GHSA-365W-HQF6-VXFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 20:13 – Updated: 2026-09-23 21:03
VLAI
Summary
Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass, XSS, JS Execution
Details

Summary

Multiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.

Vulnerabilities

1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)

The output_path parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.

Fix: Added validate_output_path() restricting writes to CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic field_validator rejecting .. traversal sequences.

2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)

Webhook URLs in /crawl/job and /llm/job accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.

Fix: Added validate_webhook_url() with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit follow_redirects=False.

3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)

The monitor router was mounted without token_dep dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like /monitor/actions/cleanup) accessible without authentication.

Fix: Added dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)] to monitor router. Added explicit token check on WebSocket /monitor/ws endpoint.

4. Stored XSS in Monitor Dashboard (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1)

URLs and error messages rendered in the monitor dashboard via innerHTML without escaping, enabling stored XSS via crafted crawl URLs.

Fix: Server-side html.escape() on URL and error storage. Client-side escapeHtml() wrapper on all innerHTML template injections.

5. Arbitrary JavaScript Execution via /execute_js (CWE-94, CVSS 8.1)

The /execute_js endpoint accepts and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the server's browser with --disable-web-security enabled, combining arbitrary JS execution with SSRF capability.

Fix: Disabled by default via CRAWL4AI_EXECUTE_JS_ENABLED env var. Added SSRF blocklist on destination URL. Removed --disable-web-security from default browser args.

6. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key (CWE-798, CVSS 9.8)

The JWT signing key defaults to "mysecret" in the public source code, allowing anyone to forge valid authentication tokens.

Fix: Removed default value. Added startup validation rejecting weak/short secrets. Auto-generates ephemeral key when JWT enabled but no key set.

7. SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints /crawl, /md, /llm (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)

The primary crawl entry points (/crawl, /crawl/stream, /md, /llm) fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs with no destination validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services, Docker networks, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). A blocklist that only inspects the literal hostname is additionally bypassable via IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. [::ffff:169.254.169.254], [::ffff:10.0.0.1]), which resolve to the blocked private/metadata ranges but evade a naive string check.

Fix: Added URL destination validation on all crawl/md/llm entry points, reusing the SSRF blocklist (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata IPs and hostnames). IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are normalized to their IPv4 form before the blocklist check, closing the mapping bypass. raw:// URLs are skipped. Validation applies at request entry, not only at fetch time.

Workarounds

  1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)
  2. Set CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN to enable authentication
  3. Set a strong SECRET_KEY (min 32 chars) if using JWT
  4. Restrict network access to the Docker API

Credits

  • Jeongbean Jeon - file write, SSRF, monitor auth bypass, stored XSS
  • wulonchia - file write via output_path (independent report)
  • by111 (August829) - hardcoded JWT, eval in /config/dump, /execute_js, hook sandbox escape
  • secsys_codex - SSRF via /md, /crawl, /llm endpoints + IPv6-mapped IPv4 bypass (URL destination validation)
  • Velayutham Selvaraj (LinkedIn) - SSRF via missing host validation in validate_url_scheme (independent report)
  • IcySun & Yashon - SSRF, arbitrary file write, missing-auth-by-default, hook sandbox bypass via asyncio (independent report)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "crawl4ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56266"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-79",
      "CWE-798",
      "CWE-918",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T20:13:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:50Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nMultiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.\n\n### Vulnerabilities\n\n#### 1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)\n\nThe `output_path` parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.\n\n**Fix:** Added `validate_output_path()` restricting writes to `CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR` (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic `field_validator` rejecting `..` traversal sequences.\n\n#### 2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)\n\nWebhook URLs in `/crawl/job` and `/llm/job` accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.\n\n**Fix:** Added `validate_webhook_url()` with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit `follow_redirects=False`.\n\n#### 3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)\n\nThe monitor router was mounted without `token_dep` dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like `/monitor/actions/cleanup`) accessible without authentication.\n\n**Fix:** Added `dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)]` to monitor router. Added explicit token check on WebSocket `/monitor/ws` endpoint.\n\n#### 4. Stored XSS in Monitor Dashboard (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1)\n\nURLs and error messages rendered in the monitor dashboard via `innerHTML` without escaping, enabling stored XSS via crafted crawl URLs.\n\n**Fix:** Server-side `html.escape()` on URL and error storage. Client-side `escapeHtml()` wrapper on all `innerHTML` template injections.\n\n#### 5. Arbitrary JavaScript Execution via /execute_js (CWE-94, CVSS 8.1)\n\nThe `/execute_js` endpoint accepts and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the server\u0027s browser with `--disable-web-security` enabled, combining arbitrary JS execution with SSRF capability.\n\n**Fix:** Disabled by default via `CRAWL4AI_EXECUTE_JS_ENABLED` env var. Added SSRF blocklist on destination URL. Removed `--disable-web-security` from default browser args.\n\n#### 6. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key (CWE-798, CVSS 9.8)\n\nThe JWT signing key defaults to `\"mysecret\"` in the public source code, allowing anyone to forge valid authentication tokens.\n\n**Fix:** Removed default value. Added startup validation rejecting weak/short secrets. Auto-generates ephemeral key when JWT enabled but no key set.\n\n#### 7. SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints /crawl, /md, /llm (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)\n\nThe primary crawl entry points (`/crawl`, `/crawl/stream`, `/md`, `/llm`) fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs with no destination validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services, Docker networks, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). A blocklist that only inspects the literal hostname is additionally bypassable via IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`), which resolve to the blocked private/metadata ranges but evade a naive string check.\n\n**Fix:** Added URL destination validation on all crawl/md/llm entry points, reusing the SSRF blocklist (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata IPs and hostnames). IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are normalized to their IPv4 form before the blocklist check, closing the mapping bypass. `raw://` URLs are skipped. Validation applies at request entry, not only at fetch time.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)\n2. Set `CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN` to enable authentication\n3. Set a strong `SECRET_KEY` (min 32 chars) if using JWT\n4. Restrict network access to the Docker API\n\n### Credits\n\n- Jeongbean Jeon - file write, SSRF, monitor auth bypass, stored XSS\n- wulonchia - file write via output_path (independent report)\n- by111 ([August829](https://github.com/August829)) - hardcoded JWT, eval in /config/dump, /execute_js, hook sandbox escape\n- secsys_codex - SSRF via /md, /crawl, /llm endpoints + IPv6-mapped IPv4 bypass (URL destination validation)\n- Velayutham Selvaraj ([LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/velayuthamselvaraj)) - SSRF via missing host validation in validate_url_scheme (independent report)\n- IcySun \u0026 Yashon - SSRF, arbitrary file write, missing-auth-by-default, hook sandbox bypass via asyncio (independent report)",
  "id": "GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg",
  "modified": "2026-09-23T21:03:22Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T20:13:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56266"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-unauthenticated-access-to-monitor-endpoints-via-docker-api-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-stored-cross-site-scripting-in-monitor-dashboard"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-server-side-request-forgery-via-webhook-urls"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-server-side-request-forgery-via-direct-crawl-endpoints"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-authentication-bypass-via-hardcoded-jwt-signing-key"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-arbitrary-javascript-execution-via-execute-js-endpoint"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-arbitrary-file-write-via-output-path-parameter"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-798.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-596.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-3449.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-3443.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-239.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-230.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-229.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrfj-6m49-wfmm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9hw-78q5-478g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g2pv-76hm-j4x9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f23g-2f38-gg94"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8qrg-7j2f-rf2h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-53rg-46cm-4g2v"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass, XSS, JS Execution"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…