GHSA-36MM-W85J-3Q2J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:08 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:08
VLAI
Summary
veraPDF Validation XXE via XFA
Details

Summary

Description An XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.

Details

The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java within the getdynamicRender() method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF's /AcroForm dictionary, decodes the embedded XML stream, and parses it to extract the <dynamicRender> element value.

The vulnerability stems from the use of a default-configured DocumentBuilderFactory to parse fully attacker-controlled XML:
- The factory is created via DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() with no security features enabled. disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities, external-parameter-entities, and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING are all left at their insecure defaults.
- The input passed to builder.parse() is the decoded /XFA stream taken directly from the untrusted PDF.
- The text content of the <dynamicRender> node is returned to the validation model. Note that the shipped PDF/UA-1 rule (dynamicRender != 'required') consumes this value but does not echo it into the report output, so reliable exfiltration requires the out-of-band parameter-entity technique described under Impact rather than in-band reflection.

Impact

This impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module.

Successful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF against the PDF/UA-1 profile (or via flavour auto-detection on a PDF that declares PDF/UA-1 conformance), since getdynamicRender() is invoked by the dynamicRender != 'required' rule in the bundled PDF/UA-1 profile. No additional configuration or operator action is required.

Proposed Patch

Harden the DocumentBuilderFactory in validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.verapdf:validation-model"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.35"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.30.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.31.70"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.verapdf:validation-model"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.31.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.31.71"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.35"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.30.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.31.70"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.31.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.31.71"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54079"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-611"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:08:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary  \n  \n**Description**\nAn XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.  \n  \n## Details  \nThe vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` within the `getdynamicRender()` method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF\u0027s /AcroForm dictionary, decodes the embedded XML stream, and parses it to extract the `\u003cdynamicRender\u003e` element value.  \n  \nThe vulnerability stems from the use of a default-configured `DocumentBuilderFactory` to parse fully attacker-controlled XML:  \n- The factory is created via `DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance()` with no security features enabled. disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities, external-parameter-entities, and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING are all left at their insecure defaults.  \n- The input passed to `builder.parse()` is the decoded /XFA stream taken directly from the untrusted PDF.  \n- The text content of the `\u003cdynamicRender\u003e` node is returned to the validation model. Note that the shipped PDF/UA-1 rule (`dynamicRender != \u0027required\u0027`) consumes this value but does not echo it into the report output, so reliable exfiltration requires the out-of-band parameter-entity technique described under Impact rather than in-band reflection.  \n  \n## Impact  \n  \nThis impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module.  \n  \nSuccessful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF against the PDF/UA-1 profile (or via flavour auto-detection on a PDF that declares PDF/UA-1 conformance), since `getdynamicRender()` is invoked by the `dynamicRender != \u0027required\u0027` rule in the bundled PDF/UA-1 profile. No additional configuration or operator action is required.  \n    \n## Proposed Patch  \n  \nHarden the `DocumentBuilderFactory` in `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.",
  "id": "GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T15:08:17Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T15:08:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/security/advisories/GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/pull/730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/commit/94caa46c1a594512247fbd46c808edae39469542"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/commit/cacd9436d0de40b0e58cc7d2dbb06451619e61ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "veraPDF Validation XXE via XFA"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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