GHSA-3J4H-H3FP-VWWW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-17 21:24 – Updated: 2024-06-17 21:24Summary
Paying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight.
Details
Using blocking: true on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn't send a reply.
https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138
This is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after: https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L141 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L146
The best way to fix this is to check the payment status after an error, and when not sure, always consider a payment still in flight.
PoC
A very simple way to exploit this is: - Create a hold invoice - Pay the invoice with the LNbits server backed by an Eclair node, until it times out - Settle the hold invoice
Impact
This vulnerability can lead to a total loss of funds for the node backend.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lnbits"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.12.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-34694"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-754"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-17T21:24:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-14T15:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPaying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight.\n\n### Details\n\nUsing `blocking: true` on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: `Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn\u0027t send a reply.`\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138\n\nThis is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after:\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L141\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L146\n\nThe best way to fix this is to check the payment status after an error, and when not sure, always consider a payment still in flight.\n\n### PoC\n\nA very simple way to exploit this is:\n- Create a hold invoice\n- Pay the invoice with the LNbits server backed by an Eclair node, until it times out\n- Settle the hold invoice\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to a total loss of funds for the node backend.\n",
"id": "GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww",
"modified": "2024-06-17T21:24:18Z",
"published": "2024-06-17T21:24:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/security/advisories/GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34694"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LNbits improperly handles potential network and payment failures when using Eclair backend"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.