH server in-process using asyncssh's own API, then downloads from it via asyncssh.scp().
Expected Output:
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.23.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.23.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54591"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T15:34:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T21:16:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "| | |\n|---|---|\n| Product | asyncssh (all versions through 2.23.0) |\n| Related | CVE-2019-6111 (same class in OpenSSH) |\n| Fix | AsyncSSH 2.23.1 |\n\nA malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client\u0027s filesystem by sending filenames containing `../` traversal sequences. The SCP receive path does not currently sanitize server-provided filenames. By chaining directory traversals via the `D` (directory) action, an attacker can escape any target directory and overwrite `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/rc`, or `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, achieving code execution. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2019-6111. The mitigation applied in OpenSSH does not appear to have been adopted in asyncssh.\n\n---\n\n**Steps to exploit:**\n\n**Step 1 - Normal usage:** Application calls `await asyncssh.scp((conn, \u0027file\u0027), \u0027/home/user/downloads/\u0027)`. This is the standard, documented API.\n\n**Step 2 - SCP protocol:** asyncssh opens an SSH exec channel, runs `scp -f file`. The server controls the filename field:\n\n```\nC0644 100 ../pwned.txt\\n (simple traversal)\n\nD0755 0 ..\\n (traverse up, repeat as needed)\nC0644 47 .bashrc\\n (write payload)\nE\\n\n```\n\n**Step 3 - `_parse_cd_args`** (`scp.py:134-142`) returns the filename verbatim:\n\n```python\ndef _parse_cd_args(args: bytes) -\u003e Tuple[int, int, bytes]:\n permissions, size, name = args.split(None, 2)\n return int(permissions, 8), int(size), name # no sanitization\n```\n\nThe returned `name` is not passed through `basename()` and is not checked for `..` or `/` components.\n\n**Step 4 - `_recv_files`** (`scp.py:706-713`) joins the unsanitized name:\n\n```python\nnew_dstpath = posixpath.join(dstpath, name)\n```\n\nWith `dstpath=b\u0027/home/user/downloads/subdir\u0027` and `name=b\u0027../pwned.txt\u0027`, this resolves to `/home/user/downloads/pwned.txt`, outside the target.\n\n**Step 5 - File write:** `_recv_file` opens the traversed path via `self._fs.open(dstpath, \u0027wb\u0027)` and writes attacker-controlled content. The resolved path is not checked against the target directory boundary.\n\n**Step 6 - RCE chains:**\n\n| Target | Execution trigger | Reliability |\n|---|---|---|\n| `~/.bashrc` | Next terminal open | High |\n| `~/.profile` | Next login | High |\n| `~/.ssh/rc` | Next SSH connection (requires sshd) | High |\n| `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` | Attacker logs in with `command=` | Medium |\n\n---\n\n**Reproduction:**\n\nLink to reproduction script: [path_traversal_poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28160665/path_traversal_poc.zip)\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t asyncssh-scp-traversal -f Dockerfile .\ndocker run --rm asyncssh-scp-traversal\n```\n\nThe attached `poc_scp_traversal.py` starts a malicious SSH server in-process using asyncssh\u0027s own API, then downloads from it via `asyncssh.scp()`.\n\n*Expected Output:*\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1400\" height=\"815\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/496745e4-d11d-4ed8-bddd-d15dd13d1751\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-2wxc-x7rj-hg8f",
"modified": "2026-08-26T15:34:22Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T15:34:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-2wxc-x7rj-hg8f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54591"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/d730803b8e4e94c20c7580d90f94d1e05f9f58de"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/releases/tag/v2.23.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "asyncssh has SCP Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Write"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.